On 23 Sep 2013, at 01:10, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Sunday, September 22, 2013 3:03:58 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 22 Sep 2013, at 05:15, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Saturday, September 21, 2013 12:18:19 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal
wrote:
On 20 Sep 2013, at 20:20, Craig Weinberg wrote:
It doesn't sound like it though. The difference between shapes and
thoughts is not related to proof or truth. Making some information
provable wouldn't turn it into a shape.
But if UDA is correct, provable-and-consistent will do. G/G* is
extended on the intensional nuances.
What does that have to do with the invention of shape though?
Please, study the papers. Comp is like Kant, on *this*, shape belongs
to the category of numbers imagination, and with comp this is given
by arithmetical relations.
I have an idea of comp, you have to study comp, and see if it answers
your question. You have to be able to assume it, if only for the sake
of the reasoning and then judge, not stopping to reason once you
suspect comp is used.
All the paragraphs below try in vain to make me doubt of comp. In
vain, because I already doubt. But then I study its consequences. If
we find a contradiction, we will just abandon comp, but up to now we
find only sort of platonic quantum weirdness.
modal logic
They are a tool, but a tool for machines, not for subjectivity.
No, they are tools for humans, studying the subjectivity of machines.
Accepting some definitions which have been provided, and the comp "act
of faith.
No more than you can create a galaxy with a telescope.
But you can bet on the galaxy pattern thanks to the use of a
telescope.
Likewise, modal logics can help to see the many different views that
arithmetic and universal machines can have about herself and their
possible and probable universal neighbors.
I'm not denying that modal logic is an important tool for certain
things, but what does that have to do with flavor?
This would need a long develpment, in part explained in the
literature, and my papers.
You continue to ask question what does "fuel" have to do with the moon?
The answer is to get the rocket navigating toward the moon from earth.
But here you know what is a rocket, and you seem to not be so much
familiar with modal logic. That would be long to explain ad abrupto. I
gave references, and you can find more in my URL.
A page of sheet music can refer to a song, but only to someone who
is familiar with music.
Then a human baby might never been able to appreciate music, unless
you put the familiarity of music at the start, like at the big-bang.
But this explains nothing, and is a case of comp with an infinitely
low level.
I think machines, like babies, can be open up to music. The
hypostases gives the place where the consciousness flux can take
those "colors".
It is a sort of illusion, but only for God's eye, which is useless
in science (but can have practical consequences for believer of
course).
The problem is that a page of sheet music can refer to anything. For
comp to be true, there would have to be something inherent in the
configuration of the symbols on the page which can be turned into
music
Correct.
directly.
I think you, and all machines, are easily deluded on this.
There isn't anything like that though. We can associate those
symbols with lots of things, none of which requires that sound be
invented in the universe.
The actual page refers to nothing but itself. Musical experience
can't be only logic.
Absolutely so.
But we are not talking about logic, but about arithmetic or
machines. Logic again is just a tool.
Arithmetic and machines still have no reason to invent music, let
alone suggest why such an invention would be possible for them (are
machines omnipotent? Can they invent unlimited ontologies?).
We don't have precise answer for why humans do music.
You only come back with your prejudice against machines, or people
with mechanical bodies.
> Not the judgements about the flavor of pizza, but the appreciation
> of the actual flavor.
Well, it is, accepting comp + some amount of the classical theory of
belief, knowledge, etc.
But why would we want to accept comp?
People will not do much philosophy. Most will accept comp for the
same reason they accept glasses when seeing not well.
If your hypo-campus does not function well, so that you are in loop,
like in the movie "Memento", you might accept an artificial hypo-
campus, just like you can accept an artificial heart in case of
grave miss-function.
Then once your body is entirely digital, it is handy to move among
planets at the speed of light, and above all, it cots much less than
a carbon-body.
I once assumed that was inevitable, but now I don't think its going
to happen that way. I think the more we get into the brain, the more
we will see that it is not going to be replaceable to any great
extent. Extendable yes, but not so much replaceable digitally.
I *do* think our level might be lower than what neurophysiologist
think, but again, I reason theoretically, assuming the existence of
such a level, no matter how low it is.
And I am not pretending that such level exists, I just study the
(theological and physical) consequences.
They have to assume it. If they didn't exist though, modal logic
could not bring them into existence.
Sure. No more than Hubble can cause the far away galaxies to appear.
We agree on this.
It is not the modal logic which thinks, nor even the 3p machines, it
is the person locally represented by the machine which lives the
arithmetical points of view.
That doesn't explain why there are flavors within the local person's
arithmetic points of view.
It does explains many aspects, including why some aspects cannot be
explained. But you must do the math.
>
>
> Treatises on planes cannot fly either.
>
> Right but they cannot build planes either, unless someone who can
> read them has the materials and skill.
>
>
>
>
>
>> it assumes it from the start. It assumes a condition of 'provable'
>> or 'true' as independent of experience rather than qualities which
>> are abstracted from aesthetic comparisons.
>
>
> But that exists, once you agree that 17 is prime, or not,
> independently of me and you.
>
> Independently of me and you, sure, but not necessarily independent
> of sense-making itself.
In that case, it is trivially dependent, as the "whole arithmetical
truth" can be considered as being connected.
Arithmetical truth is connected, but its only one such connected
layer of sense.
Right, but it emulates other.
No, it doesn't. Only retrospectively when taking other layers for
granted. Prospectively, arithmetic would have no way to 'emulate'
anything. Numbers are numbers, why would they seem otherwise?
They feel that way, retrospectively, indeed.
You confuse the person (Bp & p) with the machine (Bp). They are
related, but they are different.
None of them have flavors though.
I am still not sure. The math says there are flavors (using standard
definitions), and my intuition was that they should appear only in Bp
& <>p & p, but then my intuition might be wrong.
Emotional truth is connected too, as is visual sense, comedic
sense, etc. Arithmetic truth is only the most fully public-facing
category of sense, so it has the most public qualities -
consistency, reliability, repeatability, etc.
You are right, if you take only the extensional relations, but there
are internal intensional relations too.
Are the intensional relations not consistent, reliable, and
repeatable also?
Only the Bp and Bp & <> p. The "& p" makes them "repeatable" only in a
much weaker sense.
They are consistent, and reliable, but the machine cannot justify this.
> You are putting 'me and you' in between the machine and arithmetic
> truth,
The machine is a part of arithmetical truth. You and me, too.
> but I'm saying that arithmetic truth is between matter and sense-
> making in general, which is more primitive than matter or numbers.
I cannot conceive something simpler than numbers, and having such
(Turing complete) spectrum of explanation. Sense-making is primitive
in your theory, not with comp.
That's why comp is untrue. It fails to locate the machine that
computation runs on - which is sensory-motive participation.
Not at all. Anyone will do. Physics, biology, theology are universal
machine independent. I take arithmetic to fix the things, then we
can look at the computations, and interview the machines about what
they see, believe, hope, love etc.
I meant that comp doesn't question itself. It doesn't look at the
fundamental properties of computation, it just assumes them.
That's not true.
- Comp does question itself all the time, and explains indeed why it
needs an act of faith.
- it does not assumes the computation, it derives them from the laws
of addition and multiplication (together with CT).
Without a priori participation in a sensible context of attention
and memory, of recursiveness and digital exchange, there can be no
arithmetic truth. If arithmetic truth is primary, why do we have to
learn to count? Why do come out of the womb filled with feelings
and sensations, but no numbers?
We have to learn to count as it can help in the 'eat or be eaten'
problem. Then we learn mainly a language so that we count in a
public sharable way.
Instead of adding and multiplying numbers, we can abstract and apply
lambda terms, also. The ontology is simple, and the choice of which
universal number we start is not important. In fact comp provides a
new invariant: the change of the everything base (the universal
number used to talk about all the others and their competitions, ...)
Wouldn't it help with the eat or be eaten problem to simply have
access to our own computing ability rather than having to learn it
though?
That would help, but that is not the case, in arithmetic.
Well, that seems to be your axiom.
Yes, I think it's important.
It is not. What is important is to not impose certainties on other. To
make clear what we assume.
I am not defending comp, I just work in comp. Then machine self-
reference explains more than any other theory, especially those who
assumed experience (or matter) as primitive, as comp explain both
from
less. Not completely, but the x*-x logics explains why.
Comp is fine for machines, but there is no need to assume that it
has much to do with qualia and awareness.
The qualia are handled by X1* minus X1.
Why would that be true?
That's what I try to explain, through UDA and the math, when
*assuming* comp.
Maybe you can get a set of variables with unknown values, but why
would they have a smell or sound?
Because if they didn't, you would die when saying "yes" to the doctor.
Of course you can say that the machine is a zombie. In the 3p sense,
you are right (but this means only that the machine's body cannot
think, which is trivial). In the 1p sense, you cannot know, unless
you are some actual infinite public object.
It's not a matter of knowing, its a matter of understanding that 1p
can only come from a history grounded in the beginning of time, not
from parts in space.
I don't assume time and space.
There are important parallels, for sure, but that makes sense
since, in my model, qualia and quanta branch from the parent
pansensitivity early on.
You are not yet "scientist intelligible", I am afraid. My feeling is
that you put a perhaps interesting phenomenology on the usual
aristotelian (since 1500 years here) "theology", with the sad (imo)
condition that it leads you to make infinities of beings into
zombies a priori.
They aren't beings, they are representations within the experience
of a being. It is clear that this is the way that all forms of
counting work. There is nothing that it is like to be counted.
Because you take numbers as only being counted, but they can add and
mutliply and thats enough to get universal machine, which trivially
can dream when we assume comp.
The truth or falsity of comp is out of my topic.
I am interested only in the refutability of comp.
> Where is it getting the aesthetic sensations from, and why?
Even if comp can't explain this completely, taking them as primitive
assumes them to be entirely not explainable.
Explainable is a problem for any primitive.
That's why scientist takes the simplest one, on which everyone
serious agree (like natural numbers, real, numbers, complex numbers,
functions, etc.). of course in cognitive science things are more
complex a priori.
The scientist who is even more serious doesn't take consensus
agreements for truth,
Truth is out of his topics, period.
and seeks out an even simpler philosophical vacuum. Arithmetic is
neither necessary nor sufficient to define sense, but sense
naturally contains arithmetic.
We have already discussed this.
It looks like philosophy to
me, when my point is that, comp (be it true or false) makes possible
to do science and predictions.
That's why comp is good for instrumental purposes, but it is
misleading as a worldview.
Well, it is instrumental, like a brain. It makes you survives, and
biology uses it all the time (arguably), by making copies of the
most basic instructions all the times.
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4jtmOZaIvS0
Cool video. Still, it doesn't explain consciousness.
It is the molecular form of Dx = xx. Consciousness will need more
abilities and a richer Dx = F(xx). Indeed.
Then consciousness is not entirely explained, nor even defined, for
reason which are explainable by the machine.
The machine will be aware that she cannot justify to you her
consciousness, and so will only sigh in front of your axioms, and
probably run away.
But your theory makes non falsifiable negative statement (insult)
about some entities (it makes my sun-in-law into a zombie).
That's because your epistemology is grounded only in logic, not in
aesthetic truth. Logic can't tell the difference between dream and
reality, or can't intentionally lie or tell the truth. Logic isn't
true, it's merely consistent - the essence of consistency really.
Aesthetic truth is pre-consistency and pre-falsifiable. It is that
which consists and falsifies.
Logic is just when we decide to be as much precise as we can on the
words "and", "or", etc. It is a tool.
You would criticize Einstein, in the manner of Bergson, like saying
"come on all you talk about are tensors, you miss space completely".
You confuse the tools used to be "scientist intelligible" with the
subject matter.
Scientist intelligibility is incompatible with 1p as it is now.
Right. It *is* the difference between Bp (scientific belief) and Bp &
p (true scientific belief).
Science has to be extended to a more complete form to access private
physics, but its hard because it involves pseudo-retrocausailty from
eternity and perceptual relativity.
Like in comp, which needs the whole of the natural numbers, and the
whole universal dovetailing, or the additive and multiplicative
structure of the numbers.
> From sense is derived a discernment between Absolute and
> subordinate, and that is the birth of quantitative sense.
Arithmetic
> sense is the skeleton that sense uses to grow on, but it is not a
> presence or an awareness. The ubiquity of its truth comes from its
> timelessness and generality, not from authenticity.
>
> In practice of course, as human beings, some of us are better
suited
> to enjoy a life from the opposite perspective. Because of the
> symmetric nature of sense, it works with the tail end first as well
> for almost everything. Everything,. except consciousness.
> Consciousness cannot exist tail first. It cannot be conjured by
> figures, it can only be passed on directly through appreciation of
> sensation directly, without any computation.
Yes. It is the selector, picking a continuation of complex scenario
and ascribing a reality to it.
This in comp needs much *more* than a computation; it needs
infinities
of computation on which the selection will be done, indexically, by
numbers having long histories.
How does a number know if it has a history?
By scrutinizing his probable past, and remembering experiences.
You are assuming it is conscious from the start. Which makes comp
redundant. A number doesn't need a machine to become a person, you
are saying it already is a person.
A number is never a person. A person is an actor in some (complex)
story, and, with comp, it is related to number and machine. But person
are not really number nor machine. Those can support person, but the
person itself is supported by infinities of numbers and relations.
No more, no less, a priori than the QM multiverse. We live or better
our consciousness fluxes differentiate on the wireframe, and
physicality is an invariant of a type of point of view.
Still, QM, I presume, implies the other known forces to make the
microcosm consistent with astrophysics and classical mechanics. I'm
not sure that comp does that.
It has to do that. That's the point.
This asks fro work, and you have to grasp the intensional nuances of
self-reference, and perhaps you might read the Theaetetus of Plato.
We can come back on this. I have to go.
The Explanatory Gap is still untouched though. Self-reference does
not imply flavor.
It does, if you agree on some standard definition and explanation in
the computationalist philosophy of mind/cognitive science.
We might try to write one paragraph post.
Sure. Next time..
OK, next time :)
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
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