On 30 Oct 2013, at 18:01, Craig Weinberg wrote:

On Wednesday, October 30, 2013 4:52:49 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 29 Oct 2013, at 19:15, Craig Weinberg wrote:

That assumes that being alive implies separation from Platonia - that our essence is isolation rather than absolute.

True for our 3p relative "position" in histories.
Half true for our 1p (the BP part of Bp & p).

What we see in reality I think supports my version.

I can use what we see to refute a theory. Not so much to support it.

Sense has no reason to communicate since any receiver would not be able to communicate unless it could already sense.

Like arithmetic truth, who win all war, without any army, and not saying one word.

Sure. Arithmetic truth and Sense are almost twins, but only one of the two can be the authentic absolute.

All right. Then Arithmetical Truth is the absolute in comp. But that's has to be taken with a grain of salt. The quantfiied Noùs (qG*) is incomplete even with the Arithmetical Truth as Oracle. But I will not insts, as it is not so important, and need a lot of math.

I was saying that the machines already know that if you decide that she is not thinking, she has no mean to prove you wrong. Comp explains why machines will fear you.

She has no means to prove what I have decided either. I think the whole notion of machines having fear is too silly to even call science fiction.

Then Strong AI and comp are false. To compare it to science fiction is not an argument. To say that machine's cannot fear is equivalent with invoking actual infinities in nature, and that is considered as fantazy by 99%9 of scientist. But I avoid such type of remark, as they are not argument.

Again, not because I don't like technology, or wouldn't rather be a computer myself, but because it obviously is not true of the world we live in.

How could you say that it is obvious in a list where most people consider it as the only plausible explanation.

Computer science excels in solving the recursive regress. There are many fixed points which solve them.
The universality comes from some closure properties.

But there is no plausible entry for sensory experience, and no way of bridging it to this hypothetical non-sensory existence.

For you, who admit not studying the field.

? Everything can find sense.

No, only the universal machine, notably looking in their own head (so to speak). looking outside their head can accelerate or distract that process.

What is an example of something that isn't a universal machine?

An adder, a multiplier, a fridge, a clock, a bridge, a house, most computer software, etc. Among the i of the phi_i, the universal number are scarce.

A universal machine is a very special sort of machine.

If there are non-machines that are gods, why would there need to be machines also who are people?

Because the number exists and have complex relations making it so.

That's not anywhere near an answer as far as I can tell. If a number exists, and complex relations make it so, what does that have to do with dictating what is machine, what is non-machine, what are gods and who are people?

The set of functions from N to N is not enumerable, the computable functions is enumerable. The set of subset of N is not enumerable, yet the set of enumerable set is enumerable.

The computable is a tiny part of math. Most math learned in high school is not computable. You need to do intuitionist mathematics to limit yourself to the effective, or to the computable etc.

So, if you identify an entity by its set of beliefs, machine have enumerable set of beliefs, and non machine or gods, refers to non enumerable set of beliefs. You need some amount of math to understand explicit example, like the set of set theoretical sentences true in all transitive models of ZF. I have given reference to books.

Again it seems completely unfalsifiable. Comp keeps morphing from 'UMs can emulate consciousness' to 'gods and daemons exist (who are conscious) which are not machines.

No, it is well known mathematical theorems. The logicians study machines and non-machines all the time. Most attributes of machines are themselves non-machines, and some are Löbian entities.

But you can study Löbian entities without ascribing to them literal awareness.

Perhaps, we can always do that. That is why zombie are logically possible.

Not plowing yields uncultivated land.
Thus, it is beneficial to have a goal to move to.

Not taking action to make things happen, so nothing happens. It is better to work towards a goal.

Pretty good I think. Without pretense. It perfectly describes back to me my own intention here. I do not try to impose an agenda, I only show you what I am looking at. The super-personal reflections which can work through inanimate objects without turning those objects into literal subjects.


That's good. Distraction is the only thing that can break the spell of Comp.

If you think that distraction is the only thing that can break the spell of comp, it means that you suspect comp to be true, and admit you dislike the idea, so let us be distracted ... Come on Craig. You admit wishful thinking, which does not work in science (even if it works in life and consciousness, like some machine seems to say already, interpreting them in some way).

> Comp may mistake self referential logic for a self,

Comp does not mistake the self-referential logic for the self. There
is no reason why comp would do such a big mistake.

So you say, but I don't believe it.

Because you don't study. You are like "I know machines are dumb, so I don't need to listen to them. "
That is a self-enforcing prejudice.

Know, I am like "I know that I can be sucked into a delusional belief that machines are smart, so I should assume that it is even easier for such a delusion to be present in those who work closely with them."


I agree, but that doesn't mean that we can't test the relative loss of consciousness as I mentioned. We know that we have slept a dreamless sleep, whether the dreamlessness is an illusion or a retroactive fill in.

To be sure, here comp says things, but it is so hard to sum up, and so startling, that I will not try.

But we can become amnesic, and lose memory, and context. We cannot be unconscious, but we can believe having been unconscious, but that is an artificial, fragile, construct of the mind.

We can lose personal consciousness and know it. I would agree that consciousness continues at the super-personal level, and at the sub- personal level until death.

There is only 3p-death, and no 1p-death, with comp, (notably).

Well, there is no 1p-unconsciousness, but many altered states of consciousness, and some might reasonably be named by "1p-death", like finding yourself in heaven, or in the purgatory, or in a Tibetan Intermediate reality, or out of time and space or God knows which Diophantine equations Arithmetic does emulate (cf the UD).

Craig, I have not yet seen even the shadow of an argument that machine can't support genuine consciousness and personhood.

I think that your strategy consists in taking the solipsist first person intuition, which is that the first person truth is obvious, trivial, inescapable. 1-I can never recognize itself in any 3p presentation of its body, at any level.

Then comp explains why that needs to be the case, for the first person view of the machine.

That does not prove that comp is true, but that invalidates your strategy. That validates also the scientific motto of not invoking personal experiences in scientific reasoning.

"First person experiences" can *still* be part of the scientific data though. Some generalizes too much the scientific. motto, and put the first person data under the rug, which is unscientific.

You want the data to be the explanation, but this makes the data into a data-of-the-gap.



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