On Tue, Oct 8, 2013 at 11:18 AM, Craig Weinberg <whatsons...@gmail.com>wrote:
> > > On Tuesday, October 8, 2013 10:10:25 AM UTC-4, Jason wrote: > >> >> >> >> On Sun, Oct 6, 2013 at 3:00 PM, Craig Weinberg <whats...@gmail.com>wrote: >> >>> >>> >>> On Sunday, October 6, 2013 5:06:31 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>> >>>> >>>> On 06 Oct 2013, at 03:17, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: >>>> >>>> > On 5 October 2013 00:40, Bruno Marchal <mar...@ulb.ac.be> wrote: >>>> > >>>> >>> The argument is simply summarised thus: it is impossible even for >>>> >>> God >>>> >>> to make a brain prosthesis that reproduces the I/O behaviour but >>>> has >>>> >>> different qualia. This is a proof of comp, >>>> >> >>>> >> >>>> >> Hmm... I can agree, but eventually no God can make such a >>>> >> prothesis, only >>>> >> because the qualia is an attribute of the "immaterial person", and >>>> >> not of >>>> >> the brain, body, or computer. Then the prosthesis will manifest >>>> >> the person >>>> >> if it emulates the correct level. >>>> > >>>> > But if the qualia are attributed to the substance of the physical >>>> > brain then where is the problem making a prosthesis that replicates >>>> > the behaviour but not the qualia? >>>> > The problem is that it would allow >>>> > one to make a partial zombie, which I think is absurd. Therefore, the >>>> > qualia cannot be attributed to the substance of the physical brain. >>>> >>>> I agree. >>>> >>>> Note that in that case the qualia is no more attributed to an >>>> immaterial person, but to a piece of primary matter. >>>> In that case, both comp and functionalism (in your sense, not in >>>> Putnam's usual sense of functionalism which is a particular case of >>>> comp) are wrong. >>>> >>>> Then, it is almost obvious that an immaterial being cannot distinguish >>>> >>>> between a primarily material incarnation, and an immaterial one, as it >>>> >>>> would need some magic (non Turing emulable) ability to make the >>>> difference. People agreeing with this do no more need the UDA step 8 >>>> (which is an attempt to make this more rigorous or clear). >>>> >>>> I might criticize, as a devil's advocate, a little bit the partial- >>>> zombie argument. Very often some people pretend that they feel less >>>> conscious after some drink of vodka, but that they are still able to >>>> behave normally. Of course those people are notoriously wrong. It is >>>> just that alcohol augments a fake self-confidence feeling, which >>>> typically is not verified (in the laboratory, or more sadly on the >>>> roads). Also, they confuse "less conscious" with "blurred >>>> consciousness", >>>> >>> >>> Why wouldn't less consciousness have the effect of seeming blurred? If >>> your battery is dying in a device, the device might begin to fail in >>> numerous ways, but those are all symptoms of the battery dying - of the >>> device becoming less reliable as different parts are unavailable at >>> different times. >>> >>> Think of qualia as a character in a long story, which is divided into >>> episodes. If, for instance, someone starts watching a show like Breaking >>> Bad only in the last season, they have no explicit understanding of who >>> Walter White is or why he behaves like he does, where Jesse came from, etc. >>> They can only pick up what is presented directly in that episode, so his >>> character is relatively flat. The difference between the appreciation of >>> the last episode by someone who has seen the entire series on HDTV and >>> someone who has only read the closed captioning of the last episode on >>> Twitter is like the difference between a human being's qualia and the >>> qualia which is available through a logical imitation of a human bring. >>> >>> Qualia is experience which contains the felt relation to all other >>> experiences; specific experiences which directly relate, and extended >>> experiential contexts which extent to eternity (totality of manifested >>> events so far relative to the participant plus semi-potential events which >>> relate to higher octaves of their participation...the bigger picture with >>> the larger now.) >>> >>> >> >> Craig, >> >> I agree with you that there is some "building up" required to create a >> full and rich human experience, which cannot happen in a single instance or >> with a single CPU instruction being executed. However, where I disagree >> with you is in how long it takes for all the particulars of the experience >> to be generated from the computation. I don't think it requires >> re-calculating the entire history of the human race, or life itself on some >> planet. I think it can be done by comparing relations to memories and data >> stored entirely within the brain itself; say within 0.1 to 0.5 seconds of >> computation by the brain, not the eons of life's evolution. >> > > That could be true in theory but it does not seem to be supported by > nature. In reality, there is no way to watch a movie in less time than the > movie takes to be watched without sacrificing some qualities of the > experience. > But when you watch the last 5 seconds of the movie, your brain has the context/memories of all the previous parts of the movie. If you instantiated a brain from scratch with all the same memories of someone who watched the first 2 hours of the movie, and then showed them the last 5 seconds, they would understand the ending as well as anyone made to sit through the whole thing. > Experience is nothing like data, as data is compressible since it has no > qualitative content to be lost in translation. In all cases, calculation is > used to eliminate experience - to automate and anesthetize. > For you to make such a claim, you would have to experience life as one of those automatons. But you have not, so I don't see where you get this knowledge about what entities are or or are not conscious. > It cannot imitate experience, any more than an HSV coordinate can look > like a particular color. > I believe it is the machine's interpretation of the input (however it is represented), and in the context of the rest of its mind, which manifests as the experience of color. You could say an HSV coordinate is not a color, but neither is the electrical signaling of the optic nerve a color. > We cannot separate the experience of a living person from their history > going back to the beginning of time any more than we can take out the last > chapter of War and Peace and glue it to the end of a manual for a digital > thermostat. It might look like a book to us, but the story doesn't make > sense. We can't sum up the meaning of the absent chapters without having > ourselves lived in a world that Tolstoy once lived in. That world is not > accessible to digits or thermostats. > We have to go back to the beginning of time? Is that when the person was conceived, when the first conscious life form opened its eyes, when the first life form on Earth emerged, when the formation of the solar system, the Big Bang, a Brane Collision, or maybe something even further back? Jason > > > >So perhaps we are on the same page, but merely disagree on how detailed > the details of the computation need to be. i.e., what is the substitution > layer (atomic interactions, or the history of atomic interactions on a > global scale?). > > That would make sense if computation were the same as experience rather > than the representation of its opposite. In reality though, I think that > substitution is an illusion of computation itself. There is no such thing > as emulation or approximation. Awareness is absolute non-emulable because > it is the manifestation of uniqueness itself. > > Post today relates: > http://multisenserealism.com/2013/10/08/pedagogy-of-the-anti-miraculous/ > > Craig > > > Jason >> > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > To post to this group, send email to firstname.lastname@example.org. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to email@example.com. 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