On 21 Mar 2013, at 13:46, Telmo Menezes wrote:
On Tue, Mar 19, 2013 at 6:08 PM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]>
wrote:
On 19 Mar 2013, at 17:34, Telmo Menezes wrote:
On Tue, Mar 19, 2013 at 5:05 PM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]>
wrote:
So here the speed is of conceptual importance. If
my brain is a QC I can do a Fourier transform of the state of my
infinitely
many doppelgangers in some superposition states of myself, and
this gives
ways to confirm the quantum many-world in a less indirect way
than by
doing
QM.
That would be a cool explanation for the feeling of deja-vu?
Cool, perhaps. Probable? I don't think so. There are classical
explanation
of that phenomenon. Which one is correct I don't know.
Agreed, I was 99% kidding.
No problem. I was 1% arguing :)
I believe that randomness is related
to creativity.
No, randomness has not the redundancy which is the mark of
creativity.
Post number (ith digit = 1 if phi_i(i) stops, and zero if not) is
creative,
in the sense of Emil Post, and corresponds to the Turing Universal.
Algorithmic randomness (the most random thing we can conceive, like
Chaitin's Omega, which is a compression of Post number, render it
useless.
randomness is useful, tough, for making the computation which can
develop
some relation with it, like the quantum, having a winning measure
in the
rize of the sharable physical laws.
But still, I tend to bet that creativity, if he can exploit it, is
still
independent of it.
I still find it hard to grasp how we could have a creative process
without some degree of random exploration.
Why random. Pseudo random can be enough, or the natural randomness
contained in the computable.
No machine can distinguish randomness from the behavior of a more
complex machine than herself, so I think that the kind of randomness
and indetermination that you invoke in creativity is already there, in
many form and shape in the computable.
The point I made is conceptual: what I say is that we don't need real
pure randomness. We have it by the first person indeterminacy, but its
role is more in the statistical stabilization of the computable than
used as a tool in creativity, fro which the computable is enough
random per se.
One of the things that always bothered me with Roger
Penrose's argument is that he considers a theoretical classical
computer, but real computers have random number generators* that
exploit non Turing-emulable sources of randomness.
Rarely. Only A qubit, or a self-duplication, can give true
randomness, but
below my story in the building I work, they work precisely on how
to make a
qubit such that a measurement would be provably random, but even
just that
is technically quite challenging.
Ok (I wish I had such neighbours). Still, even pseudo-random
generators seeded by clock time can provide you with a strem of
numbers that likely have very low correlation with the system you're
modelling, so random in a certain sense. I guess what humans call
creativity could just be a class of algorithms for which it's not
trivial to follow causality chains.
Indeed, and for free will it is the same, when a machine is looking at
herself and trying to take a decision in a situation with very partial
information, which is quickly the natural situation above some
threshold of complexity, with respect to the most probable local
Turing base.
Bruno
This has
non-trivial implications, and anyone who played with evolutionary
computation / alife will probably agree.
In the UD, we are, in principle dependent on *all* oracles, not
just the
random one. There are many oracles. I doubt that they play a role
other than
the halting oracle (time, somehow) and the random oracle, but who
knows ...
* even pseudo-number generators can be seeded by the clock time, for
example
That would change nothing in UDA and AUDA. If the brain is a
quantum
computer, it would only mean something on the lowness of the comp
substitution level, and a more complex back and forth between the
Turing
emulable and the first person indeterminacy (Turing recoverable
from the
indeterminacy on the whole UD*).
Sure, I did not assume that the brain as a QC would pose a problem
to
COMP.
OK. In Z1*, the arithmetical quantization gives hope to show that all
machines, having deep histories, are related to a quantum computer,
or a
totally linear bottom, but their freedom and creativity seems to be
the
product of a classical computer emerging from those quantum (or FPPI)
computations. FPPI = first person plural indeterminacy computations).
Best,
Bruno
Bruno
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