On Thu, Oct 10, 2013 at 1:51 AM, Craig Weinberg <whatsons...@gmail.com>wrote:

>
>
> On Wednesday, October 9, 2013 4:56:45 PM UTC-4, Platonist Guitar Cowboy
> wrote:
>
>>
>>
>>
>> On Wed, Oct 9, 2013 at 8:39 PM, Craig Weinberg <whats...@gmail.com>wrote:
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Wednesday, October 9, 2013 11:18:03 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> On 09 Oct 2013, at 15:43, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> On Wednesday, October 9, 2013 3:18:52 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> On 08 Oct 2013, at 20:12, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> On Tuesday, October 8, 2013 12:34:57 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> On 08 Oct 2013, at 17:59, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Why isn't computationalism the consequence of quanta though?
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Human computationalism does.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> But I want the simplest conceptual theory, and integers are easier to
>>>>>> define than human integers.
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> I'm not sure how that relates to computationalism being something
>>>>> other than quanta. Humans are easier to define to themselves than 
>>>>> integers.
>>>>> A baby can be themselves for years before counting to 10.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Phenomenologically? Yes.
>>>>> Fundamentally? That does not follow. It took a long time before
>>>>> discovering the Higgs-Englert-Brout Boson.
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> It doesn't have to follow, but it can be a clue. The Higgs is a
>>>> particular type of elementary phenomenon which is not accessible to us
>>>> directly. That would not be the case with Comp if we were in fact using
>>>> only computation. If our world was composed on every level by computation
>>>> alone,
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Hmm.... It is not obvious, and not well known, but if comp is true,
>>>> then "our world" is not "made of" computations.
>>>> Our world is "only" an appearance in a multi-user arithmetical video
>>>> game or dream.
>>>>
>>>
>>> That's the problem though, what is an "appearance"? How can an
>>> arithmetic game become video or dreamlike in any way? This is what I keep
>>> talking about - the Presentation problem. Comp is pulling aesthetic
>>> experiences out of thin air. without a specific theory of what they are or
>>> how they are manufactured by computation or arithmetic.
>>>
>>
>> No, that is you and your personalized definition of aesthetic experience
>> that has nothing to do with any standard interpretation of the term
>>
>
> It's not a personalized definition, it is an uncontroversial comment about
> the nature of appearance versus the nature of that which has no appearance.
>

So you do allow for primary substance without appearance? What does "that"
refer to?


> If your arm is in pain, you can have a local *anesthetic* at the site so
> that the pain disappears, or you can have a general *anesthetic* and your
> entire experience disappears. When you wake up and your experience appears,
> or when your arm appears to hurt again, it should not be a problem to
> describe that* what has returned is a non-an-esthetic, therefore aesthetic
> *. It's not a definition, it's a description.
>
>
>> , and where you default to "what I like about aesthetic..." free
>> association to fit your current mood and the exchange you're involved in,
>> when prompted these days.
>>
>
> Let the unsupported accusations begin.
>

If you want to interpret it that way, I may have formulated a bit sharply.
I am just asking: Who is sensing what?


>
>
>>
>> Comp doesn't need to pull aesthetic experience, in it's standard
>> interpretations from anywhere.
>>
>
> Why would that be true?
>

Because the problem is still open as I am unaware of any work done in this
area. Aesthetics, both as theory and in informal use, refers to standard
humanist model. Different ontologies.


> Aesthetics exist, do they not? There is a difference between feeling pain
> and pain relief, right? So why would a computation hurt? Before you answer,
> you have to ask whether your justification for the existence of pain isn't
> based entirely in experience rather than computation. Certainly, were it
> not for your own experience of pain, there would be no reason to invent
> such a thing to explain anything that happens in a computation.
>

I am undecided on ultimate nature of self although I can guess what you'd
like to hear and what not. I will not rehash the whole sensation/relation
debate.


>
>
>> In the case of music, the vast majority of music theories, if not all,
>> are number based.
>>
>
> Music theory is not music though.
>

True, but what is music?


> Numbers do not create music.
>

Not sure on that.


> Music, like computation, can only exist as a consequence of awareness, not
> as a replacement for it.
>

>
>> Multisense realism is puling aesthetic experience from thin air, as you
>> constantly evade the question:
>>
>
> Just the opposite. Sense is in the name. I start from aesthetic
> experience. It could just as easily be called 'Pan-aesthetic Realism'. By
> aesthetic I mean sense - experiential contents.
>
>
Who is sensing what?


>
>> I can see how I can derive music and improvisation from counting and
>> numbers;
>>
>
> Can you teach a pocket calculator to make music without adding anything?
> Why not?
>

There is progress on this. Check out programs like Band in a Box. You input
some basic parameters, like harmonies, time signatures, melodies, breaks
etc. and the program composes the rest. We're not at Mahler yet, but a
passing grade for a cyborg Bill Evans block chord improvisation is already
achieved, for example.


>
>
>> can multisense realism show me how to do the same?
>>
>
> You can't derive music from anything except human experience.
>

Not "where" but "how" was my question.


> MSR begins by acknowledging that instead of denying it.
>
> There is no theory of non-human music. Numbers do not turn into sounds
> when they leave Platonia and teleport into our eardrums.
>
>
>> Because given all the claims on how central aesthetic experience is, it
>> should at least offer some clues, if not be even better than numbers.
>>
>
> The clues that MSR offers lie in the superposition of the totality of
> experience (eternity) and particular experience. Music is an irreducibly
> anthropological qualia.
>

I agree with the irreducible part. The properties of arithmetic that I can
wrap my brain around are not only sufficient in offering a clue as to the
"why" of music; they are also essential in the construction and production
of music.

Even some tribal shaman will have a drone frequency that is "the one",
"center", or will count to create polyrhythms with their entrancing
qualities. Even somebody singing in the shower will have assigned some
frequency to be "one" or tonal center of the melody or line they are
humming. If they have groove, they will count more or less precisely. Zero
music theory from first person pov; still numbers.


> It is of the moment and it is timeless. It exploits metric isomorphisms
> between qualia on the personal level and the sub-personal physiological
> levels and the super-personal archetypal levels. Music is indeed very
> mathematical, because of the isomorphism across multiple frames is
> inherently mathematical, but mathematics is not sufficient to explain
> music. If there were no hearing, there would be no music. You can look at
> the mathematical patterns of a song visual without experiencing a song or
> music.
>
>
>>
>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> it wouldn't make much sense for people to have to learn to count
>>>> integers only after years of aesthetic saturation.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> What can be computed other than quantities?
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Quantities are easily computed by stopping machines, but most
>>>>>> machines does not stop, and when they introspect, the theory explains why
>>>>>> they get troubled by consciousness, qualia, etc. Those qualia are not
>>>>>> really computed, they are part of non computable truth, but which still
>>>>>> bear on machines or machine's perspective.
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Then you still have an explanatory gap.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> But that is a good point for comp, as it explains why there is a gap,
>>>>> and it imposes on it a precise mathematical structure.
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> But there's nothing on the other side of the gap from the comp view.
>>>> You're still just finding a gap in comp that comp says is supposed to be
>>>> there and then presuming that the entire universe other than comp must fit
>>>> in there. If there is nothing within comp to specifically indicate color or
>>>> flavor or kinesthetic sensations, or even the lines and shapes of geometry,
>>>> then I don't see how comp can claim to be a theory that relates to
>>>> consciousness.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> There is something in the comp theory which specifically indicate
>>>> qualia.
>>>> The gaps in the intensional nuances could very well do that.
>>>>
>>>
>>> But flavors and colors aren't gaps.
>>>
>>
>> You do not know what Bruno is referring to and are changing the question.
>> If you do know which intensional nuances he is referring to, then explain
>> them and why gaps as colors would be inappropriate.
>>
>
> An intensional nuance would, I assume, be something like the idiosyncratic
> details of a computation's functioning. The idea that there are gaps I
> interpret as relating to incompleteness etc. as something like 'that which,
> by the nature of computation, cannot be computed'. By that definition,
> colors would be no more or less appropriate than flavors, or flags, or
> Shakespeares per second. There is no science in claiming that the Emperor
> could be wearing clothes in another dimension.
>

Nor is there any science in revealing relations between entities not
specified.


>
>
>
>>
>>> It would be like painting with invisible paint.
>>>
>>
>> UV paint. 5.40$ at Ebay.
>>
>
> You mean paint that is visible only under UV light, not 'paint that will
> never be visible'...which is what 'invisible paint' would be.
>
>
>>
>>
>>> How does theory become visible to itself, and why would it?
>>>
>>
>> Black lights. To party and have indiscriminate fun, in this case. PGC
>>
>
> Theories don't have fun, and they can't be indiscriminate. Theory is
> discrimination.
>
>

I was having fun. But maybe I am just a bad humorless theory of the
multiverse though :-) PGC


>
> Craig
>
>
>>
>>>
>>>
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