On Tue, Mar 19, 2013 at 6:08 PM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote: > > On 19 Mar 2013, at 17:34, Telmo Menezes wrote: > >> On Tue, Mar 19, 2013 at 5:05 PM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote: >>> >>> >>> On 19 Mar 2013, at 16:52, Telmo Menezes wrote: >>> >>>> On Tue, Mar 19, 2013 at 2:06 AM, Russell Standish >>>> <[email protected]> >>>> wrote: >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On Mon, Mar 18, 2013 at 07:39:44PM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> Hi Roger, >>>>>> >>>>>> On 18 Mar 2013, at 12:48, Roger Clough wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Since mind is an MQS or Multiple Quantum Superposition, it can >>>>>>> process information at the rate of a quantum computer. >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> Since you seem to talk philosophy, let me translate what you say >>>>>> for our friends the scientists. >>>>>> >>>>>> If we assume that mind is a Multiple Quantum Superposition, and if >>>>>> we assume that mind can exploit those quantum superpositions to >>>>>> process information, then the mind can process information at the >>>>>> rate of a quantum computer. >>>>>> >>>>>> That implication seems to me quite reasonable. >>>>>> >>>>>> Test of the theory according to which a human mind is a Multiple >>>>>> Quantum Superposition: >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> 1) show me a human as good as a quantum computer for finding a >>>>>> needle in a haystack. >>>>>> >>>>>> 2) Factorize 11111311111911111111511111111111121212111111111 >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Demonstrating these sorts of exponential speedups only falsifies the >>>>> proposition that a human mind is an ordinary classical computer (but >>>>> not COMP). It does not confirm in any way that a human mind operates >>>>> as a quantum computer, since random oracles are another way of >>>>> bridging computational complexity classes. >>>>> >>>>> We only need one idiot-savant to demonstrate this. >>>>> >>>>> By contrast, being unable to demonstrate this scaling means - well >>>>> nothing >>>>> at all, actually. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> I agree with Russell here. >>>> >>>> More generally, I always disliked these evaluations of the >>>> computational power of the human brain by the speed at which it can do >>>> arithmetics. It's quite possible that the brain is a computational >>>> beast, but the "software" it runs is specialised in other things: >>>> image pattern recognition, parsing semantic trees and so on. >>>> Arithmetics is a recent and unnatural activity for the brain, so it >>>> might very well have to be performed on top of inadequate and >>>> expensive pre-existing machinery. >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> But QC is not just a speed scaling of computation. It is a different way >>> to >>> do some computation, some of which are just impossible to do in "real >>> time" >>> by a classical computer. >> >> >> Good point, I didn't mean to imply the contrary. > > > OK. > > > > >> >>> So here the speed is of conceptual importance. If >>> my brain is a QC I can do a Fourier transform of the state of my >>> infinitely >>> many doppelgangers in some superposition states of myself, and this gives >>> ways to confirm the quantum many-world in a less indirect way than by >>> doing >>> QM. >> >> >> That would be a cool explanation for the feeling of deja-vu? > > > Cool, perhaps. Probable? I don't think so. There are classical explanation > of that phenomenon. Which one is correct I don't know.
Agreed, I was 99% kidding. > > > >> >>> My point to Russell was that a random oracle is less powerful than a >>> quantum >>> computer, even if the contrary is correct (a quantum computer can >>> simulate a >>> random oracle, in principle). >>> >>> My point to Roger was just that it is doubtful that the brain is a >>> quantum >>> computer, for theoretical and experimental reason. >> >> >> An hypothesis that fascinates me, though, is that it may have access >> to sources of quantum randomness. > > > But we have access to the comp first indeterminacy, and comp explain why it > has to be quantum, and have some equivalent of the randomization of phase, > to eliminate the white rabbits. > > > > > >> I believe that randomness is related >> to creativity. > > > No, randomness has not the redundancy which is the mark of creativity. > > Post number (ith digit = 1 if phi_i(i) stops, and zero if not) is creative, > in the sense of Emil Post, and corresponds to the Turing Universal. > > Algorithmic randomness (the most random thing we can conceive, like > Chaitin's Omega, which is a compression of Post number, render it useless. > > randomness is useful, tough, for making the computation which can develop > some relation with it, like the quantum, having a winning measure in the > rize of the sharable physical laws. > > But still, I tend to bet that creativity, if he can exploit it, is still > independent of it. I still find it hard to grasp how we could have a creative process without some degree of random exploration. > > > > > >> One of the things that always bothered me with Roger >> Penrose's argument is that he considers a theoretical classical >> computer, but real computers have random number generators* that >> exploit non Turing-emulable sources of randomness. > > > Rarely. Only A qubit, or a self-duplication, can give true randomness, but > below my story in the building I work, they work precisely on how to make a > qubit such that a measurement would be provably random, but even just that > is technically quite challenging. Ok (I wish I had such neighbours). Still, even pseudo-random generators seeded by clock time can provide you with a strem of numbers that likely have very low correlation with the system you're modelling, so random in a certain sense. I guess what humans call creativity could just be a class of algorithms for which it's not trivial to follow causality chains. > > > > >> This has >> non-trivial implications, and anyone who played with evolutionary >> computation / alife will probably agree. > > > > In the UD, we are, in principle dependent on *all* oracles, not just the > random one. There are many oracles. I doubt that they play a role other than > the halting oracle (time, somehow) and the random oracle, but who knows ... > > > > > >> >> * even pseudo-number generators can be seeded by the clock time, for >> example >> >>> That would change nothing in UDA and AUDA. If the brain is a quantum >>> computer, it would only mean something on the lowness of the comp >>> substitution level, and a more complex back and forth between the Turing >>> emulable and the first person indeterminacy (Turing recoverable from the >>> indeterminacy on the whole UD*). >> >> >> Sure, I did not assume that the brain as a QC would pose a problem to >> COMP. > > > OK. In Z1*, the arithmetical quantization gives hope to show that all > machines, having deep histories, are related to a quantum computer, or a > totally linear bottom, but their freedom and creativity seems to be the > product of a classical computer emerging from those quantum (or FPPI) > computations. FPPI = first person plural indeterminacy computations). > Best, > > Bruno > > > > > > >> >>> Bruno >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>>> >>>> >>>>> -- >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- >>>>> Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) >>>>> Principal, High Performance Coders >>>>> Visiting Professor of Mathematics [email protected] >>>>> University of New South Wales http://www.hpcoders.com.au >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- >>>>> >>>>> -- >>>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>>>> Groups >>>>> "Everything List" group. >>>>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send >>>>> an >>>>> email to [email protected]. >>>>> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >>>>> Visit this group at >>>>> http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. >>>>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. >>>>> >>>>> >>>> >>>> -- >>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>>> Groups >>>> "Everything List" group. >>>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send >>>> an >>>> email to [email protected]. >>>> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >>>> Visit this group at >>>> http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. >>>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. >>>> >>>> >>> >>> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> -- >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >>> "Everything List" group. >>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >>> email to [email protected]. >>> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >>> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. >>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. >>> >>> >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to [email protected]. >> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. >> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. >> >> > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. > > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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