On 27 Oct 2013, at 16:47, John Clark wrote:
On Sat, Oct 26, 2013 at 4:24 AM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]>
wrote:
>> probability implies prediction and prediction has nothing to do
with a sense of self, and that is what Bruno's "proof" is all about.
> Absolutely not.
Absolutely not what?
"that your "proof" is about investigating the nature of self?"
Absolutely not that probability implies prediction or that
prediction has nothing to do with a sense of self or that your
"proof" is about investigating the nature of self?
The "self" has a big role, and that is obvious in the arithmetical
translation which is based on the self-reference logics, but those are
tools (even if key concepts) in the UDA "proof".
Comp asks only the idea that consciousness is invaraint for a kind of
digital substitution, and shows that it makes physics necessarily into
a branche of arithmetic, or computer science, or "machine's theology".
> That is no more than what you need to say "yes" to a comp doctor.
I would say yes to the "comp" doctor because I would survive to
tomorrow if I did, provided that "I" means something that remembers
being John Clark today. And if the personal pronoun "I" means
something other than that in your language then John Clark does not
care if that fellow by the name of "I" survives or not. And neither
probabilities nor the accuracy of predictions of what city will be
seen nor the content of diaries would play any part in my decision
to say "yes". None whatsoever.
Of course.
"Saying yes" = step zero. Then we reason from that.
And?
Bruno
John K Clark
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