Hi Bruno, Unless we can explain how the *some first person plural indeterminacy* obtains, it does not give a satisfactory explanation of 'shared experience'. It seems to me that you are right, in so far as, the necessity of such, but I argue that that alone is insufficient. You might want something like the axiom of choice and foundation to force the collection of *some first person plural indeterminacy* into a partition, but I argue that this is equivalent to assuming that satistiability obtains for collections of propositions automatically - something we know it false! It is for this reason that I reject the timelessness of Platonism and adopt a 'Process" view where Becoming is ontologically fundamental and time is defined locally by the 1p measures of observers.
On Sun, Apr 14, 2013 at 12:33 PM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote: > > On 13 Apr 2013, at 15:17, Richard Ruquist wrote: > > But Bruno, > because of the measure problem, MWI must also be probabilistic, > otherwise it does not agree with experiment. > > > The universal wave evolves deterministically, but *we* are in the > superposed and differentiating branches, so we feel like there is an > indeterminacy in the 3p sense, but without collapse, it is only a first > person indeterminacy of the same kind of comp (UDA step 3). > > With comp, we are automatically in the superposed state brought by the > infinitely many universal numbers competing to generate our state. > Indeterminacy is predicted once we look around below our substitution level. > > The sharable experiment comes from some first person plural indeterminacy. > > Bruno > > > > Richard > > > On Sat, Apr 13, 2013 at 7:10 AM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote: > >> >> On 12 Apr 2013, at 03:30, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: >> >> On Fri, Apr 12, 2013 at 5:35 AM, Craig Weinberg <[email protected]> >>> wrote: >>> >>>> >>>> >>>> On Thursday, April 11, 2013 3:29:51 PM UTC-4, John Clark wrote: >>>> >>>>> >>>>> On Thu, Apr 11, 2013 Craig Weinberg <[email protected]> wrote: >>>>> >>>>> If matter is deterministic, how could it behave in a random way? >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> It couldn't. >>>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> Are you saying then that matter is random, or that it is neither random >>>> nor >>>> deterministic? >>>> >>> >>> Matter behaves randomly, but probability theory allows us to make >>> predictions about random events. >>> >> >> >> But with QM without collapse, matter does not behave randomly. The SWE is >> deterministic. >> We are multiplied, and the randomness comes from the first person >> perspective. >> Comp extends this. The SWE itself emerges from the first person >> perspective of the person supervening on the arithmetical relation defining >> computations. >> >> Bruno >> >> >> >> >> >>> >>> -- >>> Stathis Papaioannou >>> >>> >>> -- >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send >>> an email to >>> everything-list+unsubscribe@**googlegroups.com<everything-list%[email protected]> >>> . >>> To post to this group, send email to >>> everything-list@googlegroups.**com<[email protected]> >>> . >>> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/** >>> group/everything-list?hl=en<http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en> >>> . >>> For more options, visit >>> https://groups.google.com/**groups/opt_out<https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out> >>> . >>> >>> >>> >> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~**marchal/ <http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/> >> >> >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to >> everything-list+unsubscribe@**googlegroups.com<everything-list%[email protected]> >> . >> To post to this group, send email to >> everything-list@googlegroups.**com<[email protected]> >> . >> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/** >> group/everything-list?hl=en<http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en> >> . >> For more options, visit >> https://groups.google.com/**groups/opt_out<https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out> >> . >> >> >> > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. > > > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to a topic in the > Google Groups "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this topic, visit > https://groups.google.com/d/topic/everything-list/K7E-Vfwj4QU/unsubscribe?hl=en > . > To unsubscribe from this group and all its topics, send an email to > [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. > > > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
