On Tuesday, October 8, 2013 12:34:57 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
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> On 08 Oct 2013, at 17:59, Craig Weinberg wrote:
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> On Tuesday, October 8, 2013 3:40:53 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
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>> On 07 Oct 2013, at 17:20, Craig Weinberg wrote:
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>> On Monday, October 7, 2013 3:56:55 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
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>>> On 06 Oct 2013, at 22:00, Craig Weinberg wrote:
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>>> Qualia is experience which contains the felt relation to all other 
>>> experiences; specific experiences which directly relate, and extended 
>>> experiential contexts which extent to eternity (totality of manifested 
>>> events so far relative to the participant plus semi-potential events which 
>>> relate to higher octaves of their participation...the bigger picture with 
>>> the larger now.)
>>>
>>>
>>> Then qualia are infinite. This contradict some of your previous 
>>> statement. 
>>>
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>> It's not qualia that is finite or infinite, it is finity-infinity itself 
>> that is an intellectual quale. 
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>> OK. But this does not mean it is not also objective. The set of dividers 
>> of 24 is finite. The set of multiple of 24 is infinite. For example.
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> It might not be objective, just common and consistent because it 
> ultimately reflects itself, and because it reflects reflection. It may be 
> the essence of objectivity, but from the absolute perspective, objectivity 
> is the imposter - the power of sense to approximate itself without genuine 
> embodiment.
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> Is the statement that the set of dividers is finite objectively true, or 
> is it contingent upon ruling out rational numbers? Can't we just designate 
> a variable, k = {the imaginary set of infinite dividers of 24}? 
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> "Absolute" can be used once we agree on the definition. The fact that some 
> alien write 1+1=4 for our 1+1=2, just because they define 4 by s(s(0)), 
> would not made 1+1=2 less absolute.
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> The fact that we are interested in integers dividing integers might be 
> contingent, but that does not make contingent the fact that the set of 
> dividers of 24 is a finite set of integers.
>

Sure, but anything that is natural has self-consistent wholeness and can 
seem like a universal given if we focus our attention only on that. If it 
were truly not contingent it would be impossible for anyone to get a math 
problem wrong. As far as I can tell, the idea of an integer is an 
abstraction of countable solid objects that we use to objectify our own 
cognitive products. It doesn't seem very useful when it comes to 
representing non-solids, non-objects, or non-cognitive phenomenology.


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>> Quanta is derived from qualia, so quantitative characteristics have 
>> ambiguous application outside of quanta.
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>> Yes, quanta comes from the Löbian qualia, in a 100% verifiable way. 
>> Indeed. But that is again a consequence of computationalism.
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> Why isn't computationalism the consequence of quanta though? 
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> Human computationalism does.
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> But I want the simplest conceptual theory, and integers are easier to 
> define than human integers.
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I'm not sure how that relates to computationalism being something other 
than quanta. Humans are easier to define to themselves than integers. A 
baby can be themselves for years before counting to 10. 
 

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> What can be computed other than quantities?
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> Quantities are easily computed by stopping machines, but most machines 
> does not stop, and when they introspect, the theory explains why they get 
> troubled by consciousness, qualia, etc. Those qualia are not really 
> computed, they are part of non computable truth, but which still bear on 
> machines or machine's perspective.
>

Then you still have an explanatory gap. How can anything which is 
non-computable bear on the computation of an ideal machine? What connects 
the qualia to the quanta, and why isn't the qualia just quantitative 
summaries of quanta?
 

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>>> Qualia is what we are made of. As human beings at this stage of human 
>>> civilization, our direct qualia is primarily cognitive-logical-verbal. We 
>>> identify with our ability to describe with words - to qualify other qualia 
>>> as verbal qualia. We name our perceptions and name our naming power 'mind', 
>>> but that is not consciousness. Logic and intellect can only name 
>>> public-facing reductions of certain qualia (visible and tangible qualia - 
>>> the stuff of public bodies). The name for those public-facing reductions is 
>>> quanta, or numbers, and the totality of the playing field which can be used 
>>> for the quanta game is called arithmetic truth.
>>>
>>>
>>> Arithmetical truth is full of non nameable things. Qualia refer to non 
>>> verbally describable first person truth.
>>>
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>> Can arithmetical truth really name anything? 
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>> I am not sure Arithmetical Truth can be seen as a person, or anything 
>> capable of naming things. You are stretching the words too much. I guess 
>> that if you make your statement more precise, it will lead to an open 
>> problem in comp.
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> If Arithmetic truth is full of non nameable things, what nameable things 
> does it also contain, 
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> The numbers, the recursive properties, the recursively enumarable 
> properties, the Sigma_i truth, well a lot of things.
> You have the recursive (the simplest in our comp setting), then the 
> recursively enumerable (the universal machines, notably), then a whole 
> hierarchy of non computable, but still nameable set of numbers, or 
> machine's properties, 
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You say they are nameable, but I don't believe you. It is not as if a 
number would ever need to go by some other name. Why not refer to it by its 
precise coordinate within Arithmetic Truth?
 

> then you got the non nameable properties, like true (for number relations) 
> but very plausibly, things like consciousness, persons, etc. 
> Some of those non nameable things can still be studied by machines, 
> through assumptions, and approximations.
> Above that you have the truth that you cannot even approximated, etc.
> Arithmetical truth is big, *very* big.
>

Big, sure, but that's exactly why it needs no names at all. Each feature 
and meta-feature of Arithmetic truth can only be found at its own address. 
What point would there be in adding a fictional label on something that is 
pervasively and factually true?


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> and what or who is naming them? 
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> The machines. (in the comp setting, despite the machines theology does 
> refer to higher non-machine entities capable of naming things. That's the 
> case for the first order logical G* (which I note usually qG*, this one 
> needs more than arithmetical truth, but it is normal as it describes an 
> intensional (modal) views by a sort of God (Truth) about the machine. here 
> the miracle is that its zero order logical (propositional) part is 
> decidable.
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I don't think that names and machines are compatible in any way. 
Programmers of machines might use names, but once compiled, all high level 
terms are crushed into the digital sand that the machine can digest. No 
trace of proprietary intent remains.

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> Otherwise wouldn't it be tautological to say that it is full of non 
> nameable things, as it would be to say that water is full of non dry things.
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> ? (here you stretch an analogy to far, I think).
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Could be, but I don't know until I hear the counter-argument.
 

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>> It seems to me that we can use arithmetic truth to locate a number within 
>> the infinity of computable realtions, but any 'naming' is only our own 
>> attempt to attach a proprietary first person sense to that which is 
>> irreducibly generic and nameless. The thing about qualia is not that it is 
>> non-nameable, it is the specific aesthetic presence that is manifested. 
>> Names are just qualia of mental association - a rose by any other name, 
>> etc. 
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>> I think this could be made more precise by taking "our" in the Löbian 
>> sense.
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> If quanta is Löbian qualia, why would it need any non-quantitative names?
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> ?  (to fuzzy question, sorry, try to make this more clear perhaps).
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You said earlier that quanta is Löbian qualia, and then you are saying 
above that naming is one of the things that Löbians (persons? machines?) 
do, so I am asking why don't they just use quanta instead of 
non-quantitative qualia?

Craig


> Bruno
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> Craig
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>> Bruno
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>> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
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