Hi Bruno,

Interleaving

On Mon, Apr 15, 2013 at 9:05 AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:

>
> On 14 Apr 2013, at 19:02, Stephen Paul King wrote:
>
> Hi Bruno,
>
> Unless we can explain how the *some first person plural indeterminacy* 
> obtains,
> it does not give a satisfactory explanation of 'shared experience'.
>
>
> Yes. Basically, getting the fits person plural is the same as getting the
> physical laws.
>
>
> OK, but could you be a bit more elaborative? We have already agreed that
our goal is to be able to derive 'physical laws', so we cannot assume
something equivalent to them (by your account!) without explanation. I
think that we get 1st person plurality by solving the solipsism problem for
numbers: How can a number distinguish its dreams of itself and its dreams
of not-itself?


>
> It seems to me that you are right, in so far as, the necessity of such,
> but I argue that that alone is insufficient. You might want something like
> the axiom of choice
>
>
> That is asking too much, as I have already explained. I don't assume set
> theory.
>

Of course, I am not asking you to assume it. I am asking you to look at how
set theory seems to be necessary to obtain 1st person plurality.

>
>
>
> and foundation to force the collection of *some first person plural
> indeterminacy* into a partition, but I argue that this is equivalent to
> assuming that satistiability obtains for collections of propositions
> automatically - something we know it false!
> It is for this reason that I reject the timelessness of Platonism and
> adopt a 'Process" view where Becoming is ontologically fundamental and time
> is defined locally by the 1p measures of observers.
>
>
> You should convince Craig, not a computationalist, as UDA shows that
> physical time is not primitive.
>
> Bruno
>
>
>   I do not know what you mean by "physical time". The time you use is
the lexicographical ordering of numbers and does not refer to any kind of
'change' as there is nothing that 'becomes' in Platonia, everything just
'is'.
  This is where our ways of thinking differ the most. I assume that
becoming is primitive (ontologically fundamental), pace Parmenides and you
agree with Parmenides and assume Being is primitive. Time then is defined
relative to an individual's measure of Becoming and since there is no
'ultimate' observer in my ontology, there is no primitive time eithe; there
is only local times (plural) as there must exist multiple observers as
there necessarily exist multiple measures of Becoming and Being. (Being is
the equivalence class of automorphisms of Becoming.)

>
>
>
> On Sun, Apr 14, 2013 at 12:33 PM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
>
>>
>> On 13 Apr 2013, at 15:17, Richard Ruquist wrote:
>>
>> But Bruno,
>> because of the measure problem, MWI must also be probabilistic,
>> otherwise it does not agree with experiment.
>>
>>
>> The universal wave evolves deterministically, but *we* are in the
>> superposed and differentiating branches, so we feel like there is an
>> indeterminacy in the 3p sense, but without collapse, it is only a first
>> person indeterminacy of the same kind of comp (UDA step 3).
>>
>> With comp, we are automatically in the superposed state brought by the
>> infinitely many universal numbers competing to generate our state.
>> Indeterminacy is predicted once we look around below our substitution level.
>>
>> The sharable experiment comes from some first person plural
>> indeterminacy.
>>
>> Bruno
>>
>>
>>
>> Richard
>>
>>
>> On Sat, Apr 13, 2013 at 7:10 AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
>>
>>>
>>> On 12 Apr 2013, at 03:30, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>>>
>>>  On Fri, Apr 12, 2013 at 5:35 AM, Craig Weinberg <whatsons...@gmail.com>
>>>> wrote:
>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> On Thursday, April 11, 2013 3:29:51 PM UTC-4, John Clark wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> On Thu, Apr 11, 2013 Craig Weinberg <whats...@gmail.com> wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>  If matter is deterministic, how could it behave in a random way?
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> It couldn't.
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Are you saying then that matter is random, or that it is neither
>>>>> random nor
>>>>> deterministic?
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Matter behaves randomly, but probability theory allows us to make
>>>> predictions about random events.
>>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> But with QM without collapse, matter does not behave randomly. The SWE
>>> is deterministic.
>>> We are multiplied, and the randomness comes from the first person
>>> perspective.
>>> Comp extends this. The SWE itself emerges from the first person
>>> perspective of the person supervening on the arithmetical relation defining
>>> computations.
>>>
>>> Bruno
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>>
>>>> --
>>>> Stathis Papaioannou
>>>>
>>>>
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