On 08 Oct 2013, at 20:12, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Tuesday, October 8, 2013 12:34:57 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 08 Oct 2013, at 17:59, Craig Weinberg wrote:
Why isn't computationalism the consequence of quanta though?
Human computationalism does.
But I want the simplest conceptual theory, and integers are easier
to define than human integers.
I'm not sure how that relates to computationalism being something
other than quanta. Humans are easier to define to themselves than
integers. A baby can be themselves for years before counting to 10.
Fundamentally? That does not follow. It took a long time before
discovering the Higgs-Englert-Brout Boson.
What can be computed other than quantities?
Quantities are easily computed by stopping machines, but most
machines does not stop, and when they introspect, the theory
explains why they get troubled by consciousness, qualia, etc. Those
qualia are not really computed, they are part of non computable
truth, but which still bear on machines or machine's perspective.
Then you still have an explanatory gap.
But that is a good point for comp, as it explains why there is a gap,
and it imposes on it a precise mathematical structure.
How can anything which is non-computable bear on the computation of
an ideal machine?
That is the whole subject of en entire field: recursion theory, or
theoretical computer science.
What connects the qualia to the quanta, and why isn't the qualia
just quantitative summaries of quanta?
Qualia are not connected to quanta. Quanta are appearances in the
qualia theory, and they are not quantitative, they are lived at the
first person plural views.
If Arithmetic truth is full of non nameable things, what nameable
things does it also contain,
The numbers, the recursive properties, the recursively enumarable
properties, the Sigma_i truth, well a lot of things.
You have the recursive (the simplest in our comp setting), then the
recursively enumerable (the universal machines, notably), then a
whole hierarchy of non computable, but still nameable set of
numbers, or machine's properties,
You say they are nameable, but I don't believe you. It is not as if
a number would ever need to go by some other name. Why not refer to
it by its precise coordinate within Arithmetic Truth?
Because it is independent of the choice of the computational base,
like volume in geometry. If you can name something with fortran, then
you can name it with numbers, combinators, etc. Nameability is
"machine independent", like the modal logics G, G*, Z, etc;
then you got the non nameable properties, like true (for number
relations) but very plausibly, things like consciousness, persons,
Some of those non nameable things can still be studied by machines,
through assumptions, and approximations.
Above that you have the truth that you cannot even approximated, etc.
Arithmetical truth is big, *very* big.
Big, sure, but that's exactly why it needs no names at all.
It is worst than that. Many things cannot have a name.
Each feature and meta-feature of Arithmetic truth can only be found
at its own address. What point would there be in adding a fictional
label on something that is pervasively and factually true?
In science it is not a matter of decision, but of verifiable facts.
and what or who is naming them?
The machines. (in the comp setting, despite the machines theology
does refer to higher non-machine entities capable of naming things.
That's the case for the first order logical G* (which I note usually
qG*, this one needs more than arithmetical truth, but it is normal
as it describes an intensional (modal) views by a sort of God
(Truth) about the machine. here the miracle is that its zero order
logical (propositional) part is decidable.
I don't think that names and machines are compatible in any way.
Programmers of machines might use names, but once compiled, all high
level terms are crushed into the digital sand that the machine can
digest. No trace of proprietary intent remains.
Not at all. The whole point is that such proprietary are invariant for
the high or low level implementations.
Otherwise wouldn't it be tautological to say that it is full of non
nameable things, as it would be to say that water is full of non
? (here you stretch an analogy to far, I think).
Could be, but I don't know until I hear the counter-argument.
(Stretched) analogy are immune to argumentation.
It seems to me that we can use arithmetic truth to locate a number
within the infinity of computable realtions, but any 'naming' is
only our own attempt to attach a proprietary first person sense to
that which is irreducibly generic and nameless. The thing about
qualia is not that it is non-nameable, it is the specific
aesthetic presence that is manifested. Names are just qualia of
mental association - a rose by any other name, etc.
I think this could be made more precise by taking "our" in the
If quanta is Löbian qualia, why would it need any non-quantitative
? (to fuzzy question, sorry, try to make this more clear perhaps).
You said earlier that quanta is Löbian qualia, and then you are
saying above that naming is one of the things that Löbians (persons?
machines?) do, so I am asking why don't they just use quanta instead
of non-quantitative qualia?
Because, by the logical gaps Z/Z*, X/X* etc. (inherited from G/G*) it
is shown that Löbian numbers/machines/person are confronted with them.
They can names some things, and they cannot name other things. It is a
theorem in their self-reference logics. It is "basic" machine's
theology or psychology.
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