On 15 Apr 2013, at 15:27, Stephen Paul King wrote:
Hi Bruno,
Interleaving
On Mon, Apr 15, 2013 at 9:05 AM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]>
wrote:
On 14 Apr 2013, at 19:02, Stephen Paul King wrote:
Hi Bruno,
Unless we can explain how the *some first person plural
indeterminacy* obtains, it does not give a satisfactory explanation
of 'shared experience'.
Yes. Basically, getting the fits person plural is the same as
getting the physical laws.
OK, but could you be a bit more elaborative? We have already agreed
that our goal is to be able to derive 'physical laws', so we cannot
assume something equivalent to them (by your account!) without
explanation. I think that we get 1st person plurality by solving the
solipsism problem for numbers: How can a number distinguish its
dreams of itself and its dreams of not-itself?
It seems to me that you are right, in so far as, the necessity of
such, but I argue that that alone is insufficient. You might want
something like the axiom of choice
That is asking too much, as I have already explained. I don't assume
set theory.
Of course, I am not asking you to assume it. I am asking you to look
at how set theory seems to be necessary to obtain 1st person
plurality.
In some non comp theory, perhaps.
and foundation to force the collection of *some first person plural
indeterminacy* into a partition, but I argue that this is
equivalent to assuming that satistiability obtains for collections
of propositions automatically - something we know it false!
It is for this reason that I reject the timelessness of Platonism
and adopt a 'Process" view where Becoming is ontologically
fundamental and time is defined locally by the 1p measures of
observers.
You should convince Craig, not a computationalist, as UDA shows that
physical time is not primitive.
Bruno
I do not know what you mean by "physical time". The time you use
is the lexicographical ordering of numbers and does not refer to any
kind of 'change' as there is nothing that 'becomes' in Platonia,
everything just 'is'.
This is where our ways of thinking differ the most. I assume that
becoming is primitive (ontologically fundamental), pace Parmenides
and you agree with Parmenides and assume Being is primitive. Time
then is defined relative to an individual's measure of Becoming and
since there is no 'ultimate' observer in my ontology, there is no
primitive time eithe; there is only local times (plural) as there
must exist multiple observers as there necessarily exist multiple
measures of Becoming and Being. (Being is the equivalence class of
automorphisms of Becoming.)
Too much unclear, sorry. I have no idea of what you assume. You still
look like if you were defending some truth, which I do not.
Bruno
On Sun, Apr 14, 2013 at 12:33 PM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]>
wrote:
On 13 Apr 2013, at 15:17, Richard Ruquist wrote:
But Bruno,
because of the measure problem, MWI must also be probabilistic,
otherwise it does not agree with experiment.
The universal wave evolves deterministically, but *we* are in the
superposed and differentiating branches, so we feel like there is
an indeterminacy in the 3p sense, but without collapse, it is only
a first person indeterminacy of the same kind of comp (UDA step 3).
With comp, we are automatically in the superposed state brought by
the infinitely many universal numbers competing to generate our
state. Indeterminacy is predicted once we look around below our
substitution level.
The sharable experiment comes from some first person plural
indeterminacy.
Bruno
Richard
On Sat, Apr 13, 2013 at 7:10 AM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]>
wrote:
On 12 Apr 2013, at 03:30, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On Fri, Apr 12, 2013 at 5:35 AM, Craig Weinberg <[email protected]
> wrote:
On Thursday, April 11, 2013 3:29:51 PM UTC-4, John Clark wrote:
On Thu, Apr 11, 2013 Craig Weinberg <[email protected]> wrote:
If matter is deterministic, how could it behave in a random way?
It couldn't.
Are you saying then that matter is random, or that it is neither
random nor
deterministic?
Matter behaves randomly, but probability theory allows us to make
predictions about random events.
But with QM without collapse, matter does not behave randomly. The
SWE is deterministic.
We are multiplied, and the randomness comes from the first person
perspective.
Comp extends this. The SWE itself emerges from the first person
perspective of the person supervening on the arithmetical relation
defining computations.
Bruno
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