On 27 Sep 2013, at 03:20, meekerdb wrote:

On 9/26/2013 6:00 PM, LizR wrote:On 27 September 2013 12:51, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote: On 9/26/2013 5:40 PM, LizR wrote:On 27 September 2013 12:18, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote: On 9/26/2013 4:51 PM, chris peck wrote:"Giving the built-in symmetry of this experiment, if asked beforethe experiment about his personal future location, theexperiencer must confess he cannot predict with certainty thepersonal outcome of the experiment. He is confronted to anunavoidable uncertainty."And the situations are very different because prior toteleportation there is one me, waiting to be duplicated and sentto both locations. After teleportation there are two 'me's, oneat either location. That effects the probabilities, surely?Mainly because it makes "I" ambiguous. One answer would be theprobability of me being in Moscow is zero and the probability ofme being in Washington is zero, because I am going to be destroyed.Another answer would be the probability of me being in Moscow isone and the probability of me being in Washington is one, becausethere are going to be two of me.Surely this is directly analogous to the situation in the MWI.The only difference I can see is that in MWI the whole worldsplits, and by this I mean that in each branch your body maintainsall the quantum entanglements. In the teleporter it is only theclassical structure of you that can be duplicated (no cloning) andso all the entanglements are not duplicated (which why you can endup in two classically different places). Of course that alldepends on assuming MWI is true. Sometimes I think it is a littleironic that the advocates of MWI reduce everything to computation/information - but they reject the Bayesian/epistemic interpretationof QM in order to support it.Good point, which I would say depends on exactly how the teleporteractually works. (Are we, for the sake of argument, assuming"Heisenberg compensators" ? :-)I assume that in comp the substitution level is assumed to be abovethe level of quantum entanglement - indeed, all that has to beduplicated is the data structure that is (supposedly) stored inyour brain. That is presumably classical data, not qubits. So thesame argument would apply if a copy of you is made in a computer.That's what must be assumed for the teleporter to work. But thenBruno hypothesizes that the world is made of computations (by the UD)

`Not really. I assume only that our brain is Turing emulable (in a`

`large sense of brain). Then I explain why if that is the case, there`

`is no world made of computations, there are only computations,`

`determining consciousness flux, and physical realities are invariant`

`pattern in such consciousness flux. I take into account that a`

`universal turing machine cannot distinguish anything (computable or`

`not) from a diophantine approximation of its local history, so that`

`physics is build from the statistical appearance on infinities of`

`diophantine equations, or more simply any one universal.`

at the most fundamental level which means at the quantum level (orlower) and the quantum uncertainty comes from the uncertainty of youbeing 'duplicated' in MW.

`More precisely, of you multiplied in infinities of solutions of a`

`Diophantine universal equation (to put it in this way).`

`The point being that this is not true, but that 1) it follows from`

`comp, and 2) it is testable/refutable.`

This is of course pushing the idea of the brain as digital computer(or emulable by one) as far as it will go, to see if the wheelscome off. The question is, do they?I don't think so, but it's not completely clear to me. For onething both the brain and the digital computer are (if comp is right)classical objects.

`Only above the substitution level (an that's part of hat we have still`

`to justify, the apparent winning of many classical universal machines).`

That means from a quantum view they must be represented by "bundles"or "threads" of computations (like Feynman paths) to take accountof all the entanglement with the environment that makes them (quasi)classical. This entanglement will be different when you plug andelectronic artificial neuron in place of a biological one.Presumably this doesn't make any significant difference in 'you',but it *could* make a difference in some circumstance and thearguments to dispense with the physical seems to rely onanticipating all those possible counterfactuals. Which is why Isuspect you can't dispense with the physical even if it's notfundamental.

`Absolutely. Although with comp this is not entirely clear in "near`

`death" state and in some possible persistent dreamy states.`

`At some point "physical" has to be made more precise, and for the`

`machine, I suspect three different notions of physical. Life and`

`(some) afterlife may have different physics, for example. We must dig`

`deeper in machine's theology.`

`Quantization appears, with p sigma_1 arithmetical, on the knower (Bp &`

`p), the observer (Bp & Dt), the feeler (Bp & Dt & p).`

`Comp compromises with Everett and Fuchs-Pauli, we have many relative`

`states of mind, distributed in arithmetic.`

Bruno

Brent --You received this message because you are subscribed to the GoogleGroups "Everything List" group.To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it,send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.