On 18 Oct 2013, at 19:48, Quentin Anciaux wrote:

2013/10/18 meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net> On 10/18/2013 12:48 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:On 18 Oct 2013, at 01:23, meekerdb wrote:On 10/16/2013 11:55 PM, Jason Resch wrote:I see your reference and raise you a reference back to section4.1 ofhttp://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0312136 From the paper:"What of the crucial question: should Alice1 feel uncertain? Why,Alice1 is agood PI-reductionist Everettian, and she has followed what we’vesaid so far. Soshe1 knows that she1 will see spin-up, and that she1 will seespin-down. Thereis nothing left for her to be uncertain about.What (to address Saunders’ question) should Alice1 expect to see?Here Iinvoke the following premise: whatever she1 knows she1 will see,she1 shouldexpect (with certainty!) to see. So, she1 should (with certainty)expect to seespin-up, and she1 should (with certainty) expect to see spin-down. (Not thatshe1 should expect to see both: she1 should expect to see each.)"But this is where the basis problem comes in. Why is theexperience classical?Probably because our substitution level is above (or equal) to the"QM-level" (defined by the Heisenberg uncertainty)Why doesn't Alice simply experience the superposition?She could in case she has a quantum brain (quantum computer brainfor example) so that she can exploit some Fourier transforms of thethought process in the all the terms of the superposition. But youhave defended often Tegmark's argument that the brain is classical,and so she can experience only each branch, for the same reasonthat the WM-duplicated candidate can experience only Washington xorMoscow.Yes, but now you're relying on physics to explain why experiencesare classical - but people keep proposing that experiences orcomputation are fundamental and that physics is to be explained interms them. In that case you can't appeal to the physics to say whythe experiences are classical.Well a computation is "classical"... it's not a superposition ofsomething... But as we don't know currently how consciousness arisesfrom computation (nor if it can arises from it), it's premature toask for an answer like you'd like. The point of Bruno, is not thatconsciousness is a computation only that if it is (turing emulable)then physics as to be derived from computation alone... and no Brunodoesn't have the complete description how it is done... only that upto now, the fact that it shows that there must be a multiplicity(huge) of "dreams" is compatible with MWI... but he does not knowhow consciousness arises, how physics, why an electron has this massand no other and so on. He has just shown that if computationalismis true, then physics has to emerge from computation alone,

`That's UDA. It provides also the shape of physics, like MW, statistics`

`on computation, taking track of the difference between 1p and 3p`

`(which generalize relativity, and Everett), etc.`

the work left here (huge) is to show how.

Indeed.

`Yet, AUDA (Arithmetical UDA, what I call "interview" in sane04) shows`

`constructively how, and the propositional logic of observable is given`

`by a precise theory (X1*).`

`Of course this is a long way from explaining the whole logic, and thus`

`the bosons and fermions. But that's not the goal here. The key result`

`is that incompleteness makes the Theaetetus' definition of knowledge`

`(the only one I know capable of doing justice to the metaphysical`

`antic dream argument) given a classical theory of knowledge (S4Grz)`

`which X1* is an important "physical" variant.`

`Those logic have the two sides: provable and true-but-not provable,`

`which is promising to interpret the qualia.`

If one day you should be "uploaded" as a computer program, and youstill feel as alive as today and as yourself, it should be a kind ofconfirmation that it is indeed the case, even if we have not workoutthe details how physics emerge from computation and just worked onhow to transfer our consciousness... Well it would be for me...

`Computationalism will be practiced long before we get the whole of`

`physics from it. But not so long, as physicists also close the bridge`

`(with the vertex algebra and number theory per se). They just miss the`

`non provable intensional nuances, allowed and unavoidable for the`

`"mystic machine" (looking inward).`

`I know this asks for some work, but after (or even before, for some)`

`UDA, there is AUDA. It is only a beginning, of course. And the`

`remaining task is huge.`

`The basic idea is very simple though: we can already listen to what`

`the machines already tell us.`

Roughly speaking: UDA: reality is in our head.

`AUDA: reality is in the head of any universal machine. Just ask her`

`today you need Gödel's tools, but the interview, at the propositional`

`level, is entirely axiomatized by the Solovay logics (G and G*).`

Bruno

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