On Thu, Jan 16, 2014 at 3:55 PM, Stephen Paul King < stephe...@provensecure.com> wrote:
> Dear Jason, > > Block time does not offer any explanation for the notion of a flow of > time, even if such is an illusion. > Please explain how you know this. > Something has to account for the asymmetry of the arrow of thermodynamics. > Normally the answer to this is "statistics". > My proposed solution is to assume that Becoming is a ontological property, > not an illusion at all, pace Parminedies. > What is your motivation for this added assumption? > We then can define time in terms of orderings and measure of that > fundamental Becoming in a relatively local way. > Problem solved! > I still don't see what the problem is! Jason > > > On Thu, Jan 16, 2014 at 4:52 PM, Jason Resch <jasonre...@gmail.com> wrote: > >> >> >> >> On Thu, Jan 16, 2014 at 2:33 PM, Stephen Paul King < >> stephe...@provensecure.com> wrote: >> >>> Dear Jason, >>> >>> >>> On Thu, Jan 16, 2014 at 3:07 PM, Jason Resch <jasonre...@gmail.com>wrote: >>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> On Thu, Jan 16, 2014 at 12:07 PM, Stephen Paul King < >>>> stephe...@provensecure.com> wrote: >>>> >>>>> Dear Jason, >>>>> >>>>> I do not think that block time is a coherent idea. It assumes >>>>> something impossible: that a unique foliation of space-time can be defined >>>>> that correlates to a specific experience of an entity that is said to be >>>>> embedded in the block. >>>>> >>>> >>>> It makes no claims that such a foliation must be unique, all possible >>>> foliations are equally valid, and correspond to the observed orderings of >>>> events from different reference frames. >>>> >>> >>> Each foliation would correspond to a set of trajectories and a light >>> cone structure, no? Time, defined as a ordering of events vanishes in such. >>> I get that. >>> >> >> So then what is the problem with block time? >> >> >>> >>> >>> >>>> >>>> >>>>> My argument is that the entire way that time is considered has >>>>> problems and both presentism and eternalism are not even wrong. Their >>>>> definitions of "existence" and "time" are wrong. Existence is not >>>>> observable, only properties are observable. >>>>> >>>> >>>> How can something have properties unless it exists? >>>> >>> >>> Existence is a priori -eternal-, properties are a posteriori - after the >>> fact of measurement. >>> >> >> So if existence is eternal, doesn't this lead to block time? >> >> >>> >>>> >>>>> Time is not just an ordering of events that can be discovered after >>>>> the fact of the events, it is also a measure of the duration of process >>>>> that transforms one event into another. >>>>> >>>> >>>> In block time it is just a dimension. >>>> >>> >>> Not if there isn't a unique ordering of events in the Block! >>> >> >> >> That doesn't follow. You are ignoring that there are 4 dimensions >> involved so there are different ways of layering slices of the three >> dimensional space. Consider that the seeds in a 3-dimensional apple have >> defined positions in the 3 dimensions, but asking "what is the order in >> which the seeds will be encountered" has no unique answer unless you >> describe the angle at which you make each slice on your way through the >> apple. >> >> >>> >>>> >>>>> Clocks do not measure time, they measure relative durations. Time is >>>>> not a direct observable quantity. >>>>> >>>> >>>> Just like space.. >>>> >>> >>> right. >>> >>>> >>>> >>>>> If it was then it would be the canonical conjugate of energy. >>>>> >>>> >>>> How is time different from space in your view? >>>> >>> >>> Space has no possible canonical conjugate. >>> >> >> Where you think time is somehow different? How is that? >> >> Jason >> >> >>> >>>> Jason >>>> >>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On Thu, Jan 16, 2014 at 12:14 PM, Jason Resch <jasonre...@gmail.com>wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> On Thu, Jan 16, 2014 at 10:13 AM, Stephen Paul King < >>>>>> stephe...@provensecure.com> wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>>> Dear Edgar, >>>>>>> >>>>>>> I already wrote up one argument against the concept of a universal >>>>>>> present moment using the general covariance requirement of GR. Did you >>>>>>> read >>>>>>> it? It is impossible to define a clock on an infinitesimal region of >>>>>>> space-time thus it is impossible to define a "present moment" in a way >>>>>>> that >>>>>>> could be "universal" for observers that exist in a space-time. There are >>>>>>> alternatives that I have mentioned. >>>>>>> The non-communicability of first person information, that leads >>>>>>> to the concept of FPI, is another argument that may be independent. (I >>>>>>> am >>>>>>> not so sure that it is truly independent, but cannot prove that the >>>>>>> intractability of smooth diffeomorphism computations between >>>>>>> 4-manifolds is >>>>>>> equivalent to first person indeterminacy.) >>>>>>> If the information cannot be communicated then it also follows >>>>>>> that there cannot exist a single computation of the present moment >>>>>>> information. Your premise falls apart. There is an alternative but it >>>>>>> requires multiple computations (an infinite number!). Can you handle >>>>>>> that >>>>>>> change to your thesis? >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Frankly, your arguments are very naive and you do not seem to >>>>>>> grasp that we are only responding to you because we try to be nice and >>>>>>> receptive in this list to the ideas of members. There does reach a point >>>>>>> where the discussion becomes unproductive. It has been useful for me to >>>>>>> write responses to you as it improves my ability to write out my >>>>>>> reasoning. >>>>>>> I need the exercise. :-) >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> Stephen, >>>>>> >>>>>> I recall that before you defended presentism. Are you now of the >>>>>> opinion that block time is possible? >>>>>> >>>>>> Jason >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> On Thu, Jan 16, 2014 at 10:59 AM, Edgar L. Owen >>>>>>> <edgaro...@att.net>wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Stephen, >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> What is this magical FPI that tells us in this present moment that >>>>>>>> there is no such present moment? What's the actual supposed proof? >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Edgar >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> On Thursday, January 16, 2014 10:17:31 AM UTC-5, Stephen Paul King >>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Dear Edgar, >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> The "universality" of the first person experience of a flow of >>>>>>>>> events (what you denote as time) is addressed by Bruno's First Person >>>>>>>>> Indeterminism (FPI) concept. This universality cannot be said to >>>>>>>>> allow for >>>>>>>>> a singular present moment for all observers such that they can have >>>>>>>>> it in >>>>>>>>> common. It fact it argues the opposite: observers cannot share their >>>>>>>>> present moments! THus your claims fall apart >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> On Thu, Jan 16, 2014 at 10:09 AM, Edgar L. Owen >>>>>>>>> <edga...@att.net>wrote: >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Brent, >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Whoa, back up a little. This is the argument that proves every >>>>>>>>> INDIVIDUAL observer has his OWN present moment time. You are trying to >>>>>>>>> extend it to a cosmic universal time which this argument doesn't >>>>>>>>> address. >>>>>>>>> That's the second argument you referenced. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> This argument demonstrates that for every INDIVIDUAL observer SR >>>>>>>>> requires that since he continually moves at c through spactime, that >>>>>>>>> he >>>>>>>>> MUST be at one and only one point in time (and of course in space as >>>>>>>>> well), >>>>>>>>> and thus there is a privileged present moment in which every observer >>>>>>>>> exists, and since he is continually moving through time at c he will >>>>>>>>> experience an arrow of time in the direction of his movement. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Once that is agreed we can go on to the 2nd argument to prove that >>>>>>>>> these are universal across all observers.... >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> So can we agree on that? >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Edgar >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> On Wednesday, January 15, 2014 9:19:24 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote: >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> On 1/15/2014 4:38 PM, Edgar L. Owen wrote: >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Brent, >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Both DO follow if you understand the argument. Why do you think >>>>>>>>> they don't follow? >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Well the first one is true, if you take time to mean a global >>>>>>>>> coordinate time. But then it's just saying every event can be >>>>>>>>> labelled >>>>>>>>> with a time coordinate. All that takes is that the label be >>>>>>>>> monotonic and >>>>>>>>> continuous along each world line. It' saying that 'everything can >>>>>>>>> get a >>>>>>>>> time label'. But it doesn't say anything about how the label on one >>>>>>>>> worldline relates to labels on a different world line. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> The SR requirement that the speed of light be the same in all >>>>>>>>> inertial frames then implies that the labeling along one line >>>>>>>>> *cannot* be >>>>>>>>> uniquely extended to other lines, but must vary according to their >>>>>>>>> relative >>>>>>>>> velocity. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Brent >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Edgar >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> On Wednesday, January 15, 2014 7:27:07 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote: >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> On 1/15/2014 4:02 PM, Edgar L. Owen wrote: >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Brent, >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Bravo! Someone actually registered some of my arguments, though >>>>>>>>> I would state them slightly differently. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> The argument in question, that everyone except Brent seems to >>>>>>>>> have missed, is simple. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> SR requires that everything moves at the speed of light through >>>>>>>>> spacetime. This is NOT just "a useful myth", it's a very important >>>>>>>>> fundamental principle of reality (I call it the STc Principle). >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> It's a commonplace in relativity texts. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> This is true of all motions in all frames. It's a universal >>>>>>>>> absolute principle. >>>>>>>>> Now the fact that everything continually moves at the speed of >>>>>>>>> light through spacetime absolutely requires that everything actually >>>>>>>>> moves >>>>>>>>> and continually moves through just TIME at the speed of light i >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> ... >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> -- >>>>>>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to a topic in >>>>>>>> the Google Groups "Everything List" group. >>>>>>>> To unsubscribe from this topic, visit >>>>>>>> https://groups.google.com/d/topic/everything-list/TBc_y2MZV5c/unsubscribe >>>>>>>> . >>>>>>>> To unsubscribe from this group and all its topics, send an email to >>>>>>>> everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> To post to this group, send email to >>>>>>>> everything-list@googlegroups.com. >>>>>>>> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >>>>>>>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> -- >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Kindest Regards, >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Stephen Paul King >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Senior Researcher >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Mobile: (864) 567-3099 >>>>>>> >>>>>>> stephe...@provensecure.com >>>>>>> >>>>>>> http://www.provensecure.us/ >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> “This message (including any attachments) is intended only for the >>>>>>> use of the individual or entity to which it is addressed, and may >>>>>>> contain >>>>>>> information that is non-public, proprietary, privileged, confidential >>>>>>> and >>>>>>> exempt from disclosure under applicable law or may be constituted as >>>>>>> attorney work product. 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