Bruno: All this does not define the natural numbers in the sense of a logical categorical definition. Why we understand them is a mystery, but we can meta-explained why that mystery is unsolvable. We don't need an infinity axiom in the ontology (indeed the axioms of the TOE is RA: no infinity axioms, not even induction axioms). But with comp at the meta-level, we do use infinity axioms at the epistemological level---or at least the creature generated by RA do that, and we interview them to retrieve the physical laws.
Richard: Could explain why the physical laws are not ontological.? On Tue, Dec 10, 2013 at 3:47 AM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote: > > On 09 Dec 2013, at 20:06, meekerdb wrote: > > On 12/9/2013 1:40 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > On 09 Dec 2013, at 01:33, LizR wrote: > > On 9 December 2013 05:52, John Clark <[email protected]> wrote: > >> On Sat, Dec 7, 2013 at 4:38 PM, LizR <[email protected]> wrote: >> >> > Could you name a materialistic theory that explains consciousness >>> >> >> Consciousness is the feeling information has when it is being processed; >> if conscious is fundamental, that is to say it comes at the end of a long >> line of "what is that?" questions, then after saying that there is just >> nothing more that can be said about it. And hey, it's just as good as a >> billion other consciousness theories. >> > > Ah yes, Max Tegmark's "theory".These aren't theories, is the problem. > One needs a rigorous definition of what consciousness is, to start with, > and then a theory that explains all its observed features, and makes > testable predictions. Otherwise all one has is a jumble of words. > > > To be precise, we don't need a definition of what consciousness is. WE > need only to agree on some assertion on consciousness. It is the same with > line and points. The same with natural numbers. We don't need to define > them (in fact we can't). We need only to agree on axioms about them, and > methods or rules of logical inference/deduction. > > > And we learn what are natural numbers in the same way, ostensively by > one's mother holding up fingers and saying "one", "two",... And so we > generalize and make a theory about fingers and other countable things. And > we know that in all cases we run into we can add one more and so we > casually assume an axiom of infinity because it is convenient and seems to > cause no problems. But if it leads to paradoxes and absurdities... > > > All this does not define the natural numbers in the sense of a logical > categorical definition. Why we understand them is a mystery, but we can > meta-explained why that mystery is unsolvable. We don't need an infinity > axiom in the ontology (indeed the axioms of the TOE is RA: no infinity > axioms, not even induction axioms). But with comp at the meta-level, we do > use infinity axioms at the epistemological level---or at least the creature > generated by RA do that, and we interview them to retrieve the physical > laws. > > This is a point where I might be quick sometimes/ > > UDA start from comp, and at step 8, we should understand that the TOE is > RA (or equivalent), and comp is replaced by the restriction to the sigma_1 > sentences for the epistemology. > So going from UDA to AUDA, comp passes from the base level to the > metalevel. In AUDA we assume RA, and interview richer believer (like PA) as > generated by RA (or equivalently the universal dovetailer). After UDA, we > know that we dont need and cannot need anything more than > > 0 ≠ s(x) > s(x) = s(y) -> x = y > x+0 = x > x+s(y) = s(x+y) > x*0=0 > x*s(y)=(x*y)+x > > The comp philosophy is then translated entirely in term of definitions, > and theorems in that theory. > > Bruno > > > > > Brent > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
