On Thursday, April 4, 2013 11:35:49 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> On 04 Apr 2013, at 15:47, Craig Weinberg wrote:
> > http://medicalxpress.com/news/2013-03-memories-death-real-reality.html
> > "Working together, researchers at the Coma Science Group (Directed
> > by Steven Laureys) and the University of Liège's Cognitive
> > Psychology Research (Professor Serge Brédart and Hedwige Dehon),
> > have looked into the memories of NDE with the hypothesis that if the
> > memories of NDE were pure products of the imagination, their
> > phenomenological characteristics (e.g., sensorial, self referential,
> > emotional, etc. details) should be closer to those of imagined
> > memories. Conversely, if the NDE are experienced in a way similar to
> > that of reality, their characteristics would be closer to the
> > memories of real events.
> > The researchers compared the responses provided by three groups of
> > patients, each of which had survived (in a different manner) a coma,
> > and a group of healthy volunteers. They studied the memories of NDE
> > and the memories of real events and imagined events with the help of
> > a questionnaire which evaluated the phenomenological characteristics
> > of the memories. The results were surprising. From the perspective
> > being studied, not only were the NDEs not similar to the memories of
> > imagined events, but the phenomenological characteristics inherent
> > to the memories of real events (e.g. memories of sensorial details)
> > are even more numerous in the memories of NDE than in the memories
> > of real events."
> > These results fully support a sense based model of physics. It makes
> > a falsifiable claim that if NDEs are dreams, then they should be
> > like all other dreams. While this could still mean that being close
> > to death gives you massively potent dream for some reason, it still
> > points to a universe where realism, matter, and public events are
> > derived from a universal foundation which is sensory rather than
> > logical.
> With comp, we already know that the physical is a construct of the
> mind (of the universal numbers),
I don't think that Comp tells us that we know the physical is a construct,
I think that it just tells us that certain computations imply the same
kinds of functions that we have derived from physics. Or else you are
saying that Comp = the assumption of arithmetic physics by definition.
> so your point here is precisely not
> valid. Indeed you seem to need some primary matter to distinguish the
> "sensory" based on carbon from the one which we could be based on
> silicon, or numbers.
No, the sensory is not matter. Carbon is a token which plays a role in the
molecular stories. Human stories evolved from other animal stories, which
evolved from biochemical stories, and so on. Silicon could have easily been
the token which led to organic stories, but it so happens that this time it
was not, and it may be that there can be only one organic story per
universe (because of the nature of significance as consolidation of
aesthetic superlatives. All competing branches on the tree must be cut for
the ultimate stories to be told).
> > Reality is the dream of eternity made temporarily public, not a
> > collection of objects making temporary illusions.
> The self-referentially correct universal machine agrees with this.
> 100%. It is not obvious at all, but that's what the UDA explains.
> On this you are more correct than many materialist, but you fit
> perfectly well with comp. That is why I find a bit sad that you insist
> that comp is false.
I don't mind that you insist that comp is true (or insist that it has not
been falsified), but I find it sad that you don't see the sensory-motive
basis of computation.
Keep in mind that, unlike what many are thinking,
> comp is incompatible with even very weak form of materialism. So much
> that physics should be entirely derivable from the global FPI on
> arithmetic. The math confirms this up to now, if we agree with some
> rather standard definition in the theory of knowledge.
I would expect that physics can be derived from arithmetic, but aesthetics
cannot be. Presence and participation cannot be.
> It would be interesting to see if some drug does not also produce more
> of the phenomenological characteristics inherent to the memories of
> real events. Now, I have not read those papers, and as you notice, it
> might only be more "potent dream".
> In fact, from the usual work on dreams, by Jouvet, LaBerge, Dement and
> Hobson, for example, what is striking, is the remarkable similarity of
> the REM brain states and the awake brain states, for diverse tasks
> (computing, singing, walking, moving arms, seeing color, etc.).
That makes sense in my view as the brain is the public interface of a
person. We are always dreaming, but the brain allows us to share the public
side of others dreams as well.
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