On 29 Oct 2013, at 19:15, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Tuesday, October 29, 2013 1:01:25 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 29 Oct 2013, at 16:17, Craig Weinberg wrote:
> On Tuesday, October 29, 2013 10:56:44 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> On 29 Oct 2013, at 14:23, Craig Weinberg wrote:
> > On Tuesday, October 29, 2013 3:05:52 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal
> > On 28 Oct 2013, at 19:47, Craig Weinberg wrote:
> >> On Monday, October 28, 2013 1:38:58 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal
> >> On 28 Oct 2013, at 15:12, John Mikes wrote:
> >>> What do you call "ANY PHYSICS"? is there a "God given" marvel
> >>> (like any other religious miracle to believe in) callable
> >> I think Stathis was referring to any third person describable
> >> lawful laws, not relying to actual infinities or magic.
> >> Craig want to add some primary sense, and make that sense
> >> contradict such deterministic law.
> >> That would be silly. Nothing that I have ever proposed
> >> a single scientific observation, by definition. I am not adding
> >> anything, I am absorbing all disembodied pseudo-substances into
> >> sense: "Laws", "Forces", "Fields", "Wavefunctions",
> >> "Probability"...all of that invisible voodoo is gone. It's all
> >> primordial pansensitivity experiencing its own alienation and re-
> >> constellation.
> > Looks like a sense-of-the-gap to me.
> > Not at all. What we have now is a force-of-the-gap, field-of-the-
> > gap, etc.
> No. This has been solved. Indeed, so precisely that it is only a
> question of solving diophantine equation to compare the physics of
> machine and the physics we infer from observation. Primary matter
> matter-of-the-gap, OK. But not the matter as described by the
> introspective machine.
> Not the matter (because that actually is concretely sensed),
You might be dreaming.
Matter is concrete sense that extends to the inertial frame of the
body. Get rid of your body, and your dream is matter.
> but forces, fields, and laws because they are magical ideas that
> appear out of nowhere and do things without any tangible presence.
> It's just haunted space. That the haunting of the space can be
> precisely mapped and deconstructed mathematically does not give it
> the power to change matter. What has been overlooked is the
> possibility that matter is an appearance within experience, of
> experience which has alienated itself - followed different histories
> in parallel or phase-shift.
> > I am merging all of the empty bubbles and finding that none
> > anything more or less than sense.
> This cannot satisfy me, as I am looking to some understanding of
> is sense, where does it come from, why does it provide non
> feature like consciousness, etc.
> There is no understanding needed to what sense is - it is the most
> self-evident phenomena possible as it is self-evidence period, full
Yes, you are right. But it is not evident in any communicable way, if
only because it escapes definition.
Communicability would be redundant though.
In platonia, yes. You can survive without publishing, but you have to
wait for heaven. Hereby, you need to communicate, because it is the
job. For this you need to start from notions that your audience has
already study, so that you can share initial statements and reason
Sense has no reason to communicate since any receiver would not be
able to communicate unless it could already sense.
Like arithmetic truth, who win all war, without any army, and not
saying one word.
So we can't use it to do a theory of 1p.
The theory of 1p is easy, you just have to imagine the opposite of 3p.
That's a fuzzy unclear oversimplification.
It is an important data, and
its immediacy and obviousness is certainly a clue.
Then, if you do the math, you can intellectually understand why
machines looking inward describes something which looks very much like
I think it would look the same if the machines weren't looking
inward at all. The same vending machine can sell cigarettes, candy
bars, live ostrich eggs, or just empty space. It doesn't impress me
that it doesn't know what the things that it sells are or where they
This remind me a Joke.
Hardy: "-Do you think a machine can think?"
Laurel: "-hmm... I don't think ...."
Hardy: "I am not asking if *you* can think, but if *machine* can think!"
The machine knows what she is selling. I was saying that the machines
already know that if you decide that she is not thinking, she has no
mean to prove you wrong. Comp explains why machines will fear you.
> All that is, is because it has been made evident within some sensory
You bet. It is OK.
Sure, but the other bet, that there can be some kind of existence
outside of sense,
Unless you disbelieve in the existence of the prime numbers, it is
obvious that there are other kind of existence.
then brings in the implausibility of sense and the necessity for a
homunculus regress between sensory and (hypothetical) nonsensory
Computer science excels in solving the recursive regress. There are
many fixed points which solve them.
The universality comes from some closure properties.
> There is nothing there to be evident except for this relativity of
> presence shared with the contents and contexts of eternity.
> Justification is nothing but a sense of comparison among subordinate
> sense experience. You are looking for something that you have
> already found but won't accept it.
I found it in my head, and I show that all universal machine "looking
in their head" can find something quite similar.
? Everything can find sense.
No, only the universal machine, notably looking in their own head (so
to speak). looking outside their head can accelerate or distract that
You are just insulting the machine, by what looks like prejudice, as
you admit not trying to study them.
To me that's just pointing to the pet rock and saying 'you're
hurting his feelings. You should study geology.'
To you who admit not having studied the machine. But your comparison
is nonsensical. No geologist that I know believe that rock can think,
except perhaps complex quasi-cristal, in *some* sense.
But the idea that machine can think is defended since the beginning,
and is at the least a venerable hypothesis, plausible, even trivial
(in the weak comp sense). Then studying computer science provides
clues (as I try to explain).
> Unlike Comp, it does not assert the supremacy of arithmetic truth,
> but then add in dreaming numbers, resurrection by mechanical
> incantation, duplicated persons, machines emulating other machines
> which think they aren't machines (even though Comp prohibits any
> possibility of what else there would be besides machines.).
Not at all. Arithmetical Truth is full of gods, and daemons, which are
If there are non-machines that are gods, why would there need to be
machines also who are people?
Because the number exists and have complex relations making it so.
Again it seems completely unfalsifiable. Comp keeps morphing from
'UMs can emulate consciousness' to 'gods and daemons exist (who are
conscious) which are not machines.
No, it is well known mathematical theorems. The logicians study
machines and non-machines all the time. Most attributes of machines
are themselves non-machines, and some are Löbian entities.
You say 'UMs believe this' yet you run on a UM that does not believe
that anymore. Or you can meditate on your own superimposed belief
and disbelief, yet without realizing that by doing so you are
contradicting what you say UMs believe.
Comp is a vaccine against the reductionism of the
finite, and the infinite. To understand comp is to understand the
abyssalness of the mindscape. Comp prohibits nothing, not even 0=1,
although we better should hope it is not the case.
That's why Comp is not a view to the authentic and singular truth of
the uni-verse, but the opposite. Comp reflects, impersonates,
multiplies, and makes generic. It is neither uni, nor verse, but
rather nihil-phoria. Instead of feeling that can overwhelm with
terror or ecstasy, there is a toy model: hypostases of self-
reference. Modal logics and recombinatory switch positions.
Like any divination oracle, the UM will deliver interesting
information in a voice with an uncanny ring. It is not nothing. That
is clear. It does reflect deep insight, just as a Ouija board or I
Ching (try it: http://www.eclecticenergies.com/iching/virtualcoins.php)
Here's what I got just now:
25. Without Pretense
Not plowing yields uncultivated land.
Thus, it is beneficial to have a goal to move to.
Not taking action to make things happen, so nothing happens. It is
better to work towards a goal.
Pretty good I think. Without pretense. It perfectly describes back
to me my own intention here. I do not try to impose an agenda, I
only show you what I am looking at. The super-personal reflections
which can work through inanimate objects without turning those
objects into literal subjects.
> Comp may mistake self referential logic for a self,
Comp does not mistake the self-referential logic for the self. There
is no reason why comp would do such a big mistake.
So you say, but I don't believe it.
Because you don't study. You are like "I know machines are dumb, so I
don't need to listen to them. "
That is a self-enforcing prejudice.
> but I don't. I have no problem a sentence that we read as "this
> sentence is lying" as a trivial syntactic contradiction rather than
> a profound puzzle that reveals the ontology of consciousness.
That's Tarski. You need both Gödel and Tarski to get the Bp & p versus
What I understand of Gödel makes the same kind of point.
Incompleteness means that whatever rules are used to make a
mathematical system create their own blind spots when it comes to
proving those rules. You are the only one that I know of who
interpret Gödel's incompleteness as an affirmation of arithmetic
supremacy rather than an indictment of its limitations on
discovering its limitation. But Gödel was a person. The mathematical
truth was not visible in the math alone, he had to wrestle it out.
Unlike a UM, we *can* appreciate our own limitation and meta-
limitations more than a machine can, because sense is transparent
and flexible rather than rigid and opaque.
No; please read the literature. My position is almost the conventional
one by logicians. You can read the book by Judson Webb on the subject,
or the books by Torkel Franzen. I sum up all the papers on the Gödel,
mind and machine question in my long text "conscience et mécanisme".
It is a rich subject. You seem to miss the important point that
machine have not just limitation (by Gödel's theorem), but that they
know that they have those limitations),. They can prove them about
themselves, in the 3p way. And with the Bp & p, sense is transparent
and flexible ... from the machine's 1p pov.
> To start from sense is like to start from God. This answers nothing
> (even if there is a God).
> It is to start before God, and before arithmetic, truth, and even
> before 'starting'. Your are still vastly underestimating the hubris
> that I intend. Sense = the Absolute, means that there has never been
> anything else, and there can never be anything else.
It looks like the arithmetical truth.
What makes you so sure that it is not arithmetical truth?
Because if it was arithmetical truth we wouldn't need flavor.
Numbers make sense to organize flavors, but flavors do nothing for
numbers which can already inform each other (instantly, and non-
locally to boot).
> On the contrary, comp explains 100% of matter, and 99,9% of sense,
> explain 100% of why it remains 0.01% of a necessary non
> aspect of the inside first person view.
> The entire universe fits in the 0,1% of sense that comp fails to
> find. Everything else is a reflection of that sense. Comp is inside
Meaning it is the same thing. Except with comp the sun in law enjoy
the steak, where with your sense "theory" he does not, sadly.
Its not the same thing. The horse can pull the cart, but the cart
cannot pull the horse. Any one cart can pull another horse inside of
it, iff that cart has a horse pulling it. It's a matter of seeing
that on the absolute level, the first difference is that of the head
and the tail, since it is only the head who can tell the difference
that the tail makes.
Sure, but universal machine can be "head". You have nice analogies,
but you just use them to beg again the question.
> Anyway, the solution is testable, so you should be happy that we
> refute comp.
> Comp may be testable (using consciousness) but consciousness is not
> testable using comp.
Consciousness is not testable, using what you want.
Sure it is. We know that we have slept deeply. We know when we have
We never lose consciousness. Losing consciousness is an illusion that
our brain introduces for making us believe that ... we can lose
consciousness, and life. But we never do. That might play a role in
surviving (on earth) strategies, but with comp, and actually with
Descartes, there is the idea that we never lose consciousness, and
with training, you can learn to notice this during all nights.
First person unconsciousness does not make sense. That simply does not
But we can become amnesic, and lose memory, and context. We cannot be
unconscious, but we can believe having been unconscious, but that is
an artificial, fragile, construct of the mind.
Then, by testing consciousness, we were actually talking about the
consciousness of someone else, in the 3p sense of testing, like in
physics and science. Or own consciousness cannot be tested by another,
as the Löbian machines already know. We can test it ourself, but it is
trivially alway positive testing. A dead corpse cannot test and
conclude "I am not conscious". Nor can a zombie.
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