Russell, I agree that your model here is "theoretical" and does NOT apply to the actual reality of decision making organisms such as humans. My comments DO apply to the real world.
Rational agent theory properly applies to only extremely limited and non-representative cases in the real world. Specifically it applies to simple well definable games, checkers would be an example, with well defined 'best outcomes', and well defined rules that all rational agents are able to understand in the same way with no ambiguity. But the vast preponderance of decision making situations in the real world are not thus well defined and rational agent theory does not apply for the reasons I explained in my previous post. Even in a well defined game situation it is quite possible to act rationally and NOT make the optimal move. E.g. in chess or Go it is impossible to know what a true optimal move is because optimal moves are not computable except in the far end game. Nevertheless an agent can act rationally by choosing the best move he can compute having a limited understanding of the game. We can understand this better by noting that an IRrational agent is NOT one that is unable to compute an optimal move from the knowledge he has (if he is a novice at Go he will simply be unable to compute the best move from complete knowledge of the board and the rules even IF he is rational). An IRrational agent CAN compute an optimal move but rather chooses a SUBoptimal move after computing an optimal move because he has some e.g. other agenda than winning... Or an IRrational agency computes with faulty logic. So there are two types of IRrational agent. All the other decision making is rational..... Edgar On Sunday, January 19, 2014 4:14:41 PM UTC-5, Russell Standish wrote: > > On Sun, Jan 19, 2014 at 08:38:59AM -0800, Edgar L. Owen wrote: > > Russell, > > > > No, rational agents are NOT "entirely predictable". And the definition > of a > > 'rational agent' is not someone who always makes the "best choice". > > See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rational_agent > > > > > > > First of all there is no such thing as "a best choice", because best > choice > > is a judgement that depends on the value scale of some observer, and it > > Of course. This "value scale" is called the "utility", and is known by > both the agent and the predictor. If the agent can calculate the > action with optimal utility, then so can the predictor. Of course if > the agent's utility was cryptic, then it wouldn't be particularly > predictable, but that situation is unusual, to say the least. > > > also depends on what time frame the effects of the choice are considered > > in. A good choice in the sense of immediate favorable consequences can > have > > The utility is given. It may include a discounted factor for future > effects, but once given, the agent is bound to choose the optimum > action according to that utility. > > > disastrous unforeseen consequences down the line. There is no such thing > as > > a "best choice" because causality is an enormously complex > interconnected > > network rather than just A causes B. There are always a huge network of > > causes leading up to every decision, and huge ongoing network of > effects. > > > > And rational agents are not entirely predictable for several reasons. > One, > > it is impossible for any agent to know everything about everything, and > all > > knowledge is observer conditioned anyway (it's different for every > > observer). > > Rational agents are entirely driven by the environment, which is known > by all players. > > > > > Second, there are random processes occurring internally to every agent > > unknowable and unpredictable to any outside observer that are involved > in > > reaching decisions. > > Rational agents do not have internal random processes. > > Third it is impossible for any outside observer to > > entirely know the internal valuation process by which an agent > internally > > calculates its actions. > > > > The internal algorithm doesn't need to be known. The problem is > entirely determined by the agent's utility, and its environmental > input, which is known. The predictor can use any correct algorithm to > compute the rational course of action. > > > Third, agents make decisions not on the basis of a common agreed upon > > external reality, but on the basis of their private internal mental > models > > of that reality, and these are always private to the particular agent, > and > > differ widely among agents. > > > > If by private mental model, you mean information based on past > environmental states, this information is also known to other agents > in that environment. If you mean some other sort of private mental > model, such as religious beliefs, then you no longer have a rational > agent. > > > So rational agents are not necessarily predictable, and of course > neither > > are irrational agents either. > > > > Your statements are based on an extremely simplistic view of reality is > > which everything is deterministic, and everything is known, and there is > > some absolute notion of best choice. Not one of these 3 assumptions is > > actually true... > > > > I never claimed that rational agents actually exist in the real > world. They are at considerable disadvantage compared to irrational > agents in the messy, real-time, and stochastic world we live in. They > are, however, and important theoretical concept in economics and agent > based modelling. Perhaps overly important. > > > Edgar > > > > > > > > On Sunday, January 19, 2014 12:39:27 AM UTC-5, Russell Standish wrote: > > > > > > On Fri, Jan 17, 2014 at 10:40:51PM -0600, Jason Resch wrote: > > > > On Fri, Jan 17, 2014 at 6:33 PM, Russell Standish < > li...@hpcoders.com.au<javascript:>>wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > > On Fri, Jan 17, 2014 at 04:08:08PM -0800, Edgar L. Owen wrote: > > > > > > Russell, > > > > > > > > > > > > PS: On second thought maybe we don't agree completely. Though > free > > > will > > > > > is > > > > > > quantum random based (we agree on that), it doesn't mean that it > is > > > > > > "irrational". > > > > > > > > > > > > If human actions and the actions of other biological organisms > > > weren't > > > > > > basically rational they couldn't function or survive in the real > > > actual > > > > > > world they live in.... > > > > > > > > > > That is not true. Read up on the concept of Machiavellian > > > > > Intelligence. A modicum of irrationality is just what it takes to > get > > > > > ahead in the world, it makes one less predictable to one's > > > competitors. > > > > > > > > > > > > > But to be "effectively unpredictible", one doesn't need a truly > random > > > > source, rather only a small number of bits that remain undisclosed > to > > > > outsiders. > > > > > > > > > > That is true, but the irrational/rational distinction doesn't lie in > > > the same place as deterministic/indeterministic. > > > > > > Rational agents are entirely deterministic and predictable, but it is > > > certainly possible to get deterministic irrational agents, and even as > > > you argue, deterministic unpredictable agents. > > > > > > -- > > > > > > > ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- > > > > > > > Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) > > > Principal, High Performance Coders > > > Visiting Professor of Mathematics > > > hpc...@hpcoders.com.au<javascript:> > > > > University of New South Wales http://www.hpcoders.com.au > > > > ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- > > > > > > > > > > > -- > > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google > Groups "Everything List" group. > > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send > an email to everything-li...@googlegroups.com <javascript:>. > > To post to this group, send email to > > everyth...@googlegroups.com<javascript:>. > > > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. > > -- > > ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- > > Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) > Principal, High Performance Coders > Visiting Professor of Mathematics hpc...@hpcoders.com.au<javascript:> > University of New South Wales http://www.hpcoders.com.au > ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- > > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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