On Thursday, October 31, 2013 12:06:52 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
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> On 30 Oct 2013, at 18:01, Craig Weinberg wrote:
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> On Wednesday, October 30, 2013 4:52:49 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
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>> On 29 Oct 2013, at 19:15, Craig Weinberg wrote:
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> That assumes that being alive implies separation from Platonia - that our 
> essence is isolation rather than absolute. 
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> True for our 3p relative "position" in histories.
> Half true for our 1p (the BP part of Bp & p). 
>

Would it help to think of "&" as sense? Then you would derive B and p the 
other way around. 



p = -B / &

B = & /

A proposition p is defined as a disbelief (-B) divided by sense (or 
multiplied by maximum insensitivity, i.e. computation). It is a that which 
has all doubts truncated from its consideration. Get it?

A belief B is defined as sense (in this modal logic context, sense is 
already truncated to refer to &, a sense of agreement and logical 
recontextualization of multiple conditions into one) divided by (whatever 
is believed...*not* necessarily a proposition. The vast majority of belief 
is not in propositions.. propositions are truncating measurements.).

What I propose is that you put all of arithmetic truth into the &, so that 
Bp and p become nothing but a positive and negative end of a single dipole. 
God = &. Not a God of the gaps but of the permeability across all gaps. The 
diagonalization of virtual self-gapping that remains perpetually ungapped 
in equal measure. PDM = Pansensitive Dovetailing Monad = sense = &

 

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> What we see in reality I think supports my version. 
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> I can use what we see to refute a theory. Not so much to support it.
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You are using it to support that theory (that theories are only refutable).
 

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>> Sense has no reason to communicate since any receiver would not be able 
>> to communicate unless it could already sense.
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>> Like arithmetic truth, who win all war, without any army, and not saying 
>> one word.
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> Sure. Arithmetic truth and Sense are almost twins, but only one of the two 
> can be the authentic absolute.
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> All right. Then Arithmetical Truth is the absolute in comp.
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I like that. It goes along with the other ideas I've had about water being 
the absolute in biology, or light being the absolute in physics. It ties 
together.

 

> But that's has to be taken with a grain of salt. The quantfiied Noùs (qG*) 
> is incomplete even with the Arithmetical Truth as Oracle. But I will not 
> insts, as it is not so important, and need a lot of math.
>

if you say so...
 

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>> I was saying that the machines already know that if you decide that she 
>> is not thinking, she has no mean to prove you wrong. Comp  explains why 
>> machines will fear you.
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> She has no means to prove what I have decided either. I think the whole 
> notion of machines having fear is too silly to even call science fiction. 
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> Then Strong AI and comp are false. To compare it to science fiction is not 
> an argument. To say that machine's cannot fear is equivalent with invoking 
> actual infinities in nature, and that is considered as fantazy by 99%9 of 
> scientist. But I avoid such type of remark, as they are not argument. 
>

It's not invoking infinity, it's invoking a distinction between 
difference-in-kind and difference-in-degree. Feeling cannot be reduced to a 
quantity of unfeeling subunits. I suggest the relation is not 
linear-inevitable, but rooted in proprietary access by realization of 
significance through unrepeatable historical 'leveling up' experiences. 
It's neither finite nor infinite nor non-finite or non-infinite. Quality is 
the opposite of quantity.

 

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> Again, not because I don't like technology, or wouldn't rather be a 
> computer myself, but because it obviously is not true of the world we live 
> in.
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> How could you say that it is obvious in a list where most people consider 
> it as the only plausible explanation.
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Because I think that people are considering the logic of the theory as a 
theory about logic, rather than really assessing what the nature of our 
experience actually is. I think that people are falling for the prefrontal 
cortex's story about its own verbal cognition and not looking at the deep 
creative mind and surface sensations.
 

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>> Computer science excels in solving the recursive regress. There are many 
>> fixed points which solve them. 
>> The universality comes from some closure properties.
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> But there is no plausible entry for sensory experience, and no way of 
> bridging it to this hypothetical non-sensory existence.
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> For you, who admit not studying the field. 
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That may be why I can see the that color of the emperor's clothes cannot be 
a mathematical expression.


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>> ? Everything can find sense.
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>> No, only the universal machine, notably looking in their own head (so to 
>> speak). looking outside their head can accelerate or distract that process.
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> What is an example of something that isn't a universal machine?
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> An adder, a multiplier, a fridge, a clock, a bridge, a house, most 
> computer software, etc. Among the i of the phi_i, the universal number are 
> scarce.
>

But a clock can find sense - in the tension of its gears or oscillation of 
its crystal - a fridge in its containment of pressurized refrigerant gas, 
etc. All of them cohere on a functional level which hinges on sensory-motor 
interaction.
  

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> A universal machine is a very special sort of machine.
>

Its a sort of machine, but the only reason we have to assume it is 'very 
special' is because it reminds us of ourselves. Without that, why would 
this or that corner of arithmetic be any more special than another? What 
would special even mean mathematically?



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>> If there are non-machines that are gods, why would there need to be 
>> machines also who are people? 
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>> Because the number exists and have complex relations making it so. 
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> That's not anywhere near an answer as far as I can tell. If a number 
> exists, and complex relations make it so, what does that have to do with 
> dictating what is machine, what is non-machine, what are gods and who are 
> people?
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> The set of functions from N to N is not enumerable, the computable 
> functions is enumerable.
> The set of subset of N is not enumerable, yet the set of enumerable set is 
> enumerable.
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> The computable is a tiny part of math. Most math learned in high school is 
> not computable. You need to do intuitionist mathematics to limit yourself 
> to the effective, or to the computable etc.
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> So, if you identify an entity by its set of beliefs, 
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If you give a machine entity-hood, and project 'beliefs' onto it, then you 
have already completed what comp can tell you about consciousness. It's 
like building a theoretical car out of parts that are already moving at 100 
kph by themselves.
 

> machine have enumerable set of beliefs, and non machine or gods, refers to 
> non enumerable set of beliefs. 
> You need some amount of math to understand explicit example, like the set 
> of set theoretical sentences true in all transitive models of ZF. I have 
> given reference to books.
>

If you need math to understand it, how can you be sure that it applies to 
something other than math?
 

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>> Again it seems completely unfalsifiable. Comp keeps morphing from 'UMs 
>> can emulate consciousness' to 'gods and daemons exist (who are conscious) 
>> which are not machines. 
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>> No, it is well known mathematical theorems. The logicians study machines 
>> and non-machines all the time. Most attributes of machines are themselves 
>> non-machines, and some are Löbian entities. 
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> But you can study Löbian entities without ascribing to them literal 
> awareness.
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> Perhaps, we can always do that. That is why zombie are logically possible.
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Why would they be zombies if they have no awareness?

Is Siri a zombie? How about Google translate?
 

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> Not plowing yields uncultivated land. 
>> Thus, it is beneficial to have a goal to move to.
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>> Not taking action to make things happen, so nothing happens. It is better 
>> to work towards a goal.
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>> Pretty good I think. Without pretense. It perfectly describes back to me 
>> my own intention here. I do not try to impose an agenda, I only show you 
>> what I am looking at. The super-personal reflections which can work through 
>> inanimate objects without turning those objects into literal subjects.
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>> Distracting.
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> That's good. Distraction is the only thing that can break the spell of 
> Comp.
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> If  you think that distraction is the only thing that can break the spell 
> of comp, it means that you suspect comp to be true, 
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Why? If I said that distraction is the only thing that can break the spell 
of depression, does that mean I suspect whatever depressing ruminations 
someone might have to be true?
 

> and admit you dislike the idea, so let us be distracted ...
>

I don't dislike the idea, I am trying to show you why it can't be correct. 
To make that point, I have to harp on the specific consequences of comp 
that don't really work in reality.
 

> Come on Craig. You admit wishful thinking, which does not work in science 
> (even if it works in life and consciousness, like some machine seems to say 
> already, interpreting them in some way).
>

I think you are projecting, Bruno. The only wishful thought that I have is 
that others would actually run it through their heads this opposite way, 
without trying to resist it, but to actually get the bigger picture before 
reacting defensively to it.
 

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>>> > Comp may mistake self referential logic for a self, 
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>>> Comp does not mistake the self-referential logic for the self. There   
>>> is no reason why comp would do such a big mistake. 
>>>
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>> So you say, but I don't believe it.
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>> Because you don't study. You are like "I know machines are dumb, so I 
>> don't need to listen to them. "
>> That is a self-enforcing prejudice.
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> Know, I am like "I know that I can be sucked into a delusional belief that 
> machines are smart, so I should assume that it is even easier for such a 
> delusion to be present in those who work closely with them."
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> <sigh>
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> I agree, but that doesn't mean that we can't test the relative loss of 
> consciousness as I mentioned. We know that we have slept a dreamless sleep, 
> whether the dreamlessness is an illusion or a retroactive fill in. 
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> To be sure, here comp says things, but it is so hard to sum up, and so 
> startling, that I will not try. 
>

if you say so
 

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>> But we can become amnesic, and lose memory, and context. We cannot be 
>> unconscious, but we can believe having been unconscious, but that is an 
>> artificial, fragile, construct of the mind.
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> We can lose personal consciousness and know it. I would agree that 
> consciousness continues at the super-personal level, and at the 
> sub-personal level until death.
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> There is only 3p-death, and no 1p-death, with comp, (notably).
>

agreed. i don't know if there is even 3p death. 3p decay maybe.
 

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> Well, there is no 1p-unconsciousness, but many altered states of 
> consciousness, and some might reasonably be named by "1p-death", like 
> finding yourself in heaven, or in the purgatory, or in a Tibetan 
> Intermediate reality, or out of time and space or God knows which 
> Diophantine equations Arithmetic does emulate (cf the UD).
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> Craig, I have not yet seen even the shadow of an argument that machine 
> can't support genuine consciousness and personhood.
>

There can't be an argument like that, because personhood is purely 
aesthetic. It is not composed of propositions, positions, logic, etc. It is 
(a part of) the opposite of all of that. 


> I think that your strategy consists in taking the solipsist first person 
> intuition, which is that the first person truth is obvious, trivial, 
> inescapable. 1-I can never recognize itself in any 3p presentation of its 
> body, at any level.
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> Then comp explains why that needs to be the case, for the first person 
> view of the machine.
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What comp explains is only explained in 1p. Comp is a 1p dream that dreams 
it is a 3p knowing that everything else can be defined as its dream.
 

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> That does not prove that comp is true, but that invalidates your strategy. 
> That validates also the scientific motto of not invoking personal 
> experiences in scientific reasoning. 
>

It would if there were some reason to think that any criticism of 1p 
solipsism was not also 1p solipsistic (extended into virtual 3p).
 

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> "First person experiences" can *still* be part of the scientific data 
> though. 
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No experience can ever be part of any data. Data is only a sense 
measurement of sense experience. It can't contain anything but more data.
 

Some generalizes too much the scientific. motto, and put the first person 
> data under the rug, which is unscientific.
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> You want the data to be the explanation, but this makes the data into a 
> data-of-the-gap. 
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See above - sense is the gapmaker, and the gaptaker. It is comp which makes 
an uncanny automaton of insensitive gaps.

Craig
 

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> Bruno
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> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
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