On 17 Dec 2013, at 19:32, meekerdb wrote:
On 12/17/2013 1:20 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 16 Dec 2013, at 22:14, meekerdb wrote:
On 12/16/2013 12:40 PM, LizR wrote:
On 17 December 2013 08:06, meekerdb <[email protected]> wrote:
JKC makes a big point of the complete separation of quantum
worlds, although Everett didn't write about multiple worlds.
Everett only considered one world and wrote about the "relative
state" of the observer and the observed system. In some ways
this is more fundamental because in principle the "different
worlds" of MWI can interfere with one another. That they usually
don't is a statistical result.
("Many worlds" is just a nice (and roughly accurate) description,
like Big Bang (better than Small Hiss) or Black Hole (better than
Very Faintly Glowing Region of Infinite Gravity :)
I think that's an unfair criticism of Copenhagen. Deterministic
theories just push the problem back in time. Ultimately there is
either an uncaused event or an infinite past. So there is not
great intellectual virtue in rejecting uncaused events. Quantum
mechanics is an interesting intermediate case. It has
randomness, but randomness that is strictly limited and limited
in such a way that it produces the classical world at a
statistical level.
The problem is pushed back onto whatever is considered
fundamental. If there is an original event, it is only uncaused
if it doesn't emerge naturally from (for example) the equations
that are believed to describe the universe. One can say the same
about an infinite past.
Your own theory also introduces uncaused events, namely the
computations of a universal dovetailer. The whole idea of
"everythingism" was inspired by QM, but QM itself doesn't entail
that everything happens. If you measure a variable you only get
eigenvalues of that variable - not every possible value. If you
measure it again you get the same eigenvalue again - not any value.
I was given to believe that the computations of the UD aren't
events, and that they simply exist within arithmetic as a
logically necessary consequence of its existence. Did I get that
wrong?
I wouldn't say "wrong". It depends on whether you think "There
exists a successor of 2." implies that 3 exists.
3 *is* the successor of 2.
Personally I think it is a confusion to say that a logical formula
is satisfied by X is the same as saying X exists in the
ontological sense.
Existence is always theoretical, and is treated by satisfaction of
a formula beginning by Ex.
What I would expect a logician to say. But "Bruno Marchal" exists
because we can point to him and say, "That's Bruno Marchal".
You can't do that. You might happily points to my body, but that's not
me. You keep the Aristotelian view that reality is WYSIWYG, but with
computationalism, reality is not WYSIWIG.
You indexical "that's bruno" is locally well justified through the
arithmetical indexicals Bp, Bp & p, etc.)
If *everything* is theoretical then "theoretical" loses it's
meaning. I realize that makes everythingists happy, but I'm dubious.
With computationalism, we have no choice, I think (and have argued a
lot). I guess you are missing some point.
On the contrary, self-duplication explains the appearance of
such indeterminacy, without adding any further assumptions.
Well, the existence of self-duplication, even via Everett, is a
further assumption.
Surely the existence of duplication (rather than self-
duplication) arises from the equations? So one has self-
duplication as a consequence, to the same extent that one has it
within ones own personal past? Or have I misunderstood that too?
(Or are you just talking about the sort of assumptions we have to
make all the time anyway?)
Occam favors it. Your belief in "3)" substitutes a very simple
explanation by a call to a form of built-in-non-explainable magic.
No more magic than a UD.
Why is the UD magic? (Is arithmetic magic?)
It's hypothetically generating all possible worlds, but where is
it? It's in Platonia.
Platonia = Arithmetic. You need just to believe that 2+2=4 is
true. You need this Platonia to just define what is a computation.
But I don't have to believe true=exists.
If you believe that 2+2=4, then it is just usual first order logic to
accept Ex(x + x = 4)
It's "the word made flesh." Sounds a lot more magical
Once you believe in "flesh", but in comp, there is only appearance
of flesh, and we explain where that appearance comes from
(completely).
No, you don't. You explain that "it *must* come from
computation" (given your assumptions) but that is very different
from showing that it *does* come from computation.
The proof is entirely constructive in the math part. Of course it
leads to a sequence of complex problems in mathematic (even
arithmetic). I have just translated a problem (in philosophy or
theology) into another (purely mathematical) problem, and extract the
shape of the solution. Computationalism makes this possible, thanks to
computer science.
Bruno
Brent
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