On 13 Dec 2013, at 22:31, John Clark wrote:
On Fri, Dec 13, 2013 at 4:41 AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be>
>>> One told me: I see in my diary that I predicted (in Helsinki)
that I would be at both places, but I see now that this was wrong
>> I predicted? In such a situation that would only be a half
truth, it would be much more accurate to say the Helsinki man
predicted or Bruno Marchal predicted. A pronoun has raised its ugly
head yet again.
> Because you have already agreed that both copy are instantiation
of the Helsinki person.
So the Moscow man's assertion that he sees Moscow and only Moscow is
only half the information needed to invalidate the prediction that
the Helsinki Man would see both Moscow and Washington; not that I
can see what prediction has to do with personal identity
You confuse the 3-view on the 1-views, with each of the 1-views, which
is what you must to take into account for the question.
In the 1-view, each copy has a definite complete answer the question
or confirm (refute) the prediction made in Helsinki: (this or that
city, with an exclusive or as comp makes impossible that the subjects
feel to be in the two places).
>> that's the difference between "comp" and "computationalism", and
that is why you insist on using your homemade silly little word
rather than the standard term.
> For the billionth time: it is sum up by Church thesis + "yes
That is computationalism not "comp".
"comp" is an abbreviation of computationalism.
> comp is just shorter than computationalism.
There is simply no way that could be true because I've heard you say
a billion times "if comp is true then X" where X is something very odd
It is the 1-indeterminacy (in step 3), what is odd? you just said to
jason that it is trivial, so what ?
that in no way follows from computationalism; so the only thing I
know for sure about "comp" is it doesn't mean computationalism.
Then you are irrational, because if you believe that computationalism
does not entail the FPI, that should not change the meaning of comp,
but that would mean you have found some flaw in step 3, and that is
why we ask you to show it. But each time you try, you come up with a
confusion between 1p and 3p view, like above.
Changing meaning of words only add to your confusion.
> you are stuck in the 1p/3p confusion.
For several years now Bruno Marchal has accused John Clark of that,
but John Clark would maintain that there is not a single person on
the face of the earth who is confused by the difference between the
first person and the third person.
Then you know in Helsinki that you will survive and feel to be in only
one city with probability one, (that will be felt as true for both
copies' 1-views), and this introduces the 1-indeterminacy, as there
will be two exclusive outcomes that you cannot live simultaneously in
the 1p-view. You are using the fact that they can live them
simultaneously in the 3p view, but the question concerns the 1p view.
See the confusion?
As Jason and Liz just showed yesterday, you keep oscillating between
"too much easy, Og already knows" and "wrong" (but then you make a
systematic confusion between 1-views and 3-views).
Please, tell us what you think about step 4. This should help you for
the step 3. Does adding a delay of reconstitution in Moscow change the
possible quantitative indeterminacy calculus?
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