Dear Bruno, There is a movie Surrogates<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Surrogates_(film)>, that involves the ability to rest a body in far away locations or for specific events/jobs/dates, just as we would rest a car. You might enjoy it. I did. :-)
On Fri, Jan 17, 2014 at 12:36 PM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote: > > On 17 Jan 2014, at 01:51, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > > On 13 January 2014 02:23, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote: >> >>> >>> On 12 Jan 2014, at 06:21, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: >>> >> >> >> I'm a lump of dumb matter arranged in a special way and I am >>>> conscious, >>>> >>> >>> >>> I think this is misleading. Are you really a dumb of matter? I think that >>> your body can be a lump of dumb matter, but that *you* are a person, >>> using >>> that dumb of matter as a vehicle and mean to manifest yourself. In >>> principle >>> (assuming comp of course), you can change your body every morning (and as >>> you have often explain your self, we do change our "lump of dumb matter" >>> every n number of years. >>> >> >> Perhaps it is misleading to say that "I am" the dumb matter if my >> consciousness is not necessarily attached to any particular matter. >> > > Yes. You own it, really. > > If computationalism, or even your functionalism, is correct, it makes > sense to believe that some day, you can own more than one body (in the > unique first person reality, or in the same Everett branch), like having > eight special bodies well adapted to the "physical" exploration of the > planets of the solar system, and one more for the ring of Saturn, where > legs are so embarrassing. > > Bruno > > > > > >> so I don't see why another lump of dumb matter arranged in >>>> a special way might not also be conscious. >>>> >>> >>> >>> But here I agree with your point, although it is less misleading to >>> consider >>> the person as some immaterial entity (like a game, a program, memories, >>> personality traits, ... no need of magical soul with wings) owning your >>> body. >>> If the human would born directly fixed inside a car, they would also >>> believe >>> that their car is part of their body. Nature provides us with a body at >>> birth, and that might be the reason why we tend to identify ourselves >>> with >>> our bodies, but comp, which I think you accept, shows the limit of this >>> identification, imo. >>> Eventually, the UDA shows that at a very fundamental level, bodies are >>> only >>> statistical machine's percepts, or statistical relative numbers percepts. >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> What is it about that idea >>>> that you see as not only wrong, but ridiculous? >>>> >>> >>> >>> It is not what I am saying here, to be sure. >>> >>> Bruno >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> -- >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >>> "Everything List" group. >>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >>> email to [email protected]. >>> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >>> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. >>> >> >> >> >> -- >> Stathis Papaioannou >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to [email protected]. >> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. >> > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to a topic in the > Google Groups "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this topic, visit https://groups.google.com/d/ > topic/everything-list/TBc_y2MZV5c/unsubscribe. > To unsubscribe from this group and all its topics, send an email to > [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. > -- Kindest Regards, Stephen Paul King Senior Researcher Mobile: (864) 567-3099 [email protected] http://www.provensecure.us/ “This message (including any attachments) is intended only for the use of the individual or entity to which it is addressed, and may contain information that is non-public, proprietary, privileged, confidential and exempt from disclosure under applicable law or may be constituted as attorney work product. 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