On 03 Feb 2013, at 19:58, Jason Resch wrote:

On Sun, Feb 3, 2013 at 11:02 AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:

On 01 Feb 2013, at 17:10, Jason Resch wrote:

Very nice post Bruno. I found your points convincing and informative.

Thanks Jason. I appreciate.

I really don't know what happens with John K Clark.

At least John K Clark answers mails, and the contradiction can be made public.
Some other people have not been so polite.

Is there any one on the list who understood Clark's point, and would like to defend it?

When I first saw the UDA I paused at step 3 as well, and raised the point on the list that both perspectives are experienced and that these experience could rightly be said to belong to the same person. I think you replied that Chalmers had said the same thing and also that he said it would imply that we are everyone. The notion of a universal self, however, is advanced and using it here at step 3 is in a sense "skipping ahead". I think the reasoning on duplicates eventually leads to the realization on the self, which John Clark may had already reached with his writing of short stories on the subject of duplicates. I think I know what he means when he says "I experience both", but he is using "I" in a different sense than you mean it. I think he is using "I" in the broad sense of the universal self rather than the immediacy of "here and now" and "what is it my mind presently has access to?" Like a split brain patient experiencing both sides of the screen, but one hemisphere of the brain not remembering the other hemisphere's experience, you could in the same sense say John Clark is presently experiencing both W and M, but suffers from the same amnesia/loss of access of a split brain patient.

Yes. Indeed. Someone (Lee) made a similar point, and i think agreed that this entails that we are already all the same person, like the same amoeba, or the universal self, but John did not reply when I asked him if that was his view. Then it is also not relevant for the first person indeterminacy as it concerns the next possible first person experience about the result of an experiment (like pushing on a button, and looking which city we feel to be).

Despite that I share this broad sense of self, I came to realize my problem with step 3 came down to.

Good. It is frequent that some people takes time to get the first person indeterminacy. I think most people eventually understand, but some people seems to be unable to acknowlegde it. I guess it is more a psychological problem than a problem of being able to reason or not.

What I find most surprising about John's position is that he can use "I" in the same sense you mean in the UDA when referring to many- worlds thought experiments, but he refuses to use it in that same sense when it comes to duplication in the UDA.

Yes. And he did become rather delirious when explaining to me and Quentin why. He introduced the non relevant distinction that in QM the doppelganger belongs to different universes, like if that could change the comp probability.

It is a bit sad as being open to the QM MWI is normally a big help to get the comp MDI (many dreams).

Also, he uses often the mind-brain identity thesis, which is already non sensical in MWI, and of course also in comp.

But the worst is in his tone, which does not reflect that he is willing to think on those matter seriously, so he does look like a sort of priest of the materialist dogma, and at the same time he is not, as he said he was open to the idea that arithmetic might be the basic reality. That's what is rather weird. To be continued ...



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