On 01 Oct 2013, at 17:48, John Clark wrote:
On Tue, Oct 1, 2013 at 8:42 AM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]>
wrote:
> Your reasoning would show that in Everett QM, where we have also
many different futures,
Yes.
> but as Everett explained, the indeterminacy remains, it just
become first person
Forget Everett, forget Quantum Mechanics, even in pure Newtonian
physics subjective indeterminacy exists because of lack of
information. If you knew the exact speed things were moving at and
the coefficient of friction and the aerodynamic drag on the ball in
a Roulette Wheel you could figure out what number the wheel would
produce, but you don't so the number is indeterminate for you. Big
deal.
You miss the nuance between the origin of the indeterminacies, but
that's OK with me, as you seem to agree with the 1/2 in the self-
duplication, so I look forward hearing you on step 4.
> Just give us an algorithm refuting that first person indeterminacy.
You want me to give you a algorithm that can generate important
information with absolutely nothing to work with? I have no such
algorithm.
If you don't have an algorihm, then, given that you have agreed that
you will survive (not die) in that experience, and given that you have
agreed all possibilities are lived as unique by the continuers, this
confession means that you do agree there is an uncertainty.
Again, proceed.
On the TV game show "Let's Make a Deal" Monty Hall (God in your
terminology) knows with absolute certainty exactly which of the 3
doors the car is behind, but you're just a contestant and don't have
all the information that Monty has, so for you the position of the
car is indeterminate and all you can do is play the odds.
A new car is behind one door and a goat behind the other two, you
pick a door at random and Monty opens a door you didn't pick and
shows you a goat and gives you the opportunity to change your choice
of a door if you wish. Monty knows what door the prize is behind and
you do not, so Monty could pick the correct door with a probability
of 100% but the best you can do at first is 33.3%, after he lets you
change your choice and pick another door you know a little more and
your probability increases to 66.6%, Monty's probability stays at
100% and the thing itself, the new car, has no probability at all.
If Everett is right then it's exactly the same for a electron, it
has no probability at all and indeterminacy is just a measure of our
lack of information; if Copenhagen is right then probability is an
inherent part of the electron itself.
No problem with any of this.
Please proceed to step 4, or explain why you do not want to proceed,
as you said once.
In step 4, you are still read and annihilated in Helsinki, the
information to build the copy are still sent to Washington and Moscow,
but in Moscow the reconstitution is delayed for one year.
The protocol is known by the candidate person in Helsinki, and the
question is the same as in step 3. What do you expect to live when
pushing on the button, will it be statistically different, etc.
Bruno
John K Clark
The last one you gave was directly refuted by both copies after the
duplication.
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
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