On 9/26/2013 6:00 PM, LizR wrote:
On 27 September 2013 12:51, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net <mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>> wrote:

    On 9/26/2013 5:40 PM, LizR wrote:
    On 27 September 2013 12:18, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net
    <mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>> wrote:

        On 9/26/2013 4:51 PM, chris peck wrote:
        /"Giving the built-in symmetry of this experiment, if asked before the
        experiment about his personal future location, the experiencer must 
confess he
        cannot predict with certainty the personal outcome of the experiment. 
He is
        confronted to an unavoidable uncertainty."/

        And the situations are very different because prior to teleportation 
there is
        one me, waiting to be duplicated and sent to both locations. After
        teleportation there are two 'me's, one at either location. That effects 
        probabilities, surely?

        Mainly because it makes "I" ambiguous. One answer would be the 
probability of
        me being in Moscow is zero and the probability of me being in 
Washington is
        zero, because I am going to be destroyed.

        Another answer would be the probability of me being in Moscow is one 
and the
        probability of me being in Washington is one, because there are going 
to be two
        of me.

    Surely this is directly analogous to the situation in the MWI.

    The only difference I can see is that in MWI the whole world splits, and by 
this I
    mean that in each branch your body maintains all the quantum entanglements. 
 In the
    teleporter it is only the classical structure of you that can be duplicated 
    cloning) and so all the entanglements are not duplicated (which why you can 
end up
    in two classically different places).  Of course that all depends on 
assuming MWI is
    true.  Sometimes I think it is a little ironic that the advocates of MWI 
    everything to computation/information - but they reject the 
    interpretation of QM in order to support it.

Good point, which I would say depends on exactly how the teleporter actually works. (Are we, for the sake of argument, assuming "Heisenberg compensators" ? :-)

I assume that in comp the substitution level is assumed to be above the level of quantum entanglement - indeed, all that has to be duplicated is the data structure that is (supposedly) stored in your brain. That is presumably classical data, not qubits. So the same argument would apply if a copy of you is made in a computer.

That's what must be assumed for the teleporter to work. But then Bruno hypothesizes that the world is made of computations (by the UD) at the most fundamental level which means at the quantum level (or lower) and the quantum uncertainty comes from the uncertainty of you being 'duplicated' in MW.

This is of course pushing the idea of the brain as digital computer (or emulable by one) as far as it will go, to see if the wheels come off. The question is, do they?

I don't think so, but it's not completely clear to me. For one thing both the brain and the digital computer are (if comp is right) classical objects. That means from a quantum view they must be represented by "bundles" or "threads" of computations (like Feynman paths) to take account of all the entanglement with the environment that makes them (quasi) classical. This entanglement will be different when you plug and electronic artificial neuron in place of a biological one. Presumably this doesn't make any significant difference in 'you', but it *could* make a difference in some circumstance and the arguments to dispense with the physical seems to rely on anticipating all those possible counterfactuals. Which is why I suspect you can't dispense with the physical even if it's not fundamental.


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