Bruno: All this does not define the natural numbers in the sense of a
logical categorical definition. Why we understand them is a mystery, but we
can meta-explained why that mystery is unsolvable. We don't need an
infinity axiom in the ontology (indeed the axioms of the TOE is RA: no
infinity axioms, not even induction axioms). But with comp at the
meta-level, we do use infinity axioms at the epistemological level---or at
least the creature generated by RA do that, and we interview them to
retrieve the physical laws.

Richard: Could explain why the physical laws are not ontological.?


On Tue, Dec 10, 2013 at 3:47 AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:

>
> On 09 Dec 2013, at 20:06, meekerdb wrote:
>
>  On 12/9/2013 1:40 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> On 09 Dec 2013, at 01:33, LizR wrote:
>
>   On 9 December 2013 05:52, John Clark <johnkcl...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
>>  On Sat, Dec 7, 2013 at 4:38 PM, LizR <lizj...@gmail.com> wrote:
>>
>>    > Could you name a materialistic theory that explains consciousness
>>>
>>
>> Consciousness is the feeling information has when it is being processed;
>> if conscious is fundamental, that is to say it comes at the end of a long
>> line of "what is that?" questions, then after saying that there is just
>> nothing more that can be said about it. And hey, it's just as good as a
>> billion other consciousness theories.
>>
>
>  Ah yes, Max Tegmark's "theory".These aren't theories, is the problem.
> One needs a rigorous definition of what consciousness is, to start with,
> and then a theory that explains all its observed features, and makes
> testable predictions. Otherwise all one has is a jumble of words.
>
>
>  To be precise, we don't need a definition of what consciousness is. WE
> need only to agree on some assertion on consciousness. It is the same with
> line and points. The same with natural numbers. We don't need to define
> them (in fact we can't). We need only to agree on axioms about them, and
> methods or rules of logical inference/deduction.
>
>
> And we learn what are natural numbers in the same way, ostensively by
> one's mother holding up fingers and saying "one", "two",...  And so we
> generalize and make a theory about fingers and other countable things.  And
> we know that in all cases we run into we can add one more and so we
> casually assume an axiom of infinity because it is convenient and seems to
> cause no problems.  But if it leads to paradoxes and absurdities...
>
>
> All this does not define the natural numbers in the sense of a logical
> categorical definition. Why we understand them is a mystery, but we can
> meta-explained why that mystery is unsolvable. We don't need an infinity
> axiom in the ontology (indeed the axioms of the TOE is RA: no infinity
> axioms, not even induction axioms). But with comp at the meta-level, we do
> use infinity axioms at the epistemological level---or at least the creature
> generated by RA do that, and we interview them to retrieve the physical
> laws.
>
> This is a point where I might be quick sometimes/
>
> UDA start from comp, and at step 8, we should understand that the TOE is
> RA (or equivalent), and comp is replaced by the restriction to the sigma_1
> sentences for the epistemology.
> So going from UDA to AUDA, comp passes from the base level to the
> metalevel. In AUDA we assume RA, and interview richer believer (like PA) as
> generated by RA (or equivalently the universal dovetailer). After UDA, we
> know that we dont need and cannot need anything more than
>
> 0 ≠ s(x)
> s(x) = s(y) -> x = y
> x+0 = x
> x+s(y) = s(x+y)
> x*0=0
> x*s(y)=(x*y)+x
>
> The comp philosophy is then translated entirely in term of definitions,
> and theorems in that theory.
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
>
> Brent
>
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> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
>
>
>
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