On 17 Dec 2013, at 19:32, meekerdb wrote:

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On 12/17/2013 1:20 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:On 16 Dec 2013, at 22:14, meekerdb wrote:On 12/16/2013 12:40 PM, LizR wrote:On 17 December 2013 08:06, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote:JKC makes a big point of the complete separation of quantumworlds, although Everett didn't write about multiple worlds.Everett only considered one world and wrote about the "relativestate" of the observer and the observed system. In some waysthis is more fundamental because in principle the "differentworlds" of MWI can interfere with one another. That they usuallydon't is a statistical result.("Many worlds" is just a nice (and roughly accurate) description,like Big Bang (better than Small Hiss) or Black Hole (better thanVery Faintly Glowing Region of Infinite Gravity :)I think that's an unfair criticism of Copenhagen. Deterministictheories just push the problem back in time. Ultimately there iseither an uncaused event or an infinite past. So there is notgreat intellectual virtue in rejecting uncaused events. Quantummechanics is an interesting intermediate case. It hasrandomness, but randomness that is strictly limited and limitedin such a way that it produces the classical world at astatistical level.The problem is pushed back onto whatever is consideredfundamental. If there is an original event, it is only uncausedif it doesn't emerge naturally from (for example) the equationsthat are believed to describe the universe. One can say the sameabout an infinite past.Your own theory also introduces uncaused events, namely thecomputations of a universal dovetailer. The whole idea of"everythingism" was inspired by QM, but QM itself doesn't entailthat everything happens. If you measure a variable you only geteigenvalues of that variable - not every possible value. If youmeasure it again you get the same eigenvalue again - not any value.I was given to believe that the computations of the UD aren'tevents, and that they simply exist within arithmetic as alogically necessary consequence of its existence. Did I get thatwrong?I wouldn't say "wrong". It depends on whether you think "Thereexists a successor of 2." implies that 3 exists.3 *is* the successor of 2.Personally I think it is a confusion to say that a logical formulais satisfied by X is the same as saying X exists in theontological sense.Existence is always theoretical, and is treated by satisfaction ofa formula beginning by Ex.What I would expect a logician to say. But "Bruno Marchal" existsbecause we can point to him and say, "That's Bruno Marchal".

`You can't do that. You might happily points to my body, but that's not`

`me. You keep the Aristotelian view that reality is WYSIWYG, but with`

`computationalism, reality is not WYSIWIG.`

`You indexical "that's bruno" is locally well justified through the`

`arithmetical indexicals Bp, Bp & p, etc.)`

If *everything* is theoretical then "theoretical" loses it'smeaning. I realize that makes everythingists happy, but I'm dubious.

`With computationalism, we have no choice, I think (and have argued a`

`lot). I guess you are missing some point.`

On the contrary, self-duplication explains the appearance ofsuch indeterminacy, without adding any further assumptions.Well, the existence of self-duplication, even via Everett, is afurther assumption.Surely the existence of duplication (rather than self-duplication) arises from the equations? So one has self-duplication as a consequence, to the same extent that one has itwithin ones own personal past? Or have I misunderstood that too?(Or are you just talking about the sort of assumptions we have tomake all the time anyway?)Occam favors it. Your belief in "3)" substitutes a very simpleexplanation by a call to a form of built-in-non-explainable magic.No more magic than a UD. Why is the UD magic? (Is arithmetic magic?)It's hypothetically generating all possible worlds, but where isit? It's in Platonia.Platonia = Arithmetic. You need just to believe that 2+2=4 istrue. You need this Platonia to just define what is a computation.But I don't have to believe true=exists.

`If you believe that 2+2=4, then it is just usual first order logic to`

`accept Ex(x + x = 4)`

It's "the word made flesh." Sounds a lot more magicalOnce you believe in "flesh", but in comp, there is only appearanceof flesh, and we explain where that appearance comes from(completely).No, you don't. You explain that "it *must* come fromcomputation" (given your assumptions) but that is very differentfrom showing that it *does* come from computation.

`The proof is entirely constructive in the math part. Of course it`

`leads to a sequence of complex problems in mathematic (even`

`arithmetic). I have just translated a problem (in philosophy or`

`theology) into another (purely mathematical) problem, and extract the`

`shape of the solution. Computationalism makes this possible, thanks to`

`computer science.`

Bruno

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