On 19 Mar 2013, at 17:34, Telmo Menezes wrote:
On Tue, Mar 19, 2013 at 5:05 PM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be>
wrote:
On 19 Mar 2013, at 16:52, Telmo Menezes wrote:
On Tue, Mar 19, 2013 at 2:06 AM, Russell Standish <li...@hpcoders.com.au
>
wrote:
On Mon, Mar 18, 2013 at 07:39:44PM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Hi Roger,
On 18 Mar 2013, at 12:48, Roger Clough wrote:
Since mind is an MQS or Multiple Quantum Superposition, it can
process information at the rate of a quantum computer.
Since you seem to talk philosophy, let me translate what you say
for our friends the scientists.
If we assume that mind is a Multiple Quantum Superposition, and if
we assume that mind can exploit those quantum superpositions to
process information, then the mind can process information at the
rate of a quantum computer.
That implication seems to me quite reasonable.
Test of the theory according to which a human mind is a Multiple
Quantum Superposition:
1) show me a human as good as a quantum computer for finding a
needle in a haystack.
2) Factorize 11111311111911111111511111111111121212111111111
Demonstrating these sorts of exponential speedups only falsifies
the
proposition that a human mind is an ordinary classical computer
(but
not COMP). It does not confirm in any way that a human mind
operates
as a quantum computer, since random oracles are another way of
bridging computational complexity classes.
We only need one idiot-savant to demonstrate this.
By contrast, being unable to demonstrate this scaling means - well
nothing
at all, actually.
I agree with Russell here.
More generally, I always disliked these evaluations of the
computational power of the human brain by the speed at which it
can do
arithmetics. It's quite possible that the brain is a computational
beast, but the "software" it runs is specialised in other things:
image pattern recognition, parsing semantic trees and so on.
Arithmetics is a recent and unnatural activity for the brain, so it
might very well have to be performed on top of inadequate and
expensive pre-existing machinery.
But QC is not just a speed scaling of computation. It is a
different way to
do some computation, some of which are just impossible to do in
"real time"
by a classical computer.
Good point, I didn't mean to imply the contrary.
OK.
So here the speed is of conceptual importance. If
my brain is a QC I can do a Fourier transform of the state of my
infinitely
many doppelgangers in some superposition states of myself, and this
gives
ways to confirm the quantum many-world in a less indirect way than
by doing
QM.
That would be a cool explanation for the feeling of deja-vu?
Cool, perhaps. Probable? I don't think so. There are classical
explanation of that phenomenon. Which one is correct I don't know.
My point to Russell was that a random oracle is less powerful than
a quantum
computer, even if the contrary is correct (a quantum computer can
simulate a
random oracle, in principle).
My point to Roger was just that it is doubtful that the brain is a
quantum
computer, for theoretical and experimental reason.
An hypothesis that fascinates me, though, is that it may have access
to sources of quantum randomness.
But we have access to the comp first indeterminacy, and comp explain
why it has to be quantum, and have some equivalent of the
randomization of phase, to eliminate the white rabbits.
I believe that randomness is related
to creativity.
No, randomness has not the redundancy which is the mark of creativity.
Post number (ith digit = 1 if phi_i(i) stops, and zero if not) is
creative, in the sense of Emil Post, and corresponds to the Turing
Universal.
Algorithmic randomness (the most random thing we can conceive, like
Chaitin's Omega, which is a compression of Post number, render it
useless.
randomness is useful, tough, for making the computation which can
develop some relation with it, like the quantum, having a winning
measure in the rize of the sharable physical laws.
But still, I tend to bet that creativity, if he can exploit it, is
still independent of it.
One of the things that always bothered me with Roger
Penrose's argument is that he considers a theoretical classical
computer, but real computers have random number generators* that
exploit non Turing-emulable sources of randomness.
Rarely. Only A qubit, or a self-duplication, can give true randomness,
but below my story in the building I work, they work precisely on how
to make a qubit such that a measurement would be provably random, but
even just that is technically quite challenging.
This has
non-trivial implications, and anyone who played with evolutionary
computation / alife will probably agree.
In the UD, we are, in principle dependent on *all* oracles, not just
the random one. There are many oracles. I doubt that they play a role
other than the halting oracle (time, somehow) and the random oracle,
but who knows ...
* even pseudo-number generators can be seeded by the clock time, for
example
That would change nothing in UDA and AUDA. If the brain is a quantum
computer, it would only mean something on the lowness of the comp
substitution level, and a more complex back and forth between the
Turing
emulable and the first person indeterminacy (Turing recoverable
from the
indeterminacy on the whole UD*).
Sure, I did not assume that the brain as a QC would pose a problem
to COMP.
OK. In Z1*, the arithmetical quantization gives hope to show that all
machines, having deep histories, are related to a quantum computer, or
a totally linear bottom, but their freedom and creativity seems to be
the product of a classical computer emerging from those quantum (or
FPPI) computations. FPPI = first person plural indeterminacy
computations).
Best,
Bruno
Bruno
--
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Principal, High Performance Coders
Visiting Professor of Mathematics hpco...@hpcoders.com.au
University of New South Wales http://www.hpcoders.com.au
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