On Thu, May 2, 2013 at 5:27 PM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
>
> On 02 May 2013, at 15:11, Telmo Menezes wrote:
>
>> On Wed, May 1, 2013 at 6:26 PM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> On 01 May 2013, at 17:33, Telmo Menezes wrote to John Clark:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>>> At this point I'm not even talking about Science but logic and a
>>>>> distaste
>>>>> for cheerfully and strongly believing in 2 contradictory things.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> I believe that human intelligence is a product of Darwinian evolution
>>>> and I'm agnostic on consciousness. There is nothing contradictory
>>>> about this, but I can't think of any further way to make my point.
>>>> We'll have to disagree to disagree.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> You shouldn't, perhaps.
>>> May be it would be enough to just ask John Clark to push his logic a bit
>>> further.
>>>
>>> I agree that human intelligence is a product of Darwinian evolution, but
>>> this assumes some mechanism, and thus Mechanism.
>>>
>>> Then the discovery of the universal machine shows that machine
>>> intelligence
>>> is a (logical) product of the elementary operations in arithmetic.
>>>
>>> Then machine can see their own limit, and are statistically forced to
>>> guess
>>> in something which can't be a machine, as arithmetical truth, for
>>> example.
>>>
>>> We don't need to know what consciousness is.
>>>
>>> If we can agree that consciousness is
>>> 1) undoubtable
>>> 2) incommunicable
>>> 3) invariant for digital substitution at some level.
>>
>>
>> I believe in 3) but not with 100% certainty.
>
>
> You don't need to " believe" anything, just to agree 'for the sake of the
> argument.
> And there is no certainties.

Ok.

>> Isn't it possible that,
>> in fact, I was created just a couple of hours ago by adding the
>> molecules of the food I had for lunch to my body, and that before I
>> was someone else and we just happen to share the same (now fake)
>> memories. I don't think this is the case, but can I be sure?
>
>
> Yes that's an arithmetical computational history. It exists, and so you have
> to take it into account in all experience/experiment of physics you can do.
> But if the normal measure behaves a bit, you might need to take into account
> that and similar "rare" history only to get the 10^1000 billionth correct
> decimal.

Ok.

> In arithmetic you have all computational histories, and by the FPI you are
> distributed in all of them. Physics get statistical at the start.

Ok.

> Memories are not really fake of not fake. They are appropriate, or not,
> relatively to probable histories.

Yes, "fake" was a bad choice of word.

>
>
>
>>
>>> Then we can understand that the mind body problem becomes a body
>>> statistical-appearance problem in the whole of arithmetic (not just the
>>> computable sigma_1, but the non computable pi_1, sigma_2, pi_2, ..... up
>>> to
>>> arithmetical truth).
>>>
>>> This generalizes both Darwin and Everett on arithmetic.
>>> It shows a non negligible part of what the physical reality is the border
>>> of.
>>>
>>> Machines cannot not be religious.
>>>
>>> It is unavoidable, unless you deliberately program them to not look deep
>>> enough,  ... of course.
>>
>>
>> I like your ideas, but I still lack the technical knowledge in some of
>> the steps to feel confortable using them.
>
>
>
> I appreciate you tell me. Normally UDA is understandable with only a passive
> knowledge of what a computer is,

Yes, UDA is easier to follow.

> but AUDA, where the "religion" aspect is
> clearer, needs a good familiarity with the gaps between computability,
> provability and truth, coming from the incompleteness phenomenon in
> arithmetical logics and above.
>
>
>
>
>>
>>> And, btw, you are right with the 'artificial nets'. We will not make
>>> intelligent machines, we will fish in the arithmetical ocean and
>>> sometimes
>>> we get the chance to meet some-one, in some recognizable ways. We might
>>> learn deep lessons in the exploration, though.
>>
>>
>> Nice.
>
>
> Well, we can hope the best, but we can fear the worst. Even the bitcoin has
> made a little crack due to exaggerate speculation.

The exaggerate speculation phase was to be expected. Not long ago,
people where saying that nobody would even trust such a concept. Maybe
it will survive.

> Universal Machines, like
> brain, computers and cells, are really doors to the Unknown. It may be that
> lies plays some part in the exploration, like with the mimicking ants
> jumping spider which make the birds believing that they are non edible ants,
> when actually they are edible spider. Even Peano Arithmetic get some more
> provability power when the false axiom "PA is inconsistent" is added. Lies
> can run deep.
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>>
>>> Bruno
>>>
>>> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
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>>
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>>
>
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
>
>
>
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