On Thu, May 2, 2013 at 5:27 PM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote: > > On 02 May 2013, at 15:11, Telmo Menezes wrote: > >> On Wed, May 1, 2013 at 6:26 PM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote: >>> >>> >>> On 01 May 2013, at 17:33, Telmo Menezes wrote to John Clark: >>> >>> >>> >>>>> At this point I'm not even talking about Science but logic and a >>>>> distaste >>>>> for cheerfully and strongly believing in 2 contradictory things. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> I believe that human intelligence is a product of Darwinian evolution >>>> and I'm agnostic on consciousness. There is nothing contradictory >>>> about this, but I can't think of any further way to make my point. >>>> We'll have to disagree to disagree. >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> You shouldn't, perhaps. >>> May be it would be enough to just ask John Clark to push his logic a bit >>> further. >>> >>> I agree that human intelligence is a product of Darwinian evolution, but >>> this assumes some mechanism, and thus Mechanism. >>> >>> Then the discovery of the universal machine shows that machine >>> intelligence >>> is a (logical) product of the elementary operations in arithmetic. >>> >>> Then machine can see their own limit, and are statistically forced to >>> guess >>> in something which can't be a machine, as arithmetical truth, for >>> example. >>> >>> We don't need to know what consciousness is. >>> >>> If we can agree that consciousness is >>> 1) undoubtable >>> 2) incommunicable >>> 3) invariant for digital substitution at some level. >> >> >> I believe in 3) but not with 100% certainty. > > > You don't need to " believe" anything, just to agree 'for the sake of the > argument. > And there is no certainties.
Ok. >> Isn't it possible that, >> in fact, I was created just a couple of hours ago by adding the >> molecules of the food I had for lunch to my body, and that before I >> was someone else and we just happen to share the same (now fake) >> memories. I don't think this is the case, but can I be sure? > > > Yes that's an arithmetical computational history. It exists, and so you have > to take it into account in all experience/experiment of physics you can do. > But if the normal measure behaves a bit, you might need to take into account > that and similar "rare" history only to get the 10^1000 billionth correct > decimal. Ok. > In arithmetic you have all computational histories, and by the FPI you are > distributed in all of them. Physics get statistical at the start. Ok. > Memories are not really fake of not fake. They are appropriate, or not, > relatively to probable histories. Yes, "fake" was a bad choice of word. > > > >> >>> Then we can understand that the mind body problem becomes a body >>> statistical-appearance problem in the whole of arithmetic (not just the >>> computable sigma_1, but the non computable pi_1, sigma_2, pi_2, ..... up >>> to >>> arithmetical truth). >>> >>> This generalizes both Darwin and Everett on arithmetic. >>> It shows a non negligible part of what the physical reality is the border >>> of. >>> >>> Machines cannot not be religious. >>> >>> It is unavoidable, unless you deliberately program them to not look deep >>> enough, ... of course. >> >> >> I like your ideas, but I still lack the technical knowledge in some of >> the steps to feel confortable using them. > > > > I appreciate you tell me. Normally UDA is understandable with only a passive > knowledge of what a computer is, Yes, UDA is easier to follow. > but AUDA, where the "religion" aspect is > clearer, needs a good familiarity with the gaps between computability, > provability and truth, coming from the incompleteness phenomenon in > arithmetical logics and above. > > > > >> >>> And, btw, you are right with the 'artificial nets'. We will not make >>> intelligent machines, we will fish in the arithmetical ocean and >>> sometimes >>> we get the chance to meet some-one, in some recognizable ways. We might >>> learn deep lessons in the exploration, though. >> >> >> Nice. > > > Well, we can hope the best, but we can fear the worst. Even the bitcoin has > made a little crack due to exaggerate speculation. The exaggerate speculation phase was to be expected. Not long ago, people where saying that nobody would even trust such a concept. Maybe it will survive. > Universal Machines, like > brain, computers and cells, are really doors to the Unknown. It may be that > lies plays some part in the exploration, like with the mimicking ants > jumping spider which make the birds believing that they are non edible ants, > when actually they are edible spider. Even Peano Arithmetic get some more > provability power when the false axiom "PA is inconsistent" is added. Lies > can run deep. > > Bruno > > > > > > > >> >>> Bruno >>> >>> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> -- >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >>> "Everything List" group. >>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >>> email to [email protected]. >>> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >>> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. >>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. >>> >>> >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to [email protected]. >> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. >> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. >> >> > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. > > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
