On 27 Sep 2013, at 02:51, meekerdb wrote:

On 9/26/2013 5:40 PM, LizR wrote:
On 27 September 2013 12:18, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote:
On 9/26/2013 4:51 PM, chris peck wrote:
"Giving the built-in symmetry of this experiment, if asked before the experiment about his personal future location, the experiencer must confess he cannot predict with certainty the personal outcome of the experiment. He is confronted to an unavoidable uncertainty."

And the situations are very different because prior to teleportation there is one me, waiting to be duplicated and sent to both locations. After teleportation there are two 'me's, one at either location. That effects the probabilities, surely?

Mainly because it makes "I" ambiguous. One answer would be the probability of me being in Moscow is zero and the probability of me being in Washington is zero, because I am going to be destroyed.

Another answer would be the probability of me being in Moscow is one and the probability of me being in Washington is one, because there are going to be two of me.

Surely this is directly analogous to the situation in the MWI.

The only difference I can see is that in MWI the whole world splits, and by this I mean that in each branch your body maintains all the quantum entanglements. In the teleporter it is only the classical structure of you that can be duplicated (no cloning) and so all the entanglements are not duplicated (which why you can end up in two classically different places). Of course that all depends on assuming MWI is true. Sometimes I think it is a little ironic that the advocates of MWI reduce everything to computation/information - but they reject the Bayesian/epistemic interpretation of QM in order to support it.


I agree. Comp, and QM needs the epistemic interpretation of QM (that's even why we can suspect the quantization brought by Bp & Dt & p, to be closer to Everett QM, that the quantization brought by Bp & Dt, or Bp & p (which exists when p is restricted to the sigma_1 sentences, that the is the UD in arithmetic).

We have both the many worlds, and a quantum wave describing relative internal (but plural) first person views.

Bruno




Brent

If I measure a quantum event like a photon bouncing off / through a semi-silvered mirror, the chances of each result is 50%. In "classic" qnautum theory I say there is a 50% chance of seeing the photon reflect, say. In the MWI I do the same, but I am now aware that the probabilities work out as they do because I'm duplicated in the process (or two pre-existing but fungible versions of me have now become distinct - or perhaps 2 lots of infinite numbers of copies...)

Ignoring the teleporter and just looking at the MWI gives the same results but is perhaps a bit more intuitive. In the MWI "I" am also destroyed from moment to moment (or even in classical single- universe physics, if you attach me to a "brain state" it all gets very Heraclitean), and/or I am also duplicated from moment to moment (at least).

But the probabilities still work - I have a 50-50 chance of seeing the photon bouncing or transmitting, and equivalently I have a 50-50 chance to end up in Moscow or Washington. It just seems less obvious when I'm the particle in the experiment.

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