On Thu, Aug 22, 2013 at 7:44 AM, meekerdb <[email protected]> wrote: > On 8/21/2013 11:15 PM, Quentin Anciaux wrote: > > > > > 2013/8/22 meekerdb <[email protected]> >> >> On 8/21/2013 2:42 PM, Quentin Anciaux wrote: >>> >>> Ok, and I'm fascinated by the question of why we haven't found viable >>> algorithms in that class yet -- although we know has a fact that it >>> must exist, because our brains contain it. >> >> >> We haven't proved our brain is computational in nature, if we had, then we >> would had proven computationalism to be true... it's not the case. Maybe our >> brain has some non computational shortcut for that, maybe that's why AI is >> not possible, maybe our brain has this "realness" ingredient that >> computations alone lack. I'm not saying AI is not possible, I'm just saying >> we haven't proved that "our brains contain it". >> >> >> There's another possibility: That our brains are computational in nature, >> but that they also depend on interactions with the environment (not >> necessarily quantum entanglement, but possibly). > > > Then it's not computational *in nature* because it needs that little > ingredient, that's what I'm talking about when saying "Maybe our brain has > some non computational shortcut for that, maybe that's why AI is not > possible, maybe our brain has this "realness" ingredient that computations > alone lack." > > > It's not non-computational if the external influence is also computational. > But the reaction of a silicon neuron to a beta particle may be quite > different from the reaction of a biological neuron. So AI is still > possible, but it may confound questions like,"Is the artificial > consciousness the same as the biological." > > > >> >> When Bruno has proposed replacing neurons with equivalent input-output >> circuits I have objected that while it might still in most cases compute the >> same function there are likely to be exceptional cases involving external >> (to the brain) events that would cause it to be different. This wouldn't >> prevent AI, > > > It would prevent it *if* we cannot attach that external event to the > computation... > > > No, it doesn't prevent intelligence, but it may make it different. > > if that external event was finitely describable, then it means you have not > chosen the correct substitution level and computationalism alone holds. > > > Yes, that's Bruno's answer, just regard the external world as part of the > computation too, simulate the whole thing. But I think that undermined his > idea that computation replaces physics. Physics isn't really replaced if it > has to all be simulated.
But it might be relegated to the same status as social sciences, where it provides workable approximations but has no hope of achieving a TOE. Telmo. > Brent > > > .. the only way to go out of that if for that event to be non-computational > in nature. > > Regards, > Quentin > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
