On 14 Apr 2013, at 19:02, Stephen Paul King wrote:

Hi Bruno,

Unless we can explain how the *some first person plural indeterminacy* obtains, it does not give a satisfactory explanation of 'shared experience'.

Yes. Basically, getting the fits person plural is the same as getting the physical laws.



It seems to me that you are right, in so far as, the necessity of such, but I argue that that alone is insufficient. You might want something like the axiom of choice

That is asking too much, as I have already explained. I don't assume set theory.



and foundation to force the collection of *some first person plural indeterminacy* into a partition, but I argue that this is equivalent to assuming that satistiability obtains for collections of propositions automatically - something we know it false! It is for this reason that I reject the timelessness of Platonism and adopt a 'Process" view where Becoming is ontologically fundamental and time is defined locally by the 1p measures of observers.

You should convince Craig, not a computationalist, as UDA shows that physical time is not primitive.

Bruno





On Sun, Apr 14, 2013 at 12:33 PM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:

On 13 Apr 2013, at 15:17, Richard Ruquist wrote:

But Bruno,
because of the measure problem, MWI must also be probabilistic,
otherwise it does not agree with experiment.

The universal wave evolves deterministically, but *we* are in the superposed and differentiating branches, so we feel like there is an indeterminacy in the 3p sense, but without collapse, it is only a first person indeterminacy of the same kind of comp (UDA step 3).

With comp, we are automatically in the superposed state brought by the infinitely many universal numbers competing to generate our state. Indeterminacy is predicted once we look around below our substitution level.

The sharable experiment comes from some first person plural indeterminacy.

Bruno



Richard


On Sat, Apr 13, 2013 at 7:10 AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:

On 12 Apr 2013, at 03:30, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:

On Fri, Apr 12, 2013 at 5:35 AM, Craig Weinberg <whatsons...@gmail.com > wrote:


On Thursday, April 11, 2013 3:29:51 PM UTC-4, John Clark wrote:

On Thu, Apr 11, 2013 Craig Weinberg <whats...@gmail.com> wrote:

If matter is deterministic, how could it behave in a random way?


It couldn't.


Are you saying then that matter is random, or that it is neither random nor
deterministic?

Matter behaves randomly, but probability theory allows us to make
predictions about random events.


But with QM without collapse, matter does not behave randomly. The SWE is deterministic. We are multiplied, and the randomness comes from the first person perspective. Comp extends this. The SWE itself emerges from the first person perspective of the person supervening on the arithmetical relation defining computations.

Bruno






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