2013/8/23 meekerdb <[email protected]> > On 8/21/2013 11:57 PM, Quentin Anciaux wrote: > > > > > 2013/8/22 meekerdb <[email protected]> > >> On 8/21/2013 11:15 PM, Quentin Anciaux wrote: >> >> >> >> >> 2013/8/22 meekerdb <[email protected]> >> >>> On 8/21/2013 2:42 PM, Quentin Anciaux wrote: >>> >>> Ok, and I'm fascinated by the question of why we haven't found viable >>>> algorithms in that class yet -- although we know has a fact that it >>>> must exist, because our brains contain it. >>>> >>> >>> We haven't proved our brain is computational in nature, if we had, >>> then we would had proven computationalism to be true... it's not the case. >>> Maybe our brain has some non computational shortcut for that, maybe that's >>> why AI is not possible, maybe our brain has this "realness" ingredient that >>> computations alone lack. I'm not saying AI is not possible, I'm just saying >>> we haven't proved that "our brains contain it". >>> >>> >>> There's another possibility: That our brains are computational in >>> nature, but that they also depend on interactions with the environment (not >>> necessarily quantum entanglement, but possibly). >>> >> >> Then it's not computational *in nature* because it needs that little >> ingredient, that's what I'm talking about when saying "Maybe our brain has >> some non computational shortcut for that, maybe that's why AI is not >> possible, maybe our brain has this "realness" ingredient that computations >> alone lack." >> >> >> It's not non-computational if the external influence is also >> computational. >> > > If it is, you've not chosen the right level... the whole event + brain > is computational and you're back at the start. > > >> But the reaction of a silicon neuron to a beta particle may be quite >> different from the reaction of a biological neuron. So AI is still >> possible, but it may confound questions like,"Is the artificial >> consciousness the same as the biological." >> > > If it's computational, it is computational and AI at the right level > would be the same as ours. > > > But "at the right level" may mean "including all the environment outside > the brain". > > > > >> >> >> >> >>> When Bruno has proposed replacing neurons with equivalent input-output >>> circuits I have objected that while it might still in most cases compute >>> the same function there are likely to be exceptional cases involving >>> external (to the brain) events that would cause it to be different. This >>> wouldn't prevent AI, >>> >> >> It would prevent it *if* we cannot attach that external event to the >> computation... >> >> >> No, it doesn't prevent intelligence, but it may make it different. >> > > It does (for digital AI) if the ingredient is non-computational and that > there is no way to attach it to the digital part without (for example) a > biological brain. > > > I don't see why that follows. Suppose the non-computational, external > influence comes from the output of a hypercomputer? It cans till provide > input to a Turing computer. >
So you could attach it to the digital part *but* that output of the hypercomputer is the non-computable part... you'll need it and you can't bypass it *and* it is not computable. > Or even true randomness could, as is hypothesized in QM. > Same thing. > > > > >> >> if that external event was finitely describable, then it means you >> have not chosen the correct substitution level and computationalism alone >> holds. >> >> >> Yes, that's Bruno's answer, just regard the external world as part of >> the computation too, simulate the whole thing. >> > > Well if your ingredient, is the whole of physics, then it's self > defeating, > > > Exactly. That's what I said below > > Brent > > > and computationalism is false... if it's some part of it, then at that > level the "realness" of our consciousness is digital and computationalism > holds. > > Quentin > > >> But I think that undermined his idea that computation replaces physics. >> Physics isn't really replaced if it has to all be simulated. >> >> Brent >> > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. > -- All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
