On Monday, April 22, 2013 10:05:17 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 22 Apr 2013, at 13:17, Craig Weinberg wrote: 
>
> > 
> > 
> > On Monday, April 22, 2013 4:56:08 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: 
> > 
> > On 21 Apr 2013, at 19:45, Craig Weinberg wrote: 
> > 
> > > 
> > > 
> > > On Sunday, April 21, 2013 9:20:21 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: 
> > > 
> > > On 20 Apr 2013, at 23:23, Craig Weinberg wrote: 
> > > 
> > >> 
> > >> 
> > >> But what makes the laws of physics turn into physics? What makes 
> > >> physics follow the laws? 
> > > 
> > > Study UDA. It answers this precisely. Observability is lawful. I 
> > > gave the axioms, and shows them being theorem of arithmetic, once 
> > > comp is at the metatlevel. 
> > > 
> > > It's not enough that observability is lawful, 
> > 
> > Indeed. 
> > 
> > 
> > 
> > > physical enactments must be identified as a pure consequence of law 
> > > - which it can't be. 
> > 
> > No it is too. 
> > 
> > Why do you assume so? What makes a map into a territory, and why   
> > would a map want to be one? 
>
>
> You don't need to make a map into a territory.


I agree, in theory, but that theory does not predict a universe in which 
anything is actually presented as a sensory experience. A computation is a 
logical process which, if it were truly substrate independent, would have 
no aesthetic qualities at all. In reality however, that is not the case, 
and all computation supervenes eventually on some aesthetic presentation - 
either subjectively as cognition, or objectively as the positions of bodies 
relative to each other.
 

> It is sufficient to   
> embed the map in the territory. 


My entire point is that Comp does not give you any possibility of a 
territory. To the contrary, it demonstrates why territory is redundant.
 

> There will be a self-referential   
> point, which indicates its own localization. The same occur in   
> computer science, but is more technical to explain. It is what I have   
> studied and applied in the cognitive science. 
>

It might be hard to explain it in computer science, but it's impossible to 
explain how it ever gets out of computer science. I don't doubt that 
self-reference provides a useful framework for analyzing and modeling 
cognition - the most useful model by far, but in all cases the idea of 
self-reference borrows on a pre-existing knowledge of self to jump to the 
conclusion of awareness. A blinking cursor may seem to us like a point of 
self-referential consciousness for a computer, but it's just a collection 
of automatic routines to orient us to the GUI. 

Cognitive science is great once you already have cognition. I don't have a 
problem explaining our logical mind as a mixture of computation and 
non-computation which is heavy on the computation, but it only a small part 
of our overall consciousness, which is overwhelmingly aesthetic and 
trans-logical.


>
>
> > 
> > 
> > 
> > 
> > 
> > > All laws of geometry can be simulated computationally without 
> > > generating any physical lines, points, or shapes. 
> > 
> > 
> > No need to generate them. 
> > 
> > Then how do you explain all geometric appearances in the universe? 
>
> Two things: first there is already a lot of geometry in the   
> extensional possible relations among the numbers (that is usual math).   
> Then the *appearance* of geometrical and physical is explained by   
> computer science, with the qualia aspect explained by the logic of   
> self-reference. 
>

Does computer science explain how geometric appearances can be generated 
without sense organs? 



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> > 
> > 
> > 
> > 
> > 
> > > When does UDA generate geometry, why should it ever do that, and how 
> > > does it accomplish it? 
> > 
> > It is explained in sane2004, and that is the object of many posts   
> > here. 
> > 
> > I don't think so. I think that anything anyone has said here can   
> > give a single insight into why abstract computations could, would,   
> > or should ever clothe themselves in sensory experience of any kind,   
> > including geometry. 
>
> I hear but you don't provide any argument, other than statement of   
> primitiveness for the experience, which is what the (Bp & p) part of   
> the machine already say. But the machine can look inward and   
> understand that indeed, that true primitiveness feeling is a not a   
> proof of the primitiveness. 
>

You can so that trick on arithmetic too though. You don't provide any 
argument, other than a statement of primitiveness for the non-experience of 
+ and *. There is no proof for that, it's just a feeling of true 
primitiveness. That feeling is sense, and while the particular content of 
any given sense experience may not reflect every other without conflicts, 
the sense itself is all that we can ever have, and all that arithmetic can 
ever have. The sense itself is primary - it doesn't matter if it's + and * 
or matter and energy, space and time, etc, but it is all perception and 
participation first, last, and always.


>
>
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> > 
> > 
> > 
> > 
> > 
> > 
> > > 
> > >> What would be the point of physics if this realm of Comp already 
> > >> exists? 
> > > 
> > > It exists, like the prime number exists. What is the point of prime 
> > > numbers? Not sure such question makes sense, but who knows. 
> > > 
> > > Prime numbers exist if you understand what you are looking for. 
> > 
> > It exists even if you don't understand them. It is like the taxes. 
> > 
> > The taxes are only a belief system until that belief system inspires   
> > people to direct the actions of their bodies toward enforcing it.   
> > The primeness of numbers is an analysis of counting, it need not   
> > have been discovered for the universe to be complete. Taxes need not   
> > have been invented for the universe to be complete. All that is   
> > needed for the universe is sensory perception and motor participation. 
>
> Terms like "universe", "sensory", "motor" and "participation" must be   
> explained in a non circular way. 
>

They can't be ex-plained, because they are already the sole source of all 
that is plain. Please re-read that sentence until you realize what it means 
and why it must be true.

Sense precedes all notions and theories, all languages and definitions. It 
precedes ontology and circularity and 'preceding'. This is the fabric of 
all noumena - the capacity for affective presence to cause re-presented 
effects. 

+ and * already take this for granted. They rely on an expectation of 
presence and effect which is not at all accounted for by Comp. Comp 
freeloads on sense and then has the nerve to presume to replace it.


>
>
>
>
> > 
> > 
> > 
> > 
> > > So do words ending in the word 's'. There is a huge difference, 
> > > however, in questioning the meaning of a pattern within a symbol 
> > > system, and a completely arbitrary attachment of all of the physical 
> > > phenomena in the universe to an abstract system. What Comp really 
> > > does is push dualism halfway under the carpet, leaving only mind 
> > > exposed and claiming body as an epiphenomena. 
> > 
> > A body cannot be an epiphenomenon. That's does not make any sense. But 
> > comp makes it into an epinoumenon, like ether, phlogiston, and other 
> > superstition. 
> > 
> > Ok, but how does that change Comp's failure to explain the specific   
> > aesthetic nature of that superstition? 
>
> Why should comp fails here, 


Because there is nothing literally heavy or hot or soft about computations. 
Any computation can be executed perfectly well in theory without any 
sensory-motor clothing. X=y^z has no need for a body no matter how complex 
the values represented by x, y, and z. I think that no interpretation of 
computer science brings us any closer to a possibility of bodies, even if 
the field equations of physics drop right out of it. Equations aren't real 
unless something makes them real. Something = a direct aesthetic experience 
or an indirectly experienced public body.
 

> and also, a failure of a theory to explain   
> something does not mean that the theory is false. It means that some   
> job must be done. 
>

What must be done is to turn the theory upside down. Computation does not 
need or lead to consciousness, computation is part of the body half of the 
universe. It does not dream, it does not feel, it simply organizes the 
relation between presences which feel and experience and their public 
re-presentations.
 

>
>
>
>
> > Ether, phlogiston, and other superstitions are superstitions because   
> > they are subject to our imagination to give them any kind of   
> > definition . Shapes, colors, textures of superstitions are not   
> > agreed upon - with matter of course, universal agreement on the   
> > macrocosmic level is their defining quality. 
>
> There is no unanimity there, and unanimity is not an evidence of truth   
> nor even plausibility. 
>

No, but it suggests that it is more like the opposite of a superstition 
than a superstition. Why would matter or feeling be more of a superstition 
than arithmetic?
 

>
>
>
> > 
> > 
> > 
> > 
> > 
> > > The question remains though, if all bodies can be simulated, 
> > 
> > With comp bodies cannot be emulated by Turing machine. They can be 
> > simulated at some substitution level on which yopu might bet. careful, 
> > it is a very important nuance to grasp if you want to understand why 
> > machine believes in some correct local way to matter and physical   
> > laws. 
> > 
> > I don't think that its a nuance, it's obvious. I have designed video   
> > games on a computer before, so I have no problem understanding how   
> > an avatar detects collisions and behaves as if certain colored   
> > pixels are an immobile obstruction. But that's a cartoon. It is an   
> > automated picture which reminds us of our own experience of a body.   
> > The pixels on the screen are not detecting each other, nor are the   
> > numbers in the program, it is all incidental. The collisions are   
> > figurative and anesthetic, not literal and aesthetic. Switches are   
> > being opened and closed in memory which illuminates a monitor -   
> > that's all that is going on as far as anything is concerned except   
> > in the minds of programmers and audiences. It's a one dimensional   
> > representation, it has no wholeness. 
> > 
> > It's confusing to say that Comp can't emulate bodies...so what makes   
> > bodies then and how can Comp claim to explain consciousness without   
> > explaining our consciousness of bodies? 
>
> By a relative measure on all computations + notion of first and third   
> person view, handled eventually through self-reference logic. See the   
> paper mentioned. 
>

Can't relative measures of computations be accomplished without creating an 
epiphenomenal universe of bodies? It seems like on the one hand you are 
declaring that matter is epinoumenal but on the other hand that it is 
created automatically, which implies that some function is served by it, so 
it can't be epi-anything.
 

>
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>
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> > 
> > 
> > 
> > 
> > > then why have bodies at all? 
> > 
> > To talk and manifest our consciousness relatively to other persons. 
> > 
> > But why does that require a body? According to Comp, numbers are the   
> > only things that really ever are 'manifested', so what could it   
> > possibly mean for numbers to manifest as bodies or persons? 
>
> A number can manifest itself relatively to a universal number which   
> read it as a program or machine, automatically with a notion of body.   
> Then the math explains much more, and  many problems are open, of   
> course. But that's make the research fun and worthwhile. 
>

I agree that the research is fun and worthwhile, but it doesn't mean that 
this approach is working with the complete picture.
 

>
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> > 
> > 
> > 
> > 
> > 
> > > If anything can be simulated as a number relation, then what's with 
> > > all of the shapes and textures? 
> > 
> > This is what is explained by computer science. Machines cannot avoid 
> > them. It follows from addition and multiplication, like the prime 
> > numbers. 
> > 
> > I don't believe you. I do not think that the shape of a literal   
> > triangle is explained by number relations unless you already have a   
> > universe which has infinite aesthetic wonders on tap to add to any   
> > meaningless recursive iteration of computers science. 
>
> You might be right, but you fail to provide an argument. 
>

We are presented with a choice - a reality which has no argument or an 
argument which has no reality. My argument is that only the former can 
produce the latter. All figures within Comp can be argued because they are 
all representations. Representations make sense in some aesthetic modes but 
not others - only genuine presentations make self-evident sense.
 

>
> Bruno 
>
>
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ 
>
>
>
>

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