On 18 Oct 2013, at 18:55, meekerdb wrote:
On 10/18/2013 12:48 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 18 Oct 2013, at 01:23, meekerdb wrote:
On 10/16/2013 11:55 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
I see your reference and raise you a reference back to section
4.1 of
http://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0312136
From the paper:
"What of the crucial question: should Alice1 feel uncertain? Why,
Alice1 is a
good PI-reductionist Everettian, and she has followed what we’ve
said so far. So
she1 knows that she1 will see spin-up, and that she1 will see
spin-down. There
is nothing left for her to be uncertain about.
What (to address Saunders’ question) should Alice1 expect to see?
Here I
invoke the following premise: whatever she1 knows she1 will see,
she1 should
expect (with certainty!) to see. So, she1 should (with certainty)
expect to see
spin-up, and she1 should (with certainty) expect to see spin-
down. (Not that
she1 should expect to see both: she1 should expect to see each.)"
But this is where the basis problem comes in. Why is the
experience classical?
Probably because our substitution level is above (or equal) to the
"QM-level" (defined by the Heisenberg uncertainty)
Why doesn't Alice simply experience the superposition?
She could in case she has a quantum brain (quantum computer brain
for example) so that she can exploit some Fourier transforms of the
thought process in the all the terms of the superposition. But you
have defended often Tegmark's argument that the brain is classical,
and so she can experience only each branch, for the same reason
that the WM-duplicated candidate can experience only Washington xor
Moscow.
Yes, but now you're relying on physics to explain why experiences
are classical - but people keep proposing that experiences or
computation are fundamental and that physics is to be explained in
terms them. In that case you can't appeal to the physics to say why
the experiences are classical.
I assume classical, boolean, platonist (= assuming p v ~p), from the
start, at the meta-level, and for the machines I interview and
studied. You need only to agree that the arithmetical propositions
obeys classical logic. All scientists do that, as it is the simpler
way to proceed. There are no quantum theorem, and quantum proof in
physical books.
Quantum logic is an empirical discovery, and I interpret it literally
(logic of alternative stories). With comp, that empirical reality must
be justified by boolean realities concerning the mind of classical,
or not, machines.
The thought experiences are simpler with a high level description,
which is boolean, but at step seven that restriction is relinquished,
as quantum computer can be emulated by classical machine, and we must
explain why they seem to win the measure game.
I was not relying on physics, but not in way which would imply
physicalism.
Bruno
Brent
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