On 10/18/2013 11:22 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 18 Oct 2013, at 18:55, meekerdb wrote:

On 10/18/2013 12:48 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 18 Oct 2013, at 01:23, meekerdb wrote:

On 10/16/2013 11:55 PM, Jason Resch wrote:

    I see your reference and raise you a reference back to section 4.1 of

    http://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0312136


From the paper:

"What of the crucial question: should Alice1 feel uncertain? Why, Alice1 is a
good PI-reductionist Everettian, and she has followed what we’ve said so far. So
she1 knows that she1 will see spin-up, and that she1 will see spin-down. There
is nothing left for her to be uncertain about.
What (to address Saunders’ question) should Alice1 expect to see? Here I
invoke the following premise: whatever she1 knows she1 will see, she1 should
expect (with certainty!) to see. So, she1 should (with certainty) expect to see
spin-up, and she1 should (with certainty) expect to see spin-down. (Not that
she1 should expect to see both: she1 should expect to see each.)"

But this is where the basis problem comes in.   Why is the experience classical?

Probably because our substitution level is above (or equal) to the "QM-level" (defined by the Heisenberg uncertainty)




Why doesn't Alice simply experience the superposition?

She could in case she has a quantum brain (quantum computer brain for example) so that she can exploit some Fourier transforms of the thought process in the all the terms of the superposition. But you have defended often Tegmark's argument that the brain is classical, and so she can experience only each branch, for the same reason that the WM-duplicated candidate can experience only Washington xor Moscow.


Yes, but now you're relying on physics to explain why experiences are classical - but people keep proposing that experiences or computation are fundamental and that physics is to be explained in terms them. In that case you can't appeal to the physics to say why the experiences are classical.

I assume classical, boolean, platonist (= assuming p v ~p), from the start, at the meta-level, and for the machines I interview and studied. You need only to agree that the arithmetical propositions obeys classical logic. All scientists do that, as it is the simpler way to proceed. There are no quantum theorem, and quantum proof in physical books.

Quantum logic is an empirical discovery, and I interpret it literally (logic of alternative stories).

Some would say that MWI is far from 'literal', but I'll let that pass.

With comp, that empirical reality must be justified by boolean realities concerning the mind of classical, or not, machines.

It's that last sentence that bothers me. What does "must" mean in that context? I think it means "If my assumptions about a TOE are right then everything *must* be explained by my assumptions." But then it seems that you and others make a further leap and say that comp does explain everything - which is quite different than it "must explain them".


The thought experiences are simpler with a high level description, which is boolean, but at step seven that restriction is relinquished, as quantum computer can be emulated by classical machine, and we must explain why they seem to win the measure game.

Again, "We *must* IF my assumptions are right."


I was not relying on physics, but not in way which would imply physicalism.

?? You mean "I was relying on physics, but..."

Brent


Bruno

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