On 9/26/2013 7:33 PM, LizR wrote:
On 27 September 2013 14:18, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net <mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>> wrote:

    On 9/26/2013 6:47 PM, LizR wrote:
    On 27 September 2013 13:03, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net
    <mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>> wrote:

        On 9/26/2013 6:05 PM, Russell Standish wrote:
        This is a sort of cul de sac experience, which has to be impossible to
        create if QTI is true. The existence of a universal dovetailer entails
        the lack of all cul de sac experiences (Comp immortality).

        So does it make loss of consciousness impossible? ....under 

    Surely not, because from a first person perspective one just goes to sleep 
    wakes up again (or experiences dreams). "No cul de sac" implies there's no 
way to
    stop consciousness permanently.

    I know it implies that, but I see no reason to believe it.  The question 
    whether consciousness continues, but whether *your* consciousness, a 
    consciousness continues.  To say otherwise is like saying you can't kill 
the guy in
    Moscow because he has a duplicate in Washington.

This is the "Haraclitus" problem (or observation, if you don't consider it a problem). The man can't step into the same river because he isn't the same man. The consciousness that continues after any given moment is, presumably, the next moment of consciousness which is the "best continuation" of the last one. This seems similar to the view in FOR that the multiverse is made of "snapshots" which give the appearance of forming continuous histories (ignoring whether you can slice up space-time into snapshots...)

But I think this is a confusion. Because computations have states and nothing corresponding to transition times between states people are tempted to identify those states with states of consciousness and make an analogy with frames of film in a movie (hence 'the movie graph argument'). But there's a huge mismatch here. A conscious thought has a lot of duration, I'd estimate around 0.02sec. The underlying computation that sustains the quasi-classical brain at the quantum level has a time constant on the order of the Planck time 10^-43sec. And even if it isn't the quantum level that's relevant, it's obvious that most thinking is unconscious and a computer emulating your brain would have to go through many billions or trillions of states to instantiate one moment of consciousness. That means that at the fundamental level (of say the UD) there can be huge overlap between one conscious thought and the next and so they can form a chain, a stream of consciousness.

So there's a certain amount of "mini-death-and-mini-rebirth" going on every second in the normal process of consciousness (in this view). Deciding what counts as a continuation and what doesn't seems a bit ... problematic. (And of course there are many continuations from any given moment.)

Not if there's nothing to overlap. Sure there is, by some measure, a closest next continuation. But when you're eighty years old and fading out on the operating table, it's going to be another eighty year old fading out on some other operating table. I think someone has suggested that if you fade out completely then the next closest continuation could be a newborn infant who is just 'fading in'. Which is a nice thought - but is it you?


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