Liz, et al,

The so called 'unreasonable effectiveness of mathematics' is obvious in a 
universe where reality math actually computes reality. That couldn't be any 
simpler or clearer.

Edgar

On Monday, January 13, 2014 6:06:15 PM UTC-5, Liz R wrote:
>
> On 14 January 2014 11:29, meekerdb <[email protected] <javascript:>>wrote:
>
>>  On 1/13/2014 1:29 PM, LizR wrote:
>>  
>>  On 14 January 2014 10:17, meekerdb <[email protected] <javascript:>>wrote:
>>
>>>  On 1/13/2014 10:54 AM, L.W. Sterritt wrote:
>>>  
>>> Isn’t this just the reification fallacy?  From Wikipedia: 
>>>  Reification (also known as concretism, or the fallacy of misplaced 
>>> concreteness) is a fallacy of ambiguity, when 
>>> an abstraction (abstract belief or hypothetical construct) is treated as if 
>>> it were a concrete, real event, or physical entity. In other words, it is 
>>> the error of treating as a concrete thing something which is not concrete, 
>>> but merely an idea.
>>>
>>>
>>>  Like reifying arithmetic.
>>>  
>>  
>>  I do indeed!
>>
>> :-)
>>  
>> Fallaciously?  ;-)
>>
>
> Quite possibly, of course! But in my humble opinion, Max Tegmark and Bruno 
> and Eugene Wigner (and Galileo, Gauss, Einstein etc) do have a point, that 
> maths does seem to "kick back" and to be "unreasonably effective", and I 
> think that it's worth thinking about why that is, even if it leads us into 
> what may be wild flights of fancy  ... just in case they turn out not to be.
>
>>
>> In your model of the world, with chairs and tables and planets and 
>> people, where is the number 2?
>>
>> It's part of an explanation of where the chairs and tables etc come from.
>
> (Perhaps!)
>
>

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