On 22 Apr 2013, at 18:18, Craig Weinberg wrote:

On Monday, April 22, 2013 10:05:17 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 22 Apr 2013, at 13:17, Craig Weinberg wrote:

> On Monday, April 22, 2013 4:56:08 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> On 21 Apr 2013, at 19:45, Craig Weinberg wrote:
> >
> >
> > On Sunday, April 21, 2013 9:20:21 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> >
> > On 20 Apr 2013, at 23:23, Craig Weinberg wrote:
> >
> >>
I agree, in theory, but that theory does not predict a universe in which anything is actually presented as a sensory experience.

Yes it does, through the logic of qualia. that is how it works (mainly the Bp & Dt & p) intensional varaint of Bp (Gödel's self-referential predicate).

A computation is a logical process

It is not. You need more than logic. You need some non logical axioms.

which, if it were truly substrate independent, would have no aesthetic qualities at all.

This what we ask you to provide an argument.

In reality however, that is not the case, and all computation supervenes eventually on some aesthetic presentation - either subjectively as cognition, or objectively as the positions of bodies relative to each other.

It is sufficient to
embed the map in the territory.

My entire point is that Comp does not give you any possibility of a territory. To the contrary, it demonstrates why territory is redundant.

On the contrary, the self-reference explains the rise of territories, topologies. Arithmetic, seen from inside, get complex structures, some sensible, some observable, some physical.

There will be a self-referential
point, which indicates its own localization. The same occur in
computer science, but is more technical to explain. It is what I have
studied and applied in the cognitive science.

It might be hard to explain it in computer science, but it's impossible to explain how it ever gets out of computer science. I don't doubt that self-reference provides a useful framework for analyzing and modeling cognition - the most useful model by far, but in all cases the idea of self-reference borrows on a pre-existing knowledge of self

No, the notion of self is well defined. See my amoeba planaria and dreaming machine paper. Or read a book on theoretical computer science.

to jump to the conclusion of awareness.

No, there is no jump. It is an non obvious reasoning, and it needs some semi-axiomatic of knowledge. But that exists and is rather standard and easy to motivate.

A blinking cursor may seem to us like a point of self-referential consciousness for a computer, but it's just a collection of automatic routines to orient us to the GUI.

Cognitive science is great once you already have cognition. I don't have a problem explaining our logical mind as a mixture of computation and non-computation which is heavy on the computation, but it only a small part of our overall consciousness, which is overwhelmingly aesthetic and trans-logical.

That's right, but that's a consequence of comp, not a problem.

> > All laws of geometry can be simulated computationally without
> > generating any physical lines, points, or shapes.
> No need to generate them.
> Then how do you explain all geometric appearances in the universe?

Two things: first there is already a lot of geometry in the
extensional possible relations among the numbers (that is usual math).
Then the *appearance* of geometrical and physical is explained by
computer science, with the qualia aspect explained by the logic of

Does computer science explain how geometric appearances can be generated without sense organs?

No problem with this, except the 1% of the qualia which has to remained non justifiable by any sound machine.

> > When does UDA generate geometry, why should it ever do that, and how
> > does it accomplish it?
> It is explained in sane2004, and that is the object of many posts
> here.
> I don't think so. I think that anything anyone has said here can
> give a single insight into why abstract computations could, would,
> or should ever clothe themselves in sensory experience of any kind,
> including geometry.

I hear but you don't provide any argument, other than statement of
primitiveness for the experience, which is what the (Bp & p) part of
the machine already say. But the machine can look inward and
understand that indeed, that true primitiveness feeling is a not a
proof of the primitiveness.

You can so that trick on arithmetic too though. You don't provide any argument, other than a statement of primitiveness for the non- experience of + and *.

No, that primitiveness can be proved.

There is no proof for that, it's just a feeling of true primitiveness.

Without assuming the + and * laws, we cannot derive them. They are necessarily primitive.

That feeling is sense,

It might be sense. That sense is called understanding.

and while the particular content of any given sense experience may not reflect every other without conflicts, the sense itself is all that we can ever have, and all that arithmetic can ever have. The sense itself is primary - it doesn't matter if it's + and * or matter and energy, space and time, etc, but it is all perception and participation first, last, and always.

That is phenomenologically correct. By reifying sense, you miss the explanation.

> >
> >> What would be the point of physics if this realm of Comp already
> >> exists?
> >
> > It exists, like the prime number exists. What is the point of prime
> > numbers? Not sure such question makes sense, but who knows.
> >
> > Prime numbers exist if you understand what you are looking for.
> It exists even if you don't understand them. It is like the taxes.
> The taxes are only a belief system until that belief system inspires
> people to direct the actions of their bodies toward enforcing it.
> The primeness of numbers is an analysis of counting, it need not
> have been discovered for the universe to be complete. Taxes need not
> have been invented for the universe to be complete. All that is
> needed for the universe is sensory perception and motor participation.

Terms like "universe", "sensory", "motor" and "participation" must be
explained in a non circular way.

They can't be ex-plained, because they are already the sole source of all that is plain. Please re-read that sentence until you realize what it means and why it must be true.

I read it a few times, but it asserts dogmatically the primitiveness of sense. It is like "don't ask". You don't provide an argument, just a personal feeling, and *that* personal feeling is 100% explained in the comp theory.

Sense precedes all notions and theories, all languages and definitions. It precedes ontology and circularity and 'preceding'. This is the fabric of all noumena - the capacity for affective presence to cause re-presented effects.

You talk like if you knew that your theory is true. That looks like pseudo-science/pseudo-religion.

+ and * already take this for granted.

Not at all. It take "0" for granted, and simple axioms like 0+x = x, etc.

They rely on an expectation of presence and effect which is not at all accounted for by Comp. Comp freeloads on sense and then has the nerve to presume to replace it.

No. It is an hypothesis that there is no magic operating in the bodies and brains.

> > So do words ending in the word 's'. There is a huge difference,
> > however, in questioning the meaning of a pattern within a symbol
> > system, and a completely arbitrary attachment of all of the physical
> > phenomena in the universe to an abstract system. What Comp really
> > does is push dualism halfway under the carpet, leaving only mind
> > exposed and claiming body as an epiphenomena.
> A body cannot be an epiphenomenon. That's does not make any sense. But
> comp makes it into an epinoumenon, like ether, phlogiston, and other
> superstition.
> Ok, but how does that change Comp's failure to explain the specific
> aesthetic nature of that superstition?

Why should comp fails here,

Because there is nothing literally heavy or hot or soft about computations. Any computation can be executed perfectly well in theory without any sensory-motor clothing. X=y^z has no need for a body no matter how complex the values represented by x, y, and z. I think that no interpretation of computer science brings us any closer to a possibility of bodies, even if the field equations of physics drop right out of it. Equations aren't real unless something makes them real. Something = a direct aesthetic experience or an indirectly experienced public body.

All you can say is that equation are real, but different from what they describe. Like the number 1 and the sign "1" are different thing. You do the confusion, at different level, I think.

and also, a failure of a theory to explain
something does not mean that the theory is false. It means that some
job must be done.

What must be done is to turn the theory upside down. Computation does not need or lead to consciousness, computation is part of the body half of the universe. It does not dream, it does not feel, it simply organizes the relation between presences which feel and experience and their public re-presentations.

Perhaps, but repeating this many times does not make it true.

> Ether, phlogiston, and other superstitions are superstitions because
> they are subject to our imagination to give them any kind of
> definition . Shapes, colors, textures of superstitions are not
> agreed upon - with matter of course, universal agreement on the
> macrocosmic level is their defining quality.

There is no unanimity there, and unanimity is not an evidence of truth
nor even plausibility.

No, but it suggests that it is more like the opposite of a superstition than a superstition. Why would matter or feeling be more of a superstition than arithmetic?

If you think that "5+5=10" is a superstition, then I can't do nothing to help you.

> > The question remains though, if all bodies can be simulated,
> With comp bodies cannot be emulated by Turing machine. They can be
> simulated at some substitution level on which yopu might bet. careful,
> it is a very important nuance to grasp if you want to understand why
> machine believes in some correct local way to matter and physical
> laws.
> I don't think that its a nuance, it's obvious. I have designed video
> games on a computer before, so I have no problem understanding how
> an avatar detects collisions and behaves as if certain colored
> pixels are an immobile obstruction. But that's a cartoon. It is an
> automated picture which reminds us of our own experience of a body.
> The pixels on the screen are not detecting each other, nor are the
> numbers in the program, it is all incidental. The collisions are
> figurative and anesthetic, not literal and aesthetic. Switches are
> being opened and closed in memory which illuminates a monitor -
> that's all that is going on as far as anything is concerned except
> in the minds of programmers and audiences. It's a one dimensional
> representation, it has no wholeness.
> It's confusing to say that Comp can't emulate bodies...so what makes
> bodies then and how can Comp claim to explain consciousness without
> explaining our consciousness of bodies?

By a relative measure on all computations + notion of first and third
person view, handled eventually through self-reference logic. See the
paper mentioned.

Can't relative measures of computations be accomplished without creating an epiphenomenal universe of bodies?

A phenomenal universe. Yes, this cannot be avoided if the brain works like a machine.

It seems like on the one hand you are declaring that matter is epinoumenal but on the other hand that it is created automatically, which implies that some function is served by it, so it can't be epi- anything.


> > then why have bodies at all?
> To talk and manifest our consciousness relatively to other persons.
> But why does that require a body? According to Comp, numbers are the
> only things that really ever are 'manifested', so what could it
> possibly mean for numbers to manifest as bodies or persons?

A number can manifest itself relatively to a universal number which
read it as a program or machine, automatically with a notion of body.
Then the math explains much more, and  many problems are open, of
course. But that's make the research fun and worthwhile.

I agree that the research is fun and worthwhile, but it doesn't mean that this approach is working with the complete picture.

Nobody said that, and nobody can access to the complete picture.

> > If anything can be simulated as a number relation, then what's with
> > all of the shapes and textures?
> This is what is explained by computer science. Machines cannot avoid
> them. It follows from addition and multiplication, like the prime
> numbers.
> I don't believe you. I do not think that the shape of a literal
> triangle is explained by number relations unless you already have a
> universe which has infinite aesthetic wonders on tap to add to any
> meaningless recursive iteration of computers science.

You might be right, but you fail to provide an argument.

We are presented with a choice - a reality which has no argument or an argument which has no reality. My argument is that only the former can produce the latter.

We do agree on this. We differ on the basic reality.

All figures within Comp can be argued because they are all representations.

Numbers are not representation. You confuse again 1 and "1".

Representations make sense in some aesthetic modes but not others - only genuine presentations make self-evident sense.

I agree with this.



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