On Friday, January 17, 2014 1:03:15 PM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > On 17 Jan 2014, at 03:11, LizR wrote: > > On 17 January 2014 14:17, Stathis Papaioannou <[email protected]<javascript:> > > wrote: > >> Historically, AI researchers did not consider the question of whether >> a computer that behaves intelligently was conscious, on the assumption >> that intelligence was observable while consciousness was not and >> therefore not a fit subject for scientists. > > > Hence the Turing test. > > > Ah! Gosh, if you do all the work, I might as well take some holiday, > except that what I like the most in Holiday is to chat with you! I am stuck > in a paradox! > > > > > > >> This makes it a bit >> confusing when terms such as strong AI/ weak AI are appropriated by >> philosophers such as Searle. >> > > Yes, I was finding it a bit confusing, especially since the first thing I > got on to was Searle's "Strong AI hypothesis" ! > > > Searle fight strongly against Strong AI, and comp. But he mixes the level > of descriptions. >
Level of description is smuggled in from non-comp. Comp can't have any level of description as far as I can tell. My example of the keyboard password is better anyhow. Try as I might, memorizing the finger movements of a password will not tell me what the meaning of the password is, From all external accounts my ability to log in would make me a zombie. Only I would know that I have no idea what the password is, even though I use it every day. Craig > It is a case closed, imo, by Hofstadter and Dennett in "Mind's I" (the > book the closer to comp's consequence, but which still misses the FPI and > its importance. Dennett get close though). Searle confuse levels, in the > chinese room. > > Bruno > > > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected] <javascript:>. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]<javascript:> > . > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
