On 9/26/2013 6:00 PM, LizR wrote:
On 27 September 2013 12:51, meekerdb <[email protected]
<mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:
On 9/26/2013 5:40 PM, LizR wrote:
On 27 September 2013 12:18, meekerdb <[email protected]
<mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:
On 9/26/2013 4:51 PM, chris peck wrote:
/"Giving the built-in symmetry of this experiment, if asked before the
experiment about his personal future location, the experiencer must
confess he
cannot predict with certainty the personal outcome of the experiment.
He is
confronted to an unavoidable uncertainty."/
And the situations are very different because prior to teleportation
there is
one me, waiting to be duplicated and sent to both locations. After
teleportation there are two 'me's, one at either location. That effects
the
probabilities, surely?
Mainly because it makes "I" ambiguous. One answer would be the
probability of
me being in Moscow is zero and the probability of me being in
Washington is
zero, because I am going to be destroyed.
Another answer would be the probability of me being in Moscow is one
and the
probability of me being in Washington is one, because there are going
to be two
of me.
Surely this is directly analogous to the situation in the MWI.
The only difference I can see is that in MWI the whole world splits, and by
this I
mean that in each branch your body maintains all the quantum entanglements.
In the
teleporter it is only the classical structure of you that can be duplicated
(no
cloning) and so all the entanglements are not duplicated (which why you can
end up
in two classically different places). Of course that all depends on
assuming MWI is
true. Sometimes I think it is a little ironic that the advocates of MWI
reduce
everything to computation/information - but they reject the
Bayesian/epistemic
interpretation of QM in order to support it.
Good point, which I would say depends on exactly how the teleporter actually works. (Are
we, for the sake of argument, assuming "Heisenberg compensators" ? :-)
I assume that in comp the substitution level is assumed to be above the level of quantum
entanglement - indeed, all that has to be duplicated is the data structure that is
(supposedly) stored in your brain. That is presumably classical data, not qubits. So the
same argument would apply if a copy of you is made in a computer.
That's what must be assumed for the teleporter to work. But then Bruno hypothesizes that
the world is made of computations (by the UD) at the most fundamental level which means at
the quantum level (or lower) and the quantum uncertainty comes from the uncertainty of you
being 'duplicated' in MW.
This is of course pushing the idea of the brain as digital computer (or emulable by one)
as far as it will go, to see if the wheels come off. The question is, do they?
I don't think so, but it's not completely clear to me. For one thing both the brain and
the digital computer are (if comp is right) classical objects. That means from a quantum
view they must be represented by "bundles" or "threads" of computations (like Feynman
paths) to take account of all the entanglement with the environment that makes them
(quasi) classical. This entanglement will be different when you plug and electronic
artificial neuron in place of a biological one. Presumably this doesn't make any
significant difference in 'you', but it *could* make a difference in some circumstance and
the arguments to dispense with the physical seems to rely on anticipating all those
possible counterfactuals. Which is why I suspect you can't dispense with the physical
even if it's not fundamental.
Brent
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