On 08 Dec 2013, at 17:24, John Clark wrote:
On Sat, Dec 7, 2013 at 3:51 PM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]>
wrote:
> Comp is the belief (hope, assumption, theory) that you can survive
when saying yes to a doctor who proposed to you a digital computer
brain transplant.
If that were all "comp" meant I would have no problem with it,
Stop playing with word. That is and has always been what it means. You
have agreed on step 0, 1, 2, and fail to explain to any one what is
your problem with step 3.
but I know from bitter experience that "comp" also includes all
sorts of other things (many contradictory)
You have not shown one.
and it includes all the bogus conclusions from your pronoun rich
erroneous proof.
You are the one making systematically a confusion between the 1-view
and the 3-view.
Your bad faith becomes blattant. What are you afraid of?
So that is why I refuse to use your homemade term "comp" and don't
know what you mean when you use it.
I mean what everybody mean by computationalism in the cognitive
science (with Church-thesis, and the amount of math to make sense of
Church thesis, notably arithmetic).
> Of course to get this, you should put your shoes in the first
person picture, and stay in it for awhile,
And that's a good example of such a contradiction right there. If it
were possible to "put your shoes in the first person picture, and
stay in it for awhile" then only a fool would say "yes" to a doctor
in the above definition; but in a world with duplicating machines
that simply can't be done because you've got 2 identical pairs of
shoes and no way to know which pair to put your feet into.
We assume comp! So we can put our shoes in them. You have to double
the effort only, and do it FOR BOTH. The guy in W will say, "gosh, I
am the one in W, why?", and the guy in M will say "Oh! I am in M, why
am I the one in M".
In the iterated self-duplication, it is very easy to predict: it is
white noise. You have 2^n with a big n first person experience to
consult, but an easy reasoning shows that it is equivalent to a
Bernouilli experience, with a Gaussian distribution (for such perfect
protocol).
In all your thought experiments you make the hidden assumption that
the duplicating machines can make a exact copy of everything in the
universe
What? No I don't say that. Comp is only that there is a level of copy
of myself such that I survive.
EXCEPT for a pair of shoes, and so there is only one unique pair of
shoes that one can put ones feet into, the mighty original.
On the contrary, if some original was a winner, the statement of the
others could be forgotten, but we interrogate both of them.
What I did say, is that the first person does not feel has having
duplicated. Form the first person point you are in one city, and get a
doppelganger, which looks like you, but is no more "you" in the first
person immediate sense, and even that you don't know before getting
some 3p information. As it could be, the reconstitution of the other
might have been delayed.
But as for me I see nothing special about the original
Of course. His body has been annihilated.
and see no reason shoes can't be duplicated just like everything else.
Not a first person experience FROM the view of the first person
experience. It is equivalent in Everett of not feeling to be splitted
and multiplied all the time. It is in that sense that the first person
experience is not duplicated (in the 1-1-view if you make the pronouns
precise). Of course, in the 3-view about 1-view (by gentle
attribution), you can duplicated first person experience, and that is
what we do also. But the statistic are asked about your expectation on
the unique singluar person you will feel to be, as you know by comp,
that they will all feel one, so that the probability that you will
feel one is 1.
Do you agree with this? That the probability in Helsinki that (you
will feel to be in one city) is equal to one? (With comp and the
default hypotheses.
Bruno
John K Clark
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