On Thu, Aug 22, 2013  Telmo Menezes <te...@telmomenezes.com> wrote:

>>  Then there are only 2 possibilities:
>> 1) The ultra computer that simulates our world changes from one state to
>> the
>> other for a reason; if so then our simulated computers which change from
>> one
>> state to the other for a simulated reason can create a simulated simulated
>> world that also looks real to its simulated simulated inhabitants.
>>
>>  2) The ultra computer that simulates our world changes from one state to
>> the
>>  other for NO reason; if so then its random and there's nothing very ultra
>> about the machine.
>
>
>
> But the ultra computer I postulated is not a pure Turing machine. It's
> behaviour can be influenced by entities external to our simulated universe.
>

Any Turing Machine can be influenced by anything external to it, such as me
throwing a rock at the contraption.  I don't see the point.

>> Cannot comment, I don't know what "comp" is.
>>
>
> > Come on John, we've been through this the other day. You do know.
>

I know what I don't know and I'm telling you I don't know what "comp"
means, every time I think I do Bruno proves me wrong. After over 2 and a
half years of constantly seeing people on this list (and nowhere else) use
that strange made up word I have come to the conclusion that I am not
alone, nobody has a deep understanding of what the hell "comp" is supposed
to mean.

> Computation does not require causality. It can be defined simply in the
> form of symbolic relationships.


I'm not interested in definitions and I'm not interested in relationships,
if state X isn't the reason for a machine or computer or brain or SOMETHING
going into state Y  then an algorithm is just squiggle of ink in a book.
Computation is physical.

   John K Clark

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