On 21 Mar 2013, at 13:46, Telmo Menezes wrote:

On Tue, Mar 19, 2013 at 6:08 PM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:

On 19 Mar 2013, at 17:34, Telmo Menezes wrote:

On Tue, Mar 19, 2013 at 5:05 PM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
So here the speed is of conceptual importance. If
my brain is a QC I can do a Fourier transform of the state of my
infinitely
many doppelgangers in some superposition states of myself, and this gives ways to confirm the quantum many-world in a less indirect way than by
doing
QM.


That would be a cool explanation for the feeling of deja-vu?


Cool, perhaps. Probable? I don't think so. There are classical explanation
of that phenomenon. Which one is correct I don't know.

Agreed, I was 99% kidding.

No problem. I was 1% arguing :)



I believe that randomness is related
to creativity.


No, randomness has not the redundancy which is the mark of creativity.

Post number (ith digit = 1 if phi_i(i) stops, and zero if not) is creative,
in the sense of Emil Post, and corresponds to the Turing Universal.

Algorithmic randomness (the most random thing we can conceive, like
Chaitin's Omega, which is a compression of Post number, render it useless.

randomness is useful, tough, for making the computation which can develop some relation with it, like the quantum, having a winning measure in the
rize of the sharable physical laws.

But still, I tend to bet that creativity, if he can exploit it, is still
independent of it.

I still find it hard to grasp how we could have a creative process
without some degree of random exploration.

Why random. Pseudo random can be enough, or the natural randomness contained in the computable. No machine can distinguish randomness from the behavior of a more complex machine than herself, so I think that the kind of randomness and indetermination that you invoke in creativity is already there, in many form and shape in the computable. The point I made is conceptual: what I say is that we don't need real pure randomness. We have it by the first person indeterminacy, but its role is more in the statistical stabilization of the computable than used as a tool in creativity, fro which the computable is enough random per se.









One of the things that always bothered me with Roger
Penrose's argument is that he considers a theoretical classical
computer, but real computers have random number generators* that
exploit non Turing-emulable sources of randomness.


Rarely. Only A qubit, or a self-duplication, can give true randomness, but below my story in the building I work, they work precisely on how to make a qubit such that a measurement would be provably random, but even just that
is technically quite challenging.

Ok (I wish I had such neighbours). Still, even pseudo-random
generators seeded by clock time can provide you with a strem of
numbers that likely have very low correlation with the system you're
modelling, so random in a certain sense. I guess what humans call
creativity could just be a class of algorithms for which it's not
trivial to follow causality chains.

Indeed, and for free will it is the same, when a machine is looking at herself and trying to take a decision in a situation with very partial information, which is quickly the natural situation above some threshold of complexity, with respect to the most probable local Turing base.

Bruno









This has
non-trivial implications, and anyone who played with evolutionary
computation / alife will probably agree.



In the UD, we are, in principle dependent on *all* oracles, not just the random one. There are many oracles. I doubt that they play a role other than the halting oracle (time, somehow) and the random oracle, but who knows ...






* even pseudo-number generators can be seeded by the clock time, for
example

That would change nothing in UDA and AUDA. If the brain is a quantum
computer, it would only mean something on the lowness of the comp
substitution level, and a more complex back and forth between the Turing emulable and the first person indeterminacy (Turing recoverable from the
indeterminacy on the whole UD*).


Sure, I did not assume that the brain as a QC would pose a problem to
COMP.


OK. In Z1*, the arithmetical quantization gives hope to show that all
machines, having deep histories, are related to a quantum computer, or a totally linear bottom, but their freedom and creativity seems to be the
product of a classical computer emerging from those quantum (or FPPI)
computations. FPPI = first person plural indeterminacy computations).
Best,

Bruno







Bruno







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