On Tue, Mar 19, 2013 at 6:08 PM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
>
> On 19 Mar 2013, at 17:34, Telmo Menezes wrote:
>
>> On Tue, Mar 19, 2013 at 5:05 PM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> On 19 Mar 2013, at 16:52, Telmo Menezes wrote:
>>>
>>>> On Tue, Mar 19, 2013 at 2:06 AM, Russell Standish
>>>> <li...@hpcoders.com.au>
>>>> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> On Mon, Mar 18, 2013 at 07:39:44PM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Hi Roger,
>>>>>>
>>>>>> On 18 Mar 2013, at 12:48, Roger Clough wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Since mind is an MQS or Multiple Quantum Superposition, it can
>>>>>>> process information at the rate of a quantum computer.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Since you seem to talk  philosophy, let me translate what you say
>>>>>> for our friends the scientists.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> If we assume that mind is a Multiple Quantum Superposition, and if
>>>>>> we assume that mind can exploit those quantum superpositions to
>>>>>> process information, then the mind can process information at the
>>>>>> rate of a quantum computer.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> That implication seems to me quite reasonable.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Test of the theory according to which a human mind is a Multiple
>>>>>> Quantum Superposition:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> 1) show me a human as good as a quantum computer for finding a
>>>>>> needle in a haystack.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> 2) Factorize 11111311111911111111511111111111121212111111111
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Demonstrating these sorts of exponential speedups only falsifies the
>>>>> proposition that a human mind is an ordinary classical computer (but
>>>>> not COMP). It does not confirm in any way that a human mind operates
>>>>> as a quantum computer, since random oracles are another way of
>>>>> bridging computational complexity classes.
>>>>>
>>>>> We only need one idiot-savant to demonstrate this.
>>>>>
>>>>> By contrast, being unable to demonstrate this scaling means - well
>>>>> nothing
>>>>> at all, actually.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> I agree with Russell here.
>>>>
>>>> More generally, I always disliked these evaluations of the
>>>> computational power of the human brain by the speed at which it can do
>>>> arithmetics. It's quite possible that the brain is a computational
>>>> beast, but the "software" it runs is specialised in other things:
>>>> image pattern recognition, parsing semantic trees and so on.
>>>> Arithmetics is a recent and unnatural activity for the brain, so it
>>>> might very well have to be performed on top of inadequate and
>>>> expensive pre-existing machinery.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> But QC is not just a speed scaling of computation. It is a different way
>>> to
>>> do some computation, some of which are just impossible to do in "real
>>> time"
>>> by a classical computer.
>>
>>
>> Good point, I didn't mean to imply the contrary.
>
>
> OK.
>
>
>
>
>>
>>> So here the speed is of conceptual importance. If
>>> my brain is a QC I can do a Fourier transform of the state of my
>>> infinitely
>>> many doppelgangers in some superposition states of myself, and this gives
>>> ways to confirm the quantum many-world in a less indirect way than by
>>> doing
>>> QM.
>>
>>
>> That would be a cool explanation for the feeling of deja-vu?
>
>
> Cool, perhaps. Probable? I don't think so. There are classical explanation
> of that phenomenon. Which one is correct I don't know.

Agreed, I was 99% kidding.

>
>
>
>>
>>> My point to Russell was that a random oracle is less powerful than a
>>> quantum
>>> computer, even if the contrary is correct (a quantum computer can
>>> simulate a
>>> random oracle, in principle).
>>>
>>> My point to Roger was just that it is doubtful that the brain is a
>>> quantum
>>> computer, for theoretical and experimental reason.
>>
>>
>> An hypothesis that fascinates me, though, is that it may have access
>> to sources of quantum randomness.
>
>
> But we have access to the comp first indeterminacy, and comp explain why it
> has to be quantum, and have some equivalent of the randomization of phase,
> to eliminate the white rabbits.
>
>
>
>
>
>> I believe that randomness is related
>> to creativity.
>
>
> No, randomness has not the redundancy which is the mark of creativity.
>
>  Post number (ith digit = 1 if phi_i(i) stops, and zero if not) is creative,
> in the sense of Emil Post, and corresponds to the Turing Universal.
>
> Algorithmic randomness (the most random thing we can conceive, like
> Chaitin's Omega, which is a compression of Post number, render it useless.
>
> randomness is useful, tough, for making the computation which can develop
> some relation with it, like the quantum, having a winning measure in the
> rize of the sharable physical laws.
>
> But still, I tend to bet that creativity, if he can exploit it, is still
> independent of it.

I still find it hard to grasp how we could have a creative process
without some degree of random exploration.

>
>
>
>
>
>> One of the things that always bothered me with Roger
>> Penrose's argument is that he considers a theoretical classical
>> computer, but real computers have random number generators* that
>> exploit non Turing-emulable sources of randomness.
>
>
> Rarely. Only A qubit, or a self-duplication, can give true randomness, but
> below my story in the building I work, they work precisely on how to make a
> qubit such that a measurement would be provably random, but even just that
> is technically quite challenging.

Ok (I wish I had such neighbours). Still, even pseudo-random
generators seeded by clock time can provide you with a strem of
numbers that likely have very low correlation with the system you're
modelling, so random in a certain sense. I guess what humans call
creativity could just be a class of algorithms for which it's not
trivial to follow causality chains.

>
>
>
>
>> This has
>> non-trivial implications, and anyone who played with evolutionary
>> computation / alife will probably agree.
>
>
>
> In the UD, we are, in principle dependent on *all* oracles, not just the
> random one. There are many oracles. I doubt that they play a role other than
> the halting oracle (time, somehow) and the random oracle, but who knows ...
>
>
>
>
>
>>
>> * even pseudo-number generators can be seeded by the clock time, for
>> example
>>
>>> That would change nothing in UDA and AUDA. If the brain is a quantum
>>> computer, it would only mean something on the lowness of the comp
>>> substitution level, and a more complex back and forth between the Turing
>>> emulable and the first person indeterminacy (Turing recoverable from the
>>> indeterminacy on the whole UD*).
>>
>>
>> Sure, I did not assume that the brain as a QC would pose a problem to
>> COMP.
>
>
> OK. In Z1*, the arithmetical quantization gives hope to show that all
> machines, having deep histories, are related to a quantum computer, or a
> totally linear bottom, but their freedom and creativity seems to be the
> product of a classical computer emerging from those quantum (or FPPI)
> computations. FPPI = first person plural indeterminacy computations).
> Best,
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
>
>
>
>>
>>> Bruno
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>> --
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> ----------------------------------------------------------------------------
>>>>> Prof Russell Standish                  Phone 0425 253119 (mobile)
>>>>> Principal, High Performance Coders
>>>>> Visiting Professor of Mathematics      hpco...@hpcoders.com.au
>>>>> University of New South Wales          http://www.hpcoders.com.au
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> ----------------------------------------------------------------------------
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>>>
>>> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
>>>
>>>
>>>
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>
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
>
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