On 27 Sep 2013, at 02:51, meekerdb wrote:
On 9/26/2013 5:40 PM, LizR wrote:
On 27 September 2013 12:18, meekerdb <[email protected]> wrote:
On 9/26/2013 4:51 PM, chris peck wrote:
"Giving the built-in symmetry of this experiment, if asked before
the experiment about his personal future location, the experiencer
must confess he cannot predict with certainty the personal outcome
of the experiment. He is confronted to an unavoidable uncertainty."
And the situations are very different because prior to
teleportation there is one me, waiting to be duplicated and sent
to both locations. After teleportation there are two 'me's, one at
either location. That effects the probabilities, surely?
Mainly because it makes "I" ambiguous. One answer would be the
probability of me being in Moscow is zero and the probability of me
being in Washington is zero, because I am going to be destroyed.
Another answer would be the probability of me being in Moscow is
one and the probability of me being in Washington is one, because
there are going to be two of me.
Surely this is directly analogous to the situation in the MWI.
The only difference I can see is that in MWI the whole world splits,
and by this I mean that in each branch your body maintains all the
quantum entanglements. In the teleporter it is only the classical
structure of you that can be duplicated (no cloning) and so all the
entanglements are not duplicated (which why you can end up in two
classically different places). Of course that all depends on
assuming MWI is true. Sometimes I think it is a little ironic that
the advocates of MWI reduce everything to computation/information -
but they reject the Bayesian/epistemic interpretation of QM in order
to support it.
I agree. Comp, and QM needs the epistemic interpretation of QM (that's
even why we can suspect the quantization brought by Bp & Dt & p, to be
closer to Everett QM, that the quantization brought by Bp & Dt, or Bp
& p (which exists when p is restricted to the sigma_1 sentences, that
the is the UD in arithmetic).
We have both the many worlds, and a quantum wave describing relative
internal (but plural) first person views.
Bruno
Brent
If I measure a quantum event like a photon bouncing off / through a
semi-silvered mirror, the chances of each result is 50%. In
"classic" qnautum theory I say there is a 50% chance of seeing the
photon reflect, say. In the MWI I do the same, but I am now aware
that the probabilities work out as they do because I'm duplicated
in the process (or two pre-existing but fungible versions of me
have now become distinct - or perhaps 2 lots of infinite numbers of
copies...)
Ignoring the teleporter and just looking at the MWI gives the same
results but is perhaps a bit more intuitive. In the MWI "I" am also
destroyed from moment to moment (or even in classical single-
universe physics, if you attach me to a "brain state" it all gets
very Heraclitean), and/or I am also duplicated from moment to
moment (at least).
But the probabilities still work - I have a 50-50 chance of seeing
the photon bouncing or transmitting, and equivalently I have a
50-50 chance to end up in Moscow or Washington. It just seems less
obvious when I'm the particle in the experiment.
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