On Tue, Oct 1, 2013 at 8:42 AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:

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> Your reasoning would show that in Everett QM, where we have also many > different futures, Yes. > but as Everett explained, the indeterminacy remains, it just become > first person Forget Everett, forget Quantum Mechanics, even in pure Newtonian physics subjective indeterminacy exists because of lack of information. If you knew the exact speed things were moving at and the coefficient of friction and the aerodynamic drag on the ball in a Roulette Wheel you could figure out what number the wheel would produce, but you don't so the number is indeterminate for you. Big deal. > Just give us an algorithm refuting that first person indeterminacy. You want me to give you a algorithm that can generate important information with absolutely nothing to work with? I have no such algorithm. On the TV game show "Let's Make a Deal" Monty Hall (God in your terminology) knows with absolute certainty exactly which of the 3 doors the car is behind, but you're just a contestant and don't have all the information that Monty has, so for you the position of the car is indeterminate and all you can do is play the odds. A new car is behind one door and a goat behind the other two, you pick a door at random and Monty opens a door you didn't pick and shows you a goat and gives you the opportunity to change your choice of a door if you wish. Monty knows what door the prize is behind and you do not, so Monty could pick the correct door with a probability of 100% but the best you can do at first is 33.3%, after he lets you change your choice and pick another door you know a little more and your probability increases to 66.6%, Monty's probability stays at 100% and the thing itself, the new car, has no probability at all. If Everett is right then it's exactly the same for a electron, it has no probability at all and indeterminacy is just a measure of our lack of information; if Copenhagen is right then probability is an inherent part of the electron itself. John K Clark > The last one you gave was directly refuted by both copies after the > duplication. > > > Bruno > > > > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~**marchal/ <http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/> > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to > everything-list+unsubscribe@**googlegroups.com<everything-list%2bunsubscr...@googlegroups.com> > . > To post to this group, send email to > everything-list@googlegroups.**com<everything-list@googlegroups.com> > . > Visit this group at > http://groups.google.com/**group/everything-list<http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list> > . > For more options, visit > https://groups.google.com/**groups/opt_out<https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out> > . > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.