On 08 Oct 2013, at 17:59, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Tuesday, October 8, 2013 3:40:53 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 07 Oct 2013, at 17:20, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Monday, October 7, 2013 3:56:55 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 06 Oct 2013, at 22:00, Craig Weinberg wrote:
Qualia is experience which contains the felt relation to all other
experiences; specific experiences which directly relate, and
extended experiential contexts which extent to eternity (totality
of manifested events so far relative to the participant plus semi-
potential events which relate to higher octaves of their
participation...the bigger picture with the larger now.)
Then qualia are infinite. This contradict some of your previous
statement.
It's not qualia that is finite or infinite, it is finity-infinity
itself that is an intellectual quale.
OK. But this does not mean it is not also objective. The set of
dividers of 24 is finite. The set of multiple of 24 is infinite. For
example.
It might not be objective, just common and consistent because it
ultimately reflects itself, and because it reflects reflection. It
may be the essence of objectivity, but from the absolute
perspective, objectivity is the imposter - the power of sense to
approximate itself without genuine embodiment.
Is the statement that the set of dividers is finite objectively
true, or is it contingent upon ruling out rational numbers? Can't we
just designate a variable, k = {the imaginary set of infinite
dividers of 24}?
"Absolute" can be used once we agree on the definition. The fact that
some alien write 1+1=4 for our 1+1=2, just because they define 4 by
s(s(0)), would not made 1+1=2 less absolute.
The fact that we are interested in integers dividing integers might be
contingent, but that does not make contingent the fact that the set of
dividers of 24 is a finite set of integers.
Quanta is derived from qualia, so quantitative characteristics have
ambiguous application outside of quanta.
Yes, quanta comes from the Löbian qualia, in a 100% verifiable way.
Indeed. But that is again a consequence of computationalism.
Why isn't computationalism the consequence of quanta though?
Human computationalism does.
But I want the simplest conceptual theory, and integers are easier to
define than human integers.
What can be computed other than quantities?
Quantities are easily computed by stopping machines, but most machines
does not stop, and when they introspect, the theory explains why they
get troubled by consciousness, qualia, etc. Those qualia are not
really computed, they are part of non computable truth, but which
still bear on machines or machine's perspective.
Qualia is what we are made of. As human beings at this stage of
human civilization, our direct qualia is primarily cognitive-
logical-verbal. We identify with our ability to describe with
words - to qualify other qualia as verbal qualia. We name our
perceptions and name our naming power 'mind', but that is not
consciousness. Logic and intellect can only name public-facing
reductions of certain qualia (visible and tangible qualia - the
stuff of public bodies). The name for those public-facing
reductions is quanta, or numbers, and the totality of the playing
field which can be used for the quanta game is called arithmetic
truth.
Arithmetical truth is full of non nameable things. Qualia refer to
non verbally describable first person truth.
Can arithmetical truth really name anything?
I am not sure Arithmetical Truth can be seen as a person, or
anything capable of naming things. You are stretching the words too
much. I guess that if you make your statement more precise, it will
lead to an open problem in comp.
If Arithmetic truth is full of non nameable things, what nameable
things does it also contain,
The numbers, the recursive properties, the recursively enumarable
properties, the Sigma_i truth, well a lot of things.
You have the recursive (the simplest in our comp setting), then the
recursively enumerable (the universal machines, notably), then a whole
hierarchy of non computable, but still nameable set of numbers, or
machine's properties, then you got the non nameable properties, like
true (for number relations) but very plausibly, things like
consciousness, persons, etc.
Some of those non nameable things can still be studied by machines,
through assumptions, and approximations.
Above that you have the truth that you cannot even approximated, etc.
Arithmetical truth is big, *very* big.
and what or who is naming them?
The machines. (in the comp setting, despite the machines theology does
refer to higher non-machine entities capable of naming things. That's
the case for the first order logical G* (which I note usually qG*,
this one needs more than arithmetical truth, but it is normal as it
describes an intensional (modal) views by a sort of God (Truth) about
the machine. here the miracle is that its zero order logical
(propositional) part is decidable.
Otherwise wouldn't it be tautological to say that it is full of non
nameable things, as it would be to say that water is full of non dry
things.
? (here you stretch an analogy to far, I think).
It seems to me that we can use arithmetic truth to locate a number
within the infinity of computable realtions, but any 'naming' is
only our own attempt to attach a proprietary first person sense to
that which is irreducibly generic and nameless. The thing about
qualia is not that it is non-nameable, it is the specific aesthetic
presence that is manifested. Names are just qualia of mental
association - a rose by any other name, etc.
I think this could be made more precise by taking "our" in the
Löbian sense.
If quanta is Löbian qualia, why would it need any non-quantitative
names?
? (to fuzzy question, sorry, try to make this more clear perhaps).
Bruno
Craig
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
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