On Thursday, April 4, 2013 2:18:45 PM UTC-4, Brent wrote:
> On 4/4/2013 11:02 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
> On Thursday, April 4, 2013 12:11:36 PM UTC-4, Brent wrote:
>> On 4/4/2013 8:35 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> > On 04 Apr 2013, at 15:47, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>> >> http://medicalxpress.com/news/2013-03-memories-death-real-reality.html
>> >> "Working together, researchers at the Coma Science Group (Directed by
>> Steven Laureys)
>> >> and the University of Liï¿½ge's Cognitive Psychology Research
>> (Professor Serge Brï¿½dart
>> >> and Hedwige Dehon), have looked into the memories of NDE with the
>> hypothesis that if
>> >> the memories of NDE were pure products of the imagination, their
>> >> characteristics (e.g., sensorial, self referential, emotional, etc.
>> details) should be
>> >> closer to those of imagined memories. Conversely, if the NDE are
>> experienced in a way
>> >> similar to that of reality, their characteristics would be closer to
>> the memories of
>> >> real events.
>> >> The researchers compared the responses provided by three groups of
>> patients, each of
>> >> which had survived (in a different manner) a coma, and a group of
>> healthy volunteers.
>> >> They studied the memories of NDE and the memories of real events and
>> imagined events
>> >> with the help of a questionnaire which evaluated the phenomenological
>> >> of the memories. The results were surprising. From the perspective
>> being studied, not
>> >> only were the NDEs not similar to the memories of imagined events, but
>> >> phenomenological characteristics inherent to the memories of real
>> events (e.g. memories
>> >> of sensorial details) are even more numerous in the memories of NDE
>> than in the
>> >> memories of real events."
>> >> These results fully support a sense based model of physics. It makes a
>> >> claim that if NDEs are dreams, then they should be like all other
>> dreams. While this
>> >> could still mean that being close to death gives you massively potent
>> dream for some
>> >> reason, it still points to a universe where realism, matter, and
>> public events are
>> >> derived from a universal foundation which is sensory rather than
>> > With comp, we already know that the physical is a construct of the mind
>> (of the
>> > universal numbers), so your point here is precisely not valid. Indeed
>> you seem to need
>> > some primary matter to distinguish the "sensory" based on carbon from
>> the one which we
>> > could be based on silicon, or numbers.
>> >> Reality is the dream of eternity made temporarily public, not a
>> collection of objects
>> >> making temporary illusions.
>> > The self-referentially correct universal machine agrees with this.
>> 100%. It is not
>> > obvious at all, but that's what the UDA explains.
>> > On this you are more correct than many materialist, but you fit
>> perfectly well with
>> > comp. That is why I find a bit sad that you insist that comp is false.
>> Keep in mind
>> > that, unlike what many are thinking, comp is incompatible with even
>> very weak form of
>> > materialism. So much that physics should be entirely derivable from the
>> global FPI on
>> > arithmetic. The math confirms this up to now, if we agree with some
>> rather standard
>> > definition in the theory of knowledge.
>> > It would be interesting to see if some drug does not also produce more
>> of the
>> > phenomenological characteristics inherent to the memories of real
>> events. Now, I have
>> > not read those papers, and as you notice, it might only be more "potent
>> Dreams are not "pure products of imagination", and nobody has ever
>> suggested they were.
>> The researchers compared NDE reports to memories of real and imagined
>> events, not dreams.
>> But what does "memory of an imagined event" mean? It means the
>> researchers asked the
>> subjects to imagine remembering something that didn't happen. They
>> discovered that this
>> did not have as much sensory detail as the memories of real events and
>> NDEs. Dog bites man.
> But the memories of the NDEs are clearer than the real events. Common
> sense tells us that memories of imagined events or dreams would be less
> Common sense tells us that events that have a lot of emotional content
> (like being near death) are going to be remember in more detail.
Only if the events were real. A delirium could be very emotional but not
> That's why the researchers asked the subjects to remember real and
> imagined events that had emotional content. But how likely are they to
> have had an emotional event comparable to nearly dying?
The experience does not correspond to the events of dying in a hospital bed
though, they correspond to these elaborate journeys.
> And the real events were further in the past than the NDE. And as John
> Clark and others have pointed out the NDE stories never have any new
What does that mean? Part of the claims of NDEs are seeing verifiable
events in other parts of the hospital, etc.
> All of this is easily explained by assuming that experience is produced
> by the brain and NDEs are dreams that occur during trauma and/or lack to
That could be true, but if it were, wouldn't we expect that people would
have a fading memory of the detail like they would a nightmare? The whole
experiment suggests the contrary - hence why it is surprising and why I
posted it. The results indicate that your explanation is not really
supported by the data, and that whatever they experience could very likely
be as real or more real than corporeal realism.
> Sensory-motive theory would predict that experience is independent of
> those merely physical brains.
Sensory-motive theory predicts that experience is physical and that brains
are characters within that experience.
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