On 14 Dec 2013, at 19:50, John Clark wrote:
On Sat, Dec 14, 2013 at Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote:
> You confuse the 3-view on the 1-views,
For several years now Bruno Marchal has accused John Clark of that,
but John Clark would maintain that there is not a single person on
the face of the earth who is confused by the difference between the
first person and the third person.
See my preceding post for an explanation that this is exactly what you
do when maintaining the "W *an* M" prediction in the self-duplication
thought experiment.
> Then you know in Helsinki that you will survive and feel to be in
only one city with probability one
That depends, Is "You" the Helsinki Man or the Moscow Man or the
Washington Man or John K Clark?
They are the same man, we have already discussed this, and agree.
> (that will be felt as true for both copies' 1-views),
Then what are we arguing about?
> and this introduces the 1-indeterminacy,
Did you really have to go through all this metaphysical gobbledegook
to figure out that you never know for sure what you're going to see
next and even if you did you can't know what you're going to say
next until you say it?
As I said you confuse "indeterminacy" (the general vague concept) with
the many different sort of indeterminacy:
1) by ignorance on initial conditions (example: the coin), that is a
3p indeterminacy.
2) Turing form of indeterminacy (example: the halting problem), that
is again a 3p indeterminacy.
3) quantum indeterminacy in copenhague (3p indeterminacy, if that
exists)
4) quantum indeterminacy in Everett (1p indeterminacy, which needs the
quantum SWE assumption)
5) computationalist 1p-indeterminacy (similar to Everett, except that
it does not need to assume the SWE or Everett-QM). It is the one we
get in step 3, and it is part of the derivation of physics from comp.
You often repeat an argument without commenting previous answers to
that argument.
You have not yet convinced one people of the presence of a flaw in
UDA. You stop at step 3 by confusing 1p and 3p. And when you see the
difference, you say the result is trivial (like if that was in the
topic).
If it is trivial for Og, ask Og if he agrees with step 4 and sequitur.
Bruno
> as there will be two exclusive outcomes that you cannot live
simultaneously in the 1p-view. You are using the fact that they can
live them simultaneously in the 3p view, but the question concerns
the 1p view. See the confusion?
Let me ask you something, approximately how many "1p-views" do you
think exist on planet Earth right now? I would estimate about 7
billion.
> you make a systematic confusion between 1-views and 3-views
For several years now Bruno Marchal has accused John Clark of that,
but John Clark would maintain that there is not a single person on
the face of the earth who is confused by the difference between the
first person and the third person.
> As Jason and Liz just showed yesterday, you keep oscillating
between "too much easy, Og already knows" and "wrong"
That's because your statements keep oscillating between trivial (but
made to sound complicated) and wrong.
> you make a systematic confusion between 1-views and 3-views
For several years now Bruno Marchal has accused John Clark of that,
but John Clark would maintain that there is not a single person on
the face of the earth who is confused by the difference between the
first person and the third person.
> Does adding a delay of reconstitution in Moscow change the
possible quantitative indeterminacy calculus?
The delay adds nothing to the thought experiment, just more
pointless wheels within wheels.
> you come up with a confusion between 1p and 3p view,
For several years now Bruno Marchal has accused John Clark of that,
but John Clark would maintain that there is not a single person on
the face of the earth who is confused by the difference between the
first person and the third person.
John K Clark
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