On 8/21/2013 11:57 PM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:

2013/8/22 meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net <mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>>

    On 8/21/2013 11:15 PM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:

    2013/8/22 meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net <mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>>

        On 8/21/2013 2:42 PM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:

            Ok, and I'm fascinated by the question of why we haven't found 
            algorithms in that class yet -- although we know has a fact that it
            must exist, because our brains contain it.

        We haven't proved our brain is computational in nature, if we had, then 
        would had proven computationalism to be true... it's not the case. 
Maybe our
        brain has some non computational shortcut for that, maybe that's why AI 
is not
        possible, maybe our brain has this "realness" ingredient that 
        alone lack. I'm not saying AI is not possible, I'm just saying we 
        proved that "our brains contain it".

        There's another possibility: That our brains are computational in 
nature, but
        that they also depend on interactions with the environment (not 
        quantum entanglement, but possibly).

    Then it's not computational *in nature* because it needs that little 
    that's what I'm talking about when saying "Maybe our brain has some non
    computational shortcut for that, maybe that's why AI is not possible, maybe 
    brain has this "realness" ingredient that computations alone lack."

    It's not non-computational if the external influence is also computational.

If it is, you've not chosen the right level... the whole event + brain is computational and you're back at the start.

    But the reaction of a silicon neuron to a beta particle may be quite 
different from
    the reaction of a biological neuron.  So AI is still possible, but it may 
    questions like,"Is the artificial consciousness the same as the biological."

If it's computational, it is computational and AI at the right level would be the same as ours.

But "at the right level" may mean "including all the environment outside the 

        When Bruno has proposed replacing neurons with equivalent input-output 
        I have objected that while it might still in most cases compute the same
        function there are likely to be exceptional cases involving external 
(to the
        brain) events that would cause it to be different.  This wouldn't 
prevent AI,

    It would prevent it *if* we cannot attach that external event to the 

    No, it doesn't prevent intelligence, but it may make it different.

It does (for digital AI) if the ingredient is non-computational and that there is no way to attach it to the digital part without (for example) a biological brain.

I don't see why that follows. Suppose the non-computational, external influence comes from the output of a hypercomputer? It cans till provide input to a Turing computer. Or even true randomness could, as is hypothesized in QM.

    if that external event was finitely describable, then it means you have not 
    the correct substitution level and computationalism alone holds.

    Yes, that's Bruno's answer, just regard the external world as part of the
    computation too, simulate the whole thing.

Well if your ingredient, is the whole of physics, then it's self defeating,

Exactly.  That's what I said below


and computationalism is false... if it's some part of it, then at that level the "realness" of our consciousness is digital and computationalism holds.


    But I think that undermined his idea that computation replaces physics. 
    isn't really replaced if it has to all be simulated.


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