On Friday, 17 January 2014, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote: > > On 16 Jan 2014, at 19:00, meekerdb wrote: > > On 1/16/2014 12:11 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: >> >>> On 16 January 2014 16:26, Jason Resch <[email protected]> wrote: >>> >>>> The computational metaphor in the sense of the brain works like the >>>> Intel >>>> CPU inside the box on your desk is clearly misleading, but the sense >>>> that a >>>> computer can in theory do everything your brain can do is almost >>>> certainly >>>> correct. It is not that the brain is like a computer, but rather, that a >>>> computer can be like almost anything, including your brain or body, or >>>> entire planet and all the people on it. >>>> >>>> Jason >>>> >>> I think neuroscientists have, over decades, used the computational >>> metaphor in too literal a way. It is obviously not true that the brain >>> is a digital computer, just as it is not true that the weather is a >>> digital computer. But a digital computer can simulate the behaviour of >>> any physical process in the universe (if physics is computable), >>> >> >> But Bruno concludes that physics is not computable. So does that imply >> one should say "no" to the doctor? >> > > Comp explains that physics is not *entirely* computable, that is we cannot > predict all sequences of observations. But that is already the case thanks > to QM (with our without Everett). So no worry!
Are you referring to quantum indeterminacy? But isn't even that computable from a third person perspective, the UDA generating every branch of the multiverse? > But without Everett, I would perhaps not even have dared to suggest that > comp might be true. > > And yes, the computable aspect of nature, even, with collapse, might > eventually be a symptom that comp is false. but up to now, the most > startling aspect of the observable reality confirms the most startling > asoect of the consequence of computationalism. > > Bruno > > >> Brent >> >> including the behaviour of weather or the human brain. That means >>> that, at least, it would be possible to make a philosophical zombie >>> using a computer. The only way to avoid this conclusion would be if >>> physics, and specifically the physics in the brain, is not computable. >>> Pointing out where the non-computable physics is in the brain rarely >>> figures on the agenda of the anti-computationalists. And even if there >>> is non-computational physics in the brain, that invalidates >>> computationalism, but not its superset, functionalism. >>> >>> >>> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to [email protected]. >> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. >> > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. > -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
