On Friday, January 17, 2014 1:03:15 PM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 17 Jan 2014, at 03:11, LizR wrote:
>
> On 17 January 2014 14:17, Stathis Papaioannou <stat...@gmail.com<javascript:>
> > wrote:
>
>> Historically, AI researchers did not consider the question of whether
>> a computer that behaves intelligently was conscious, on the assumption
>> that intelligence was observable while consciousness was not and
>> therefore not a fit subject for scientists.
>
>
> Hence the Turing test.
>
>
> Ah! Gosh, if you do all the work, I might as well take some holiday, 
> except that what I like the most in Holiday is to chat with you! I am stuck 
> in a paradox!
>
>
>
>
>  
>
>> This makes it a bit
>> confusing when terms such as strong AI/ weak AI are appropriated by
>> philosophers such as Searle.
>>
>
> Yes, I was finding it a bit confusing, especially since the first thing I 
> got on to was Searle's "Strong AI hypothesis" ! 
>
>
> Searle fight strongly against Strong AI, and comp. But he mixes the level 
> of descriptions.
>

Level of description is smuggled in from non-comp. Comp can't have any 
level of description as far as I can tell. My example of the keyboard 
password is better anyhow. Try as I might, memorizing the finger movements 
of a password will not tell me what the meaning of the password is, From 
all external accounts my ability to log in would make me a zombie. Only I 
would know that I have no idea what the password is, even though I use it 
every day.

Craig
 

> It is a case closed, imo, by Hofstadter and Dennett in "Mind's I" (the 
> book the closer to comp's consequence, but which still misses the FPI and 
> its importance. Dennett get close though). Searle confuse levels, in the 
> chinese room.
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
>
>
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> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
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