On 20 Dec 2013, at 20:06, Stephen Paul King wrote:

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Dear Bruno,Could it be that the physical world that is associated with anobserver (using your definition of an observer) is the "truth" ofthat observer? I apologize for the weirdness of this question, butconsider that nothing is more "true" than the 1st person experiencethat an observer has.

Truth enter in the picture in two ways:

`1) by the inetnsional nuance when we add the "& p", like in the first`

`and second application of Theaetetus:`

Bp ===> Bp & p Bp & Dt ====> Bp & Dt & p and

`2) By the splitting between G and G* inherited by such variants, which`

`is a spliiting between true about the machine and what the machine can`

`prove.`

An observer could doubt that what it experiences is "real" and evenhave a sophisticated argument for how it could not possibly be real,but nonetheless the illusion of a physical world persist...

Yes, that is captured by the Theatetus "& p" nuance.

One property of Truth (at least the Platonic notion of truth) isthat it is eternal and immutable.

OK. I would say that it is not even temporal.

There is another property that can be teased out! There is nocontingency in that 2 + 2 = 4 and that 17 is prime.

OK.

Could it be that this 'non-contingency' is the result of the factthat at least a countable infinity of observers (numbers!) canverify to themselves that they are numbers (they cannot know whichnumber they are) and thus are members of the set of numbers.This leads me to guess that maybe a physical world is a finitetruth of sorts in the way that a arithmetic fact is an infinite truth.

`I don't see this. Normally the physical reality inherits the computer`

`science infinities.`

What would happen if we considered your UD idea on finite sets ofnumbers that are very large but still finite?

?

`The UD generates and execute programs, which are all finite, by`

`definition, on all data, which are 3p-finite, but 1p-infinite.`

Would we still have the permanence and non-contingency of truth forsuch sets?

? Bruno

I like to see you speculating out loud so that I can add my ownspeculation. It could all be nonsense... :-)On Fri, Dec 20, 2013 at 4:51 AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be>wrote:On 19 Dec 2013, at 22:46, Jason Resch wrote:> 8. There is no need to build the computer in step 7, since theexecutions of all programs exist within the relations between largenumbers.That would only be true if everything that could exist does exist,and maybe that's the way things are but it is not obviously true.It doesn't require that everything to exist, it requires only oneparticular program to exist: the universal dovetailer. Thisprogram and its execution exist within mathematics.Yes, even in arithmetic, and under different important forms. Itsmany descriptions exist, and the computation are "truly" emulated inthe truth referred by the theorems concerning those description.That is a point which met some difficulties for non-logician, as itis impossible to ever point a computation, without mentioning adescription of it. The computation itself is captured by the truthof certain arithmetical statements, not by the existence of adescription of those computations. The nuance is subtle, because weinfer the existence of the computation by looking at the existenceof some description of them, and to show that this is equivalent isby no means a trivial affair, linking the syntax of the theory andits intended meaning (and that is why we need AR). There is a needto really study how simple theories (like RA) can represent in somestrong sense the partial recursive function. It is well done inBoolos and Jeffrey, or in Epstein & Carnielli.The whole difficulty of step 8 is in this paragraph. Those whobelieve that a filmed boolean graph can be thinking commit aconfusion between use and mention (like I have just described).For example, it is a true statement that the state of this programafter the 10^100th step of its computation has some particularvalue X, and it is also a true statement that the 10^100 + 1 stephas some other particular value Y. It is also a true statement thatthe program corresponding to the emulation of the wave function forthe Milky Way Galaxy contains John Clark and this particular JohnClark believes he is conscious and alive and sitting in front of acomputer in a physical universe.OK.> Hence, arithmetical realism is a candidate TOE.A candidate certainly, but is it the real deal? Maybe but it's notobvious.Right, but it is a scientific question. It will not be easy but wecan refute or confirm the theory by seeing what the UD implies forthe physics that observers see. Everett's theory was a greatconfirmation, for without it, conventional QM with collapse (and asingle universe) would have ruled it out. As it stands, there areseveral physical concepts that provide support for the UD being avalid TOE:Quantum uncertainty Non clonability of matter Determinism in physical lawsActually, this one is the problem. There might still be a too bigFPI, like with the "white rabbits".Information as a fundamental "physical" quantityYes, and even obeying different "information laws" above and belowthe substitution level. And this is confirmed by the differencebetween quantum information and classical (Shannon) informationtheory.(I think there is something I am forgetting, but Bruno can fill inthe gaps)May be after more coffee :)What we need to do, or at least what mathematicians should do is tocompare the empiric quantum logics with the quantum logics provided(by Goldblatt's result) on the (three) arithmetical quantum logicprovided by the arithmetical quantizations (S4Grz1, Z1*, X1*). Itfits up to now, but the program I wrote to test this should beoptimized.We can come back on this. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --You received this message because you are subscribed to a topic inthe Google Groups "Everything List" group.To unsubscribe from this topic, visit https://groups.google.com/d/topic/everything-list/1NWmK1IeadI/unsubscribe.To unsubscribe from this group and all its topics, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. 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