On Tuesday, February 4, 2014 12:57:45 PM UTC-5, David Nyman wrote: > > On 4 February 2014 17:32, meekerdb <[email protected] <javascript:>>wrote: > > I don't think there's anything wrong with criticizing a theory on >> something other than "it's own terms". I think Craig might accept Bruno's >> argument as valid but regard it as a reductio against saying "yes" to the >> doctor. I have criticized it for it's seeming lack of predictive power - a >> problem with all theories of everythingism so far, and also string theory. > > > But surely a reductio entails accepting an argument in principle and then > showing that it leads to a contradiction in its own terms? The MGA, or > Maudlin's argument, are of such a form (whether or not you agree they > succeed). Craig has already said that he accepts the form of Bruno's > argument, but not its premise: i.e. what is entailed by the acceptance of a > digital brain substitution. This is certainly saying no to the doctor, but > it's more like the opposite of a reductio. It's just a bald assertion that > any possible success of the argument isn't worth the cost of accepting the > premise. >
Yes! Because the cost is infinite. Since there is no substitute for experience, there can never be anything more impossible than the idea of simulating experience itself. > That could indeed turn out to be the case, but it isn't in itself an > argument. > The truth of physics and sense is not an argument, argument is a comparison within sense. Why does the universe have to fit into an argument of cognitive human logic? Let the universe be what it is - perception. Participation. Aesthetic acquaintance on many nested (and sometimes ambiguously so) levels. Craig > > Your own criticism, by contrast, can only succeed by accepting the > argument in its own terms and then showing that in this form it fails to > satisfy certain desirable criteria, such as predictive power. That's not a > reductio either, although of course it's a perfectly valid objection to > raise. > > David > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
