On 27 Sep 2013, at 02:18, meekerdb wrote:
On 9/26/2013 4:51 PM, chris peck wrote:
Hi
Well Im sure that I am missing something important, but I can't see
it so far...
>>The diary is the one that you have with you. You will not have two
diaries, since you cannot experience being in Moscow and Wsahington
at
the same time with contradicting the "survivability" axiom of
COMP. Therefore the probability of the diary containing 'I am in
Washington not Moscow' is decidedly less than 1. That it is precisely
0.5 is a little more debatable, however, particularly in the later
steps.
ISTM you are thinking about things after the teleportation has
occurred. If one of the 'me's is asked after teleportation but
before the doors are opened what are the chances of being in
moscow, then I can see that there is indeterminacy.
But the way the step is formulated is that I am asked prior to
teleportation:
"Giving the built-in symmetry of this experiment, if asked before
the experiment about his personal future location, the experiencer
must confess he cannot predict with certainty the personal outcome
of the experiment. He is confronted to an unavoidable uncertainty."
And the situations are very different because prior to
teleportation there is one me, waiting to be duplicated and sent to
both locations. After teleportation there are two 'me's, one at
either location. That effects the probabilities, surely?
Mainly because it makes "I" ambiguous.
That is why I make precise (as much as needed for the reasoning) the
different notion of "I" used in the reasoning.
The first person I (described by the content of his diary that he
takes with him in the teleportations and self-mutliplication). (The
first person itself is the owner of the diary. despite the diaries
will be multiplied, the person too, and the realtionship between the
persons and their diary will remain exclusive).
And the third person I. Like in "I have two eyes", or this is the
doctor description of my brain at this or that substitution level.
One answer would be the probability of me being in Moscow is zero
and the probability of me being in Washington is zero, because I am
going to be destroyed.
Making comp false.
Another answer would be the probability of me being in Moscow is one
and the probability of me being in Washington is one, because there
are going to be two of me.
That is the 3-views on the 1-views, without listening to the content
of the 1-views; which are "Oh! Washington only", and "Oh Moscow only!".
They can guess that they could not have predicted that *experience*,
of being in only this or that city. If they do it again, they have
perhaps a better understanding about what was asked, and they can bet
they have no idea at all where they might feel to be reconstituted in
the next experience.
Bruno
If I am sufficiently described by the reading process to maintain
'I'ness then this 'I'ness goes to washington and moscow. Given I am
supposed to be a 'comp practitioner' and therefore believe that
nothing over and above the data read constitutes 'I' then, when I
am asked what chance there is of me experiencing moscow in the
future, the probability must be 1. No 1-p indeterminacy.
The indeterminacy of the situation after teleportation is dependent
on an absence of knowledge concerning which 'me' is being asked the
question: 'moscow me' or 'washington me'. But the situation prior
to teleportation is certain because I know I will be both 'moscow
me' and 'washington me'. If you like, both diaries will be
identical up to the point of teleportation.
>> "I disagree that the 'I' concept is illicit in this argument. It
is
upfront with the "folk" concept of surviving an artificial brain
transplant. The 'I' is what survives."
No, I assume comp and assume that comp is sufficient. Them are the
rules of the game. I am not arguing that the comp 'I' is illicit.
The illicit 'I' is something I feel has to be smuggled in
(subconsciously?) to get the feeling of indeterminacy. An
intuition, if you will, that despite trying to assume comp and that
this description is being sent to both places, 'I' (an illicit I)
only ends up at one.
What's "illicit" is the implication forced by language that "I" and
"me" are necessarily singular. If you were the Borg, you would
answer the probability that we will be in Moscow is one and the
probability we will be in Washington is one.
>>That's one of the troubles with intuition pumps. To be quite
honest,
that intuition pump fails me
Perhaps you don't, but it isn't important. I think it is generally
accepted, perhaps not on this list, that one would be banging at
the walls of the teleporter, screaming to be released, certain of
impending death. That kind of intuition. The kind it has been
fruitful not to ignore in our evolutionary past. ;)
Probably not if you really believed in the teleporter. Suppose you
had teleported many times before?
Brent
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